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JUDICIAL OVERKILL IN APPLYING
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
William A. Reppy, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rule in Shelley's Case holds that when 0 conveys "to A for
life then to A's heirs," A gets a fee simple absolute and his would-be
heirs not even a future interest. O's intent that A get only a life estate
is frustrated. The respected Simes and Smith treatise states that courts
sometimes look for "a pretext to cut down the scope of the Rule in
Shelley's Case."' The thesis of this Article is that-far more fre-
quently-just the opposite is occurring. Perhaps to make a display of
their willingness to carry out the judicial duty of enforcing a much-
maligned and intent-defeating rule, courts are erroneously holding
Shelley's Rule applicable to limitations in remainder that, upon cor-
rect analysis, are outside the Rule's scope.
II. THE RuLE IN SHELLEY's CASE: ITS HISTORY, ITS NOW-IRRELEVANT
PoLicY BASES, AND ITS PRAGcAL APPLICATION
A. The Rule Dates from the 14th Century and Probably Was Rooted in
. Judicial Respect for the Incidents of Feudal Tenures
The Rule in Shelley's Case refers, linguistically, to the 1581 deci-
sion in Wolfe v. Shelley,2 but the concept that what looks like a remain-
* Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B., J.D., Stanford
University. For their useful comments on a draft of this Article, the author thanks
John V. Orth, William Rand KenanJr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina,
and Robert R. Wright I, Donoghey Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock. Chief student research assistant for this Article was Anthony
Prisco. Research assistance was also provided by Nelson Reid, Aaron Rugh, and Ward
Connolly.
1 LEwis M. SMsEs & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuR- ITEREsrs § 1549, at
453 (2d ed. 1956). For such a case, see Jones v. Stone, 279 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App.
1981), described in infra text accompanying note 205.
2 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1581). The facts of the case are also described in vari-
ous other sources. See, e.g., Benton v. Baucom, 135 S.E. 629, 631 (N.C. 1926); Norman
Block, The Rule in Shelley's Case in North Carolina, 20 N.C. L. REv. 49, 50-51 (1941);
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der conveyed to the life tenant's heirs as purchasers3 is actually
language of limitation creating a fee in the apparent life tenant has
been traced to an English decision, Abel's Case, decided in 1324.
4
Under feudal concepts of this time, if overlord 0 had enfeoffed un-
derlord A "and his heirs" in a livery of seisin ceremony so that A ac-
quired an estate in tenure, holding of 0, the "and his heirs"5 signified
that 0 also consented to have A's heir, upon A's death, succeed as
underlord, holding under 0 (or O's heir if 0 had died) in a position
of fealty. One of the most costly6 incidents of feudal tenure that an
underlord owed his immediate overlord was the relief, payable at the
former's death, as the cost of the overlord's acceptance of the un-
derlord's heir as the decedent's successor in the tenurial chain. For
some reason, the old courts were unwilling to expand the law to make
Annotation, Note on the Rule in Shelley's Case, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 963, 968-69 (1911)
[hereinafter Note].
For an interesting peek at the historical, political, social, and religious underpin-
nings of the case see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13-44
(1995).
3 "Purchasers" means persons who take an estate other than by intestate succes-
sion; the concept does not involve payment of money or other consideration. See 1
HERBERT THORNDIKE TnFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 24 (BasilJones ed., 3d ed.
1939). Donees and devisees are purchasers; they take "by purchase," and the lan-
guage of an instrument describing them constitutes "words of purchase." Heirs tak-
ing by intestate succession are not purchasers. See id. § 28.
4 Y.B. 18 Edw. 11 577 (1324), cited and discussed in RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 312 cmt. a (1940); see also Note, supra note 2, at 977 (discussing Abel's Case but dating
it as 1325). SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 1, § 1542, trace the Rule back to 1366 and state
that it "probably" had earlier roots.
5 Under the principle of primogeniture, it was expected that A's heir would be
his eldest surviving son. Hence the "s" in "heirs" indicated that the overlord was ac-
cepting not only A's heir, A, Jr., to assume a position of fealty under him, but also A
III, as heir of A, Jr., A JV-for an unlimited number of future successions. See SImEs &
SMITH, supra note 1, § 1543.
6 See Society Nat'l Bank v.Jacobson, 560 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1990); SIMES &
SMITH, supra note 1, § 1543 (describing relief as well as some other feudal incidents);
John V. Orth, Requiem for the Rule in Shelley's Case, 67 N.C. L. REv. 681, 682 (1989);
James A. Webster, Jr., A Relic North Carolina Can Do Without-The Rule in Shelley's Case,
45 N.C. L. REV. 3, 18 (1966); Note, supra note 2, at 980.
There were incidents of feudal tenure in addition to the relief that was imposed
on underlords who took by intestate succession, and some authorities state that the
reason for Shelley's Rule was to eliminate a device to avoid, not the relief in particu-
lar, but all such incidents. See Wool v. Fleetwood, 48 S.E. 785, 789 (N.C. 1904); King v.
Beck, 15 Ohio 559, 563 (1846); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. a (1940); 1
AMEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.40, at 478-79 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) [hereinaf-
ter AMERICAN LAW] (mentioning the incidents of wardship, marriage, and primer sei-
sin, which did not attach when underlord took by purchase); Addison M. Dowling,
Rationale of the Rule in Shelley's Case in Indiana, 13 IND. LJ. 466, 470-71 (1938).
[VOL. 73:1
RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
the relief payable when A, Jr. took his father's place in the tenurial
change by grant, either directly to him by name or as the heir in an
apparent limitation in remainder to the heirs of A. Instead the grant
to A, Jr. by name was held a fraud on the overlord,7 forcing A, Jr. to
take by succession; and what is now called Shelley's Rule treated "and
his heirs" as language of limitation, giving A a fee and also forcing A,
Jr. to take by succession and to pay a relief. The relief was abolished in
1660,8 but Shelley's Rule remained part of the common law in Eng-
land until 1925. 9
Another theory states that old English courts developed Shelley's
Rule out of fairness to creditors of the life tenant.10 The notion is that
if Lord A enfeoffed a straw person who in turn promptly enfeoffed A
for life, remainder to A's heirs, nothing really happened if this were
given literal effect except to limit A's creditors to the seizing of an
estate measured by his life. This was so because (1) A could not devise
the land (until the Statute of Wills was enacted in 1540), and (2) as a
practical matter, A was not going to convey the land outside the fam-
ily. Absent an attempt by A to convey intervivos the estate to A, Jr. or
to A, Jr. for life with remainder to his heirs, A was going to let it pass by
succession to A, Jr. his eldest son."
7 See RESrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314 cmt. j. (1940) (explaining that a devise to
named person who turned out to be heir of conveyor was ineffective as a device to
avoid feudal incidents); see also George B. Young, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Illinois: A
New Analysis and Suggestions for Repea 45 Ii.L. L. REv. (NoRaTwEmRN) 173 (1950).
8 See Orth, supra note 6, at 683.
9 Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 131, at 661 (Eng.).
10 Doyle v. Andis, 102 N.W. 177 (Iowa 1905); Benton v. Baucom, 135 S.E. 629, 630
(N.C. 1926); Williams v. Houston, 57 N.C. (4Jones Eq.) 268, 270 (1858) (finding that
the Rule's purpose was to prevent "manifest fraud of the rights of third persons"); see
also Myers v. Myers, 190 N.W. 491, 492 (Neb. 1922) (stating that the purpose was to
avoid restraint on alienation placed on a person who was effectively sole owner).
Abel's Case of 1324, said by the RESrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. A (1940), to
be the fountainhead of Shelley's Rule, treated the originally intended life tenant
grantee as a fee owner in order to benefit one of his creditors.
11 See RESTATE MENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. a (1940) (explaining that alienations
by feoffee holding a fee were very rare in 1300s).
Yet another theory for development of what is now called the Rule in Shelley's
Case is that it dates from a time-the 1300s-when contingent remainders were not
recognized. To give some effect to the words "then to his heirs," the courts changed
them to "and to his heirs," while striking "for his life" as inconsistent with the fee
estate created by "and heirs." See Simis & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 1534; WA. Rhea, The
Rule in Shelley's Case in Texas, 3 TEx. L. REv. 109, 122 (1925).
Finally it has been suggested that because, under primogeniture, the life tenant
himself would have but one heir, the conveyor's language envisioning the land pass-
ing to "heirs" (plural) meant generation after generation, so that "and then to his
heirs" were words of limitation, not purchase. See Dowling, supra note 6, at 471.
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The sole attempt to defend Shelley's Rule on the basis of a mod-
em policy asserts that it makes land more alienable. 12 That is, because
of the Rule, the would-be life tenant, whose heirs are unknown until
he dies, can convey a fee simple.
B. Shelley's Rule Is Intent-Defeating
One court has opined that Shelley's is "a rule which has done
more to produce litigation, and, when sustained, thwart the actual
purposes of a testator than all the other arbitrary rules combined."'8
As a rule of law, rather than of construction,' 4 the Rule applies "inexo-
rably"' 5 in the face of the strongest statement of intent that the life
tenant's heirs shall take as purchasers. 16 It applies even though the
12 See, e.g., Jones v. Stone, 279 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), described in infra
text accompanying note 197; Note, supra note 2, at 987-88, 991.
13 Gross v. Sheeler, 31 A. 812, 812 (Del. 1885).
14 See 1 A:MERicAN LAW, supra note 6, at 480.
15 Lippincott v. Davis, 28 A. 587, 588 (NJ. 1894) (holding that even "the most
positive or unequivocal" statement of contrary intent is irrelevant).
16 In each of the following cases the conveyor tried mightily but without success
to employ stated intent to defeat Shelley's Rule. Bishop v. Williams, 255 S.W.2d 171,
171-72 (Ark. 1953) (involving instrument which stated that "the term heirs herein
used is a term of purchase and not of limitation"); Wilson v. Harrold, 123 N.E. 563,
564 (111. 1919) (involving conveyance which specified, "it being expressly understood
that but a life estate is hereby deeded [and the grantee] is to hold it absolutely in trust
for his lawful heirs" to whom title does not pass until the life tenant's death); Andrews
v. Spurlin, 35 Ind. 262, 264 (1871) (involving deed to Mary which stated that she
quitclaimed to grantor any interest but a life estate and that any other "transfer of the
said real estate by said Mary Wood shall in no wise be valid"); Kirby v. Broaddus, 145
P. 875, 875 (Kan. 1915) (involving instrument which indicated that life tenants shall
have "life estates only," and "the fee to the premises herein described shall vest abso-
lutely" in their heirs); Lauer v. Hoffman, 88 A. 496, 497 (Pa. 1913) (involving instru-
ment which stated that "in no event whatever shall the fee simple ... vest" in the life
tenant); Finley v. Finley, 318 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, writ
ref d n.r.e.) ("This will, however, shall not be construed to give [life tenant] Norman
L. Finley a fee simple title."); see also Cook v. Sober, 135 N.E. 60, 61 (Ill. 1922) (dic-
tum) (stating that Shelley's Rule would apply if instrument said "and they shall take as
purchasers"); Lippincott v. Davis, 28 A. 587 (NJ. 1894) (dictum) (stating that Shel-
ley's Rule would apply if instrument said heirs were to take by purchase).
Some older Texas decisions have treated Shelley's Rule as one of construction,
apparently requiring-to avoid the Rule's application-some expression of anti-Shel-
ley intent beyond the words "for life" in the initial conveyance clause. See Robinson v.
Glenn, 238 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. 1951) ("The courts of Texas look with disfavor on
the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case."); Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 35 S.W.2d
1036 (Tex. 1931). More recent Texas cases hold the Rule must be applied despite
clear intent that the conveyor intended the heirs to take as purchasers. See Sybert v.
Sybert, 254 S.W.2d 999 (Tex. 1953); Finley v. Finley, 318 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1958, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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instrument refers to the Rule by name, demanding that it not be ap-
plied.' 7 Since it nullifies the expressed intent that the named grantee
or devisee take a life estate, many authorities state that it is inherently
intent-defeating.' 8
There are two reported cases where the court applied Shelley's
Rule while stating that the conveyor in fact intended it to apply. In
one, the court may have been correct. In a 1906 Maryland case,' 9 a
grantor deeded land to a husband and wife for their "joint lives" and
to the survivor "for life," and "then to their joint heirs."20 The deed
also contained a specific covenant of further assurances to "secur[e]
unto them [the husband and wife] a good and sufficient right and
title to the above-described premises in fee simple."2' This covenant,
held the Maryland Court of Appeals, showed the grantor's intention
that the term "joint heirs" be used as words of limitation and not of
purchase. That may be true; but the notion of a conveyor deliberately
relying on Shelley's Rule to upgrade a specified life estate to a fee is
almost incredible.
In the other case, an 1884 West Virginia decision,22 the court's
insistence that the conveyor intended Shelley's Rule to apply is fool-
ish. The case involved a devise of land to the testator's son "during his
natural life, and at his death, then to descend to his legal heirs."
23
Since testator wanted the heirs to take by descent, said the court, he
"necessarily" also intended the named ancestor to take the fee. "The
language could not possibly have been contemplating"24 heirs taking
as individuals rather than as the first of a potentially indefinite series
of intestate successions. The son would have a fee even if the will had
become effective after the state abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case.
17 Fowler v. Black, 26 N.E. 596, 597 (il. 1891) (dictum); Polk-v. Fars, 17 Tenn (9
Yer.) 209, 237 (1836) (dictum); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 3i2 cmt. k (1940); 1
AMmucAN LAW, supra note 6, § 4.47, at 490.
18 McCllen v. Lehker, 123 N.E. 475, 477 (Ind. App. 1919); Fraser v. Chene, 2
Mich. 81, 91 (1851); Cotten v. Moseley, 74 S.E. 454, 457 (N.C. 1912); SiMs & SMrrH,
supra note 1, § 1544; Rhea, supra note 11, at 129; Webster, supra note 6, at 3; see also
Vangieson v. Henderson, 36 N.E. 974, 974 (Ill. 1894) (stating that the Rule is "often"
intent defeating); James W. Simonton, The Rule in Shelley's Case in West V'rginia, 26 W.
VA. L.Q. 178, 179 (1920) (stating that the Rule is "almost invariably" intent-defeating).
19 Waller v. Pollitt, 64 A. 1040 (Md. 1906).
20 Id. at 1041.
21 Id.
22 Chipps v. Hall, 23 W. Va. 504 (1884).
23 Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 521.
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Surely, however, the testator meant "descend" in a nontechnical,
broad sense of "go to."
25
That Shelley's Rule is, almost always intent-defeating is an impor-
tant point underlying the thesis of this Article: that courts have been
so concerned with doing nothing to escape from the Shelley-imposed
obligation to defeat the conveyor's stated intent that they have ex-
tended Shelley's Rule beyond its scope in many ways.
C. Because It Is Intent-Defeating, Shelley's Rule Has Been Abolished in
Many States But Remains a Significant Element of American
Conveyancing Law
Shelley's Rule was never adopted in a small number of states2
6
and has been abrogated, usually by statute, in all but three of the
other American jurisdictions: Arkansas, Delaware, and Indiana.2 7 In
Indiana, a statute abolishes the Rule for purposes of determining the
scope of a beneficial interest in a trust.28 However, the statutory abro-
gations of Shelley's Rule are prospective only, so as not to disturb titles
acquired in reliance on the common law.2 9 Some of the statutes are
25 Several cases have involved the applicability of Shelley's Rule to an instrument
stating that the remainder will "descend" to the life tenant's heirs. No court other
than the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has suggested that there is such
magic in that word that the person specified as life tenant should take a fee even
without the intent-defeating Shelley's Rule. See McQueen v. Logan, 80 Ala. 304
(1885); Lydick v. Tate, 44 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. 1942); Baker v. Scott, 62 ll. 86 (1871);
Taney v. Fahnley, 25 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1890); Lippincott v. Davis, 28 A. 587 (NJ. 1896);
Crisp v. Briggs, 96 S.E. 662 (N.C. 1918); Hodges v. Fleetwood, 9 S.E. 640 (N.C. 1889);
Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa. 117 (1859).
26 Thurston v. Allen, 8 Haw. 392 (1892); Smith v. Hastings, 29 Vt. 240 (1857);
RESrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 313 cmt. a, special note (1940) (referring to Hawaii and
Vermont); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.1 crmt. I (adding that Shelley's
Rule's root in Colorado is dictum in a 1988 case). SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 1,
§ 1563, state that while Vermont and Hawaii affirmatively rejected Sheley, in Utah,
there is no case law at all on point. This is still true according to a 1996 Westlaw
search for "Shelley's Case" in Utah cases.
27 See Smith v. Wright, 779 S.W.2d 177 (Ark. 1989); Estate of Donovan, No.
CIVA.756, 1983 WL 103280 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 1983); Society Nat'l Bank v.Jacobson,
560 N.E.2d 217, 220 n.3 (Ohio 1990); Orth, supra note 6, at 681 n.3; see also Drayer v.
Wright, 782 S.W. 2d 572 (Ark. 1990) (finding Shelley's Rule inapplicable); In re Trus-
teeship of Creech, 159 N.E.2d 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1959) (same).
28 IND. CODE ANN. § 30.4-7-2-7(b) (Michie 1993).
29 SeeMcQueen v. Logan, 80 Ala. 304 (1885); SIMES & SMrrIH, supra note 1, § 1563.
Of the abolition statutes cited in infra note 33, a specific prospective-only proviso is
contained in those of Oregon, Texas, and Illinois. See OR. REV. STAT. § 112.345 (But-
terworth 1990); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5.042 (West 1984); 765 ILL. COMp. STAT.
ANN. 345/1 (West 1993).
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relatively recent. Washington's statute abrogating the application of
Shelley's Rule to deeds was enacted in 1994.30 North Carolina's stat-
ute31 generally abolishing Shelley's Rule applies only to "transfers that
take effect" on or after October 1, 1987.32 In eight other states, the
statutory abolition is less than fifty-five years old.33 In these jurisdic-
tions, as well as others with even older abolition statutes, Shelley's
Rule is by no means a dead letter. It is rather common to find parties
litigating the effect of Shelley's Rule on an instrument more than
forty,34 fifty,35 or even sixty to eighty3 6 years after the effective date of
30 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.180 (West. Supp. 1996) (enacted by 1994 Wash.
Laws 221, § 17). It was not entirely clear that Shelley's Rule would apply to deeds in
Washington before the enactment of this statute. See Rubenser v. Felice, 365 P.2d 320
(Wash. 1961); Harry M. Cross, Comment, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Washington, 15
WASH. L. REv. 99 (1940).
31 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.3 (1995).
32 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 706, § 2.
33 ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.020 (Michie 1990) (enacted by 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 51,
§ 2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.17 (West 1994) (enacted by 1945 Fla. Laws ch. 23126, § 2);
765 ILL. CoMp. STAT. ANN. 345/1 (West 1993) (enacted by 1953 Ill. Laws § 1); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 381.090 (Banks-Baldwin 1989) (enacted by 1942 Ky. Acts 208, § 1; ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 158 (West 1988) (enacted by 1954 Me. Laws 168, § 12) (ap-
plicable only to realty); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 111.101 (Michie 1993) (enacted by
1983 Nev. Stat. ch. 388, § 2) (specifically applicable only to realty); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 112.345 (Butterworth 1990) (enacted by 1969 Or. Laws ch. 591, § 48); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 5.042 (West 1984) (enacted by 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 199).
34 Tucker v. Adams, 14 Ga. 548 (1854) (48 years); Hege v. Provident Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 173 N.E. 610 (Ill. 1930) (44 years); Webbe v. Webbe, 84 N.E. 1054 (Ill. 1908)
(41 years); Taney v. Fahnley, 25 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1890) (43 years); Hall v. Gradwohl, 77
A. 480 (Md. 1910) (42 years); Waller v. Pollitt, 64 A. 1040 (Md. 1906) (44 years);
Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N.C. 62, (1881) (46 years); Bassett v. Hawk, 11 A. 802 (Pa.
1888) (45 years); Clark v. Neves, 57 S.E. 614 (S.C. 1906) (48 years); Moore v. Brooks,
53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 135 (1855) (45 years).
The years are measured from the effective date of the instrument (date of death
of testator when given, otherwise date of probating the will) until the date of the
reported decision concerning applicability of Shelley's Rule.
35 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 214 F. 928 (7th Cir. 1914) (Illinois law-52
years); American Security & Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367 (D.D.C. 1959) (59
years; decided 57 years after enactment of statute abolishing Shelley's Rule); Smith v.
Wright, 779 S.W.2d 177 (Ark. 1989) (56 years); Fuller v. Fuller, 40 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1964) (59 years); Handy v. McKim, 4 A. 125 (Md. 1886) (50 years); Crockett
v. Robinson, 46 N.H. 454 (1866) (51 years-two instruments considered); Mazzola v.
Malley, 68 A.2d 655 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (55 years); Quick v. Quick's Ex'r,
21 N.J. Eq. 13 (1870) (54 years); Lytle v. Beveridge, 58 N.Y. 592 (1874) (51 years);
Chappell v. Chappell, 133 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1963) (53 years); White v. Lackey, 253
S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (57 years); Society Nat'l Bank v.Jacobson, 560 N.E.2d
217 (Ohio 1990) (59 years); Polk v. Faris, 17 Tenn. (9 Yer.) 209 (1836) (50 years);
Stokes v. Van Wyck, 3 S.E. 387 (Va. 1887) (53 years); Taylor v. Cleary, 70 Va. (29
Gratt.) 448 (1877) (56 years); Pryorv. Duncan, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 27 (1849) (52 years).
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the instrument. This is often the result of the would-be life tenant's
longevity, with no one in the family caring to litigate what happens at
his or her death until it occurs.
3 7
D. Shelley's Rule Has Generated an Enormous Amount of Litigation
Probably because it is intent-defeating, Shelley's Rule has resulted
in a mass of litigation. 38 Researching this Article, I got the impression
that instruments presenting Shelley's Rule issues lead to reported de-
cisions (almost all appellate) at a higher percentage rate than that
generated by any other legal issue in civil or criminal law. The major-
ity of the suits seem to be pursued by would-be remainderpersons
who, under the Rule, have the future interest intended for them
stripped away. However, apparent life tenants seeking to quiet title
are also responsible for a fair share of the cases leading to reported
decisions. Grantees of the intended life tenant seem to constitute the
next largest category of Shelley's Rule plaintiffs.
Most of the Shelley's Rule litigation concerns the issue that is the
primary focus of this Article: whether the word "heirs" in the remain-
der clause was used in its technical sense. Probably the second largest
batch of Shelley's Rule cases concerns whether a word other than
"heirs" such as "issue" should be treated as its equivalent.
Other potential issues under Shelley's Rule seem to be less fre-
quently litigated. They include: (1) whether the life estate and re-
mainder are both legal or both equitable, as is required for Shelley's
Rule to apply;3 9 (2) whether an intervening interest in a party other
than the life tenant precludes application of the Rule (it does not);40
36 Holt v. Pickett, 20 So. 432 (Ala. 1896) (71 years); Hartwick v. Heberling, 4
N.E.2d 965 (Ill. 1936) (62 years); People v. Emery, 145 N.E. 349 (Ill. 1924) (75 years);
Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N.E. 1012 (Ind. App. 1905) (67 years); Hough v. Farmers Bank
& Trust Co., 60 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1948) (71 years); Campbell v. Lewisburg & N. R.R., 26
S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. 1930) (64 years); Turner v. Montiero, 103 S.E. 572 (Va. 1920) (71
years); Curtis v. Price, 33 Eng. Rep. 35 (Ch. 1805) (80 years).
37 See, e.g., People v. Emery, 145 N.E. 349 (il. 1924). This case involved a situa-
tion where the testator died in 1849, and the life tenant survived until 1923. Only
then did her brother sue for a determination whether the decedent had a life estate
or fee simple under Shelley's Rule.
38 See Note, supra note 2, at 653 and passim (reviewing many of the hundreds of
reported decisions existing as of 1911).
39 E.g., 1 AMEi4cAN LAW, supra note 6, § 4.41, at 482.
40 See Note, supra note 2, at 997. Example: 0 to A for life, then to B for life, then to
A's heirs. The intervening life estate merely delays application of Shelley. B can have
the courts treat A as a life tenant subject to the laws of waste, but A's future heirs have
no interest. A can convey a fee simple estate subject to Bs life estate (and to the law
of waste so long as A is alive in the lifetime of B).
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and (3) whether Shelley's Rule applies to personal property-the ini-
tial illustration in this Article of an improper extension of the Rule.
III. SHELLEY'S RuLE HAS BEEN UNNECESSARILY EXTENDED TO
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN SEVERAL STATES
Historically, the law did not require that the words "and his heirs"
follow the name of the transferee to pass to him full, inheritable own-
ership in personal property-the equivalent to the fee simple estate in
land.4' Ownership of personal property at the time Shelley's Rule
emerged in England involved no feudal incidents that could be
avoided if personal property passed by inter vivos conveyance rather
than succession. Accordingly, most American authorities state that
Shelley's Rule does not apply to testamentary gifts or inter vivos trans-
fers of personalty.42
In perhaps a dozen states, however, Shelley's Rule has been ap-
plied to personalty.43 Some courts, recognizing that this makes little
legal sense, say the rule that the heirs take no interest in the person-
alty and the life tenant gets full ownership is actually an "analogy" to
Shelley's Rule.44 The most recent case to apply Shelley's Rule, from
Ohio in 1990,45 involved the question whether Shelley's Rule should
apply to personalty. The court held, in effect, that it could see no
reason for having a different rule for interpreting "then to his heirs"
when land was at issue, as opposed to personal property. Of course
When the intervening interest is a prior remainder, however, Shelley's Rule will
not apply if conditions for it to become possessory at the end of the life estate are met.
Example: 0 to A for life, then to A's children, but if he has no children, to his heirs. If
a child is born to A, the first of the alternative remainders becomes vested and Shel-
ley's Rule will never apply to create a fee. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. Lamphear, 99 Ind. 251
(1884). If A dies childless, he can, due to Shelley's Rule, devise a fee simple absolute
to defeat his heirs.
41 SImEs & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 498.
42 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 80.1(3) (1988); 1 AMmcAN LAw,
supra note 6, § 4.41, at 482 (citing In re Thorne's Estate, 25 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1942)).
43 See, e.g., Crandall v. Barker, 78 N.W. 347 (N.D. 1898) (discussing note secured
by mortgage on North Dakota land-Pennsylvania law concerning Shelley's Rule ap-
plied); Riegel v. Lyerly, 143 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. 1965); C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Modern
Status of the Rule in Shelley's Case, 99 A.L.R.2d 1161, 1172 (1965) (reporting that Shel-
ley's Rule is applied to personalty in Florida, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island). For
cases applying Shelley's Rule to pre-emancipation transfers of slaves, see infra note 47.
44 E.g., Knox v. Barker, 78 N.W. 352 (N.D. 1898); see also Homer F. Carey, Words of
Limitation or Words of Purchase: Rule in Shelley's Case-Wild's Case-Miscellaneous, 34 ILL.
L. REv. (NoRTIwmmsTRN) 379 (1939).
45 Society Nat'l Bank v. Jacobson, 560 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1990).
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there is a very good reason: the conveyor's intent should be given ef-
fect unless settled law requires it to be defeated.
Only in the case of "mixed" conveyances is there reason to extend
Shelley's Rule to personalty. Example: 0 devises Blackacre together
with all farm equipment, furniture, and domestic animals located
thereon at O's death to A for life and then to A's heirs. Policies of the
"institutional theory" of trade fixtures law6 can support an applica-
tion of Shelley's Rule that causes A to receive full ownership to a work-
ing farm, horse and plough included, and not just to the land.47
However, no reason exists for applying Shelley's Rule to a bequest of
money or transfer of corporate stock or bonds.
IV. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE TO INSTRUMENTS RAISING
SHELLEY'S CASE ISSUES
A. The Words of the Instrument Are Interpreted as if There Were No Rule
in Shelley's Case
The remaining situations discussed in this Article in which courts
have unnecessarily applied Shelley's Rule were based on a construc-
tion of the deed or will at issue. Thus, before examining these cases,
study should be made of the appropriate rules and maxims of con-
struction of an instrument alleged by a party to be subject to Shelley's
Rule. Most courts agree that the starting point in a determination as
to whether the Rule in Shelley's Case applies is to construe each word
or phrase in the will or deed "precisely as if this rule had no exist-
46 Under the institutional theory, he who contracts to sell land where a commer-
cial enterprise is operating is deemed to be agreeing to transfer trade fixtures with the
land, even though had a tenant installed such fixtures, the tenant would have been
entitled to remove them at the termination of his or her lease. The notion here is a
presumption that the grantor intends to transfer not just the land, but the institution
that attracted the buyer to it. See generally Temple Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 A.
295 (N.J. 1903) (holding that seats, lighting, and other chattels on property were
necessary and adapted to building functioning as a theater and were part of the re-
alty); 2 TIFFAw, supra note 3, § 610. The doctrine also applies to a mortgage by in-
strument describing only the land.
47 States with old decisions applying Shelley's Rule to transfers of slaves have a
basis for distinguishing them, for example, from bequests of money or corporate
stock. That is, the jurisdictions wanted the transferee to have the same estate in slaves
who worked the land as in the land itself when a transferor included both in his
conveyance. Cases applying Shelley's Rule to slaves include: Lloyd v. Rambo, 35 Ala.
709 (1860); Machen v. Machen, 15 Ala. 373 (1849); Denson v. Thompson, 19 Ark. 66
(1857); Childers v. Childers, 21 Ga. 377 (1857); Tucker v. Adams, 14 Ga. 548 (1854);
Ham v. Ham, 21 N.C. 598 (1837); Nichols v. Cartwright, 6 N.C. 137 (1812); Dott v.
Cunnington, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 453 (1795); Polk v. Faris, 17 Tenn. (9 Yer.) 209 (1836);
Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804 (1858); Pryor v. Duncan, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 27 (1849).
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ence."48 This means, as the South Carolina Supreme Court stated,
that words and phrases in the instrument are interpreted "according
to the ordinary rules of construction."49
This Article explores many cases where it appears that the court
must have had Shelley's Rule in mind while construing the instrument
at issue. The three most egregious examples of this are described
below.
In a Maryland case, Cook v. Councilman,5° the remainder was to
the life tenant's children and issue of deceased children per stirpes,
but if the life tenant died without issue, to the persons who would be
his intestate heirs. There were surviving issue of the life tenant who
claimed a remainder. The court, however, held that the first refer-
ence to "children" really was just to the first generation of lineal heirs,
who would take to the exclusion of collaterals. The first use of "issue"
meant the second and further generations of lineal heirs. As a result,
all of the extensive language-merely summarized above-following
the devise of the life estate was collapsed into a remainder "to his
heirs." A more strained attempt to force an instrument into the ambit
of the Rule in Shelley's Case is hard to imagine.
In a Pennsylvania case, 51 the life tenant was the testator's daugh-
ter, and the remainder was to "her children, share and share alike, or
heirs at law." As against the daughter's grantee of an alleged fee sim-
ple, a child of the daughter claimed title as remainderperson after the
life tenant's death. Surely under ordinary rules of construction, the
testator intended that children of the life tenant were to take per cap-
ita in remainder and that the life tenant's heirs were a class of secon-
48 Grimes v. Shirk, 32 A. 113, 116 (Pa. 1895); accord Lydickv. Tate, 44 N.E.2d 583,
588 (Ill. 1942) ("[Clonstruction [of the will] cannot be determined from any consid-
eration of the Rule in Shelley's Case. In determining the intention of the testator, the
Rule in Shelley's Case must be wholly disregarded. That rule cannot properly influ-
ence the construction of the will or be given consideration in determining the inten-
tion of the testator.") (citation omitted); List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483, 491 (1877)
(stating that Shelley's Rule plays no role in determining meaning of words in will); see
also Miller v. Mowers, 81 N.E. 420, 423 (Ill. 1907).
49 Clark v. Neves, 57 S.E. 614, 615 (S.C. 1907); accord Estate of Donovon, No.
CIV.A. 756, 1983 WL 103280, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 1983) (construing terms of will
using "the normal rules of construction" before applying Shelley's Rule); Lydick v.
Tate, 44 N.E.2d 583, 588 (ll. 1942) (applying "ordinary rules of construction");
Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335, 340 (1872); Duckett v. Butler, 45 S.E. 137, 138 (S.C.
1903) (interpreting deed "under the ordinary rules of construction"); see also Louis
Moreira, Comment, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Texas, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 42, 44-54
(1950) (reviewing many of the "basic" rules of construction that can become perti-
nent in cases where Shelley's Rule is asserted).
50 72 A. 404 (Md. 1909).
51 Hough v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 60 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1948).
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dary takers to be substituted in only if there was no child of the life
tenant The word "or" is classically associated with the introduction of
a substitutional gift.52 But the Pennsylvania court construed "her chil-
dren" right out of the testator's will: "Manifestly, he used the word
'children' as synonymous with the words 'heirs at law. "'53 That is, the
"or" was converted into an "i.e." Could this have been done for any
other reason than to make Shelley's Rule applicable?
In the third example of a court making an unnatural construc-
tion so that Shelley's Rule could apply, the remainder was to the male
life tenant's "male heirs, equally... ; and for want of heirs male, then
to go in equal shares to his daughters."5 4 The Rule in Shelley's Case
applies when the remainder is in fee tail as well as in fee simple.
55
Hoping he had a fee tail male due to Shelley's Rule, the person
named as life tenant purported to disentail under the Rhode Island
procedure for doing so. In order to validate the attempt to disentail,
the court, in an 1859 opinion, construed "heirs" as "heirs of the
body,"56 words which would enable Shelley's Rule to create a fee tail.
Whatever the preference for fee tail may have been in England 500
years earlier, by the mid-nineteenth century, the word "heirs" certainly
was used in this country to include collaterals under "ordinary rules of
construction."
57
The requirement that Shelley's Rule be ignored in construing the
terms of the instrument would seem to render inapplicable statutes
found in most states declaring that a limitation in a deed58 or will59 is
presumed to grant an estate in fee. Thus, in the case of a grant "to A
for life, then to A's nearest heirs," the presumed-fee statute should not
generate a further presumption that the word "nearest" is surplusage
in order to vest a fee simple estate in A by force of Shelley's Rule.
Such a theory would be taking into account the Rule in Shelley's Case
in deciding the meaning of the word "nearest.
60
52 See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 252 cmt. a (1940).
53 Hough, 60 A.2d at 14.
54 Cooper v. Cooper, 6 RI. 261 (1859).
55 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 1, § 1547.
56 Accord Fraser v. Chene, 2 Mich. 81 (1851) (not involving a gift over).
57 See infra note 91.
58 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 29 (1951) ("Every estate in land which shall be
granted, conveyed or devised by deed or will shall be deemed an estate in fee simple
and of inheritance, unless limited by express words.").
59 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1984); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.480 (West
1992).
60 In not one of the scores of cases I read in researching this Article where the
Rule in Shelley's Case was applied, did a court rely even in part on a statute of the
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B. Courts Have Misapplied the Presumption that a Legal Term of Art Is
Used in an Instrument in its Technical Sense
As originally developed in England, the Rule in Shelley's Case
could pertain to a deed only if the clause purporting to create a re-
mainder referred to the life tenant's "heirs," "bodily heirs," or "heirs
of his [or her] body."6' These are legal terms of art to which applies
the maxim of construction that presumes the conveyor intended the
term to carry its technical, legal meaning. That is, "heirs" includes
ascendants and collaterals of the life tenant who might be his or her
intestate taker on death. "Bodily heirs" can include issue in all gener-
ations of descendants of the named ancestor who can take by repre-
sentation. Most courts applying the presumption in the context of
Shelley's Rule state that a party seeking to overcome it must demon-
strate "clearly" that the conveyor intended a nontechnical mean-
ing62-for example, that "heirs" really meant issue, or "bodily heirs"
meant children.
The most frequently encountered type of limitation that tests the
strength of the presumption is this: to A for life, then to A's heirs, but
if she die without heirs, then to her surviving brothers and sisters.
The great majority of such cases63 holds that it is sufficiently clear in
this type of clause that "heirs" is not used in the technical sense, be-
cause if A dies with brothers and sisters surviving her, she cannot have
died without heirs (in the technical sense). These cases hold that in
this type of limitation "heirs" means either "children"-in which case
Shelley's Rule has no application-or "issue." If the latter interpreta-
tion is employed, most states considered it the equivalent of "heirs of
the body" so that the Rule in Shelley's Case does apply and creates a
common law fee tail in the person named as life tenant.64
When it is urged that the word "heirs" by itself means "issue" or
"children," courts correctly apply the presumption that the word is
jurisdiction stating the presumption that an estate in fee is being granted or devised
by an instrument under consideration by the court.
61 See R SrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. f (1940). Although some states have
applied Shelley's Rule where the remainder is to "persons who would take by intes-
tacy" upon the life tenant's death, see infra text accompanying notes 273-75, 277-80,
my research suggests that in more than 95% of the cases in which a court is asked to
apply the Rule in Shelley's Case, the word "heirs" appears in the portion of the limita-
tion purporting on its face to create a remainder.
62 See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 304-316 and accompanying text.
64 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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intended by the conveyor to have its technical meaning. 65 The pre-
sumption has, however, been misapplied in many cases where the
question before the court was not the meaning of "heirs," but the ef-
fect of an adjective or phrase that appeared to qualify the word
"heirs." Thus, in a North Carolina case where the remainder was to
the life tenant's "lawful heirs," the court held that the qualifying word
did not "clearly indicate" that the conveyor used the word "heirs" in a
nontechnical sense. 66 In fact, in this type of case, the party seeking to
avoid application of the Rule in Shelley's Case concedes that "heirs" is
used in its technical sense to include anyone who might be able to
take by intestacy on the life tenant's death. The theory for avoiding
Shelley's Rule is that the qualifying word "lawful" then removes from
the class of technical heirs illegitimate children and grandchildren
65 The source of the American rule giving such strength to the presumption that
"heirs" is used in its technical sense and additional language "must clearly" demon-
strate a contrary usage seems to be Jesson v. Wright, 4 Eng. Rep. 230 (H.L. 1820),
England's most famous (or infamous) Shelley's Rule case since Wolfe v. Shelley itself.
The will left a life estate to testator's illegitimate nephew William, remainder as Wil-
liam might appoint among "the heirs of his body," and in default of appointment "to
the heirs of the body of the said William... lawfully issuing, share and share alike as
tenants in common... [and] if but one child, then to such only child." Id. at 248-49.
The lower court accepted the argument that "heirs of the body" meant children be-
cause (a) no appointment could be made to all of the members of the technical class
"heirs of the body," which would indude descendants to be born generations in the
future, yet the testator intended William to be able to appoint to all within the special
class; (b) heirs of the body in the technical sense would extend to generations in the
future and such yet-to-be-born descendants could not be tenants in common with the
first takers in remainder; and (c) the ultimate reference to but one "child" indicated
the testator was thinking only of issue living at Williams' death. The Lord Chancel-
lor's opinion reversing the Kings Bench and applying Shelley's Rule says that "heirs of
the body" are words having their technical meaning "unless they are clearly qualified
and restricted by other words so as to give them a more limited sense." Id. at 247.
The additional words "must be clearly intelligible and unequivocal" in demonstrating
the conveyor did not intend the technical meaning of "heirs of the body." Id. at 248.
Note that insofar as it was argued that "heirs of the body" referred only to issue
living when William made an appointment, the "clearly" test was properly applied.
With respect to the argument that "share and share alike" made Shelley's Rule inap-
plicable, the theory of Jesson is that these words are no more than a statement of
testator's intent that Shelley's Rule should not apply. See infra text accompanying
notes 198-215. On this theory, the conveyor did not use the words to try to change
the meaning of "heirs" or "bodily heirs" so that they would have a nontechnical mean-
ing. Thus, the "dearly" rule would have no application.
Jesson is widely followed in American Shelley's Rule cases. See, e.g., Quick's Ex'r v.
Quick, 21 NJ. Eq. 13, 17 (Ch. 1870) (specifically relying on Jesson for the "clearly"
rule); see also cases cited infra note 204.
66 Harrell v. Hagan, 60 S.E. 909, 911 (N.C. 1908); accord Wool v. Fleetwood, 48
S.E. 785, 789 (N.C. 1904).
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who can qualify as heirs of the life tenant under the applicable intes-
tacy statute. Once it is conceded that "heirs" is used in its technical
sense, the presumption should be irrelevant. The North Carolina case
changed the maxim from one applicable to the legal term of art itself
("heirs") to one applicable to the adjective or other word or clause
appearing to modify it. The erroneously created new maxim
presumes that the conveyor intended no meaning at all for the modi-
fying word or phrase unless the intent that it have some meaning
"clearly" appears. I cannot think of any logic or policy-based reason-
ing to support this new maxim of construction. It seems just ajudi-
cially-created device to enable Shelley's Rule to be applied when it
could not otherwise be applied.
The same erroneous extension of the maxim presuming a techni-
cal meaning for a legal term of art is found in cases where the remain-
der was conveyed to the life tenant's "heirs equally." For example, the
Illinois Supreme Court, applied Shelley's Rule to such an instrument
on the ground that adding the word "equally" did not "make it per-
fectly clear the word [heirs] was not used in its proper legal sense." 67
The argument for not applying Shelley's Rule in this kind of case is
not that the word "heirs" refers to persons in addition to or less than
the group technically identified under the heirship statute, but that
per capita mode of distribution might vary from the share each heir
would take under the statutory scheme.
68
Whether a qualifying word or phrase proceeds to remove some
persons from the technical class of heirs should not have to be
"clearly" proved (since there is no applicable presumption to over-
,67 Cook v. Sober, 135 N.E. 60, 61 (IMl. 1922); accord Moore v Brooks, 53 Va. (12
Gratt.) 135, 152 (1855) (finding that a directive that remainder was "equally to be
divided" among heirs did not "clearly" indicate "heirs" not used in technical sense);
see also Grimes v. Shirk, 32 A. 113 (Pa. 1895) (involving devise where the remainder
was to the life tenant's issue and "their heirs and assigns" and holding that the quoted
words did not "unequivocally qualify' issue to establish that it did not mean heirs of
the body). This type of case is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 198-203.
Note 65, supra; explains why the English case of Jesson v. Wright the apparent
source of the "clearly" rule, may have been applying that rule to a portion of the will
other than that calling for distribution "share and share alike" to bodily heirs.
The improper use of the presumption can be found on occasion in instruments
involving dispositions in remainder to the life tenant's "heirs," where the issue was not
the meaning of that word but whether additional language removed one or more
persons from the class, and where the Rule in Shelley's Case was not in issue. E.g.,
Starrett v. Botsford, 9 A.2d 871 (R.I. 1939) (gift over to testator's "legal heirs" as deter-
mined under Rhode Island law: held that there was no intent to use "heirs" in non-
technical sense "clearly indicat[ed]").
68 See infra text accompanying notes 210-15.
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come). If the plaintiff in the action is relying on the inapplicability of
the Rule in Shelley's Case, he or she should have to establish by only a
preponderance of the evidence that the apparent qualifying language
was intended to remove one or more persons from the class of techni-
cal heirs. 6
9
Instances of remainders to "lawful heirs," "nearest heirs," "heirs
male," and the like are-for purposes of applying the presumption in
favor of technical usage-equivalent to a limitation like this: to A for
life, then to her heirs, except that A's cousin Hepzebah shall under no
circumstances ever take the property or any interest in it. Here the
word "heirs" is, of course, initially used in its technical sense, but Shel-
ley's Rule would not apply because the subsequent language removes
a potential heir from the class.70
C. Courts Often Ignore the Maxim of Construction Requiring that
Meaning Be Given to Each Word or Phrase, with None Treated
as Surplusage
A second familiar maxim used by courts in construing written in-
struments requires "giving effect to every word and rejecting none as
meaningless or repugnant."71 This maxim should be held applicable
69 Likewise, if the plaintiff seeks affirmative relief on the basis that Shelley's Rule
eliminates a linguistically-granted remainder, he or she should have to prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that words in the deed or will that arguably remove
one or more persons from the class were not intended to have that effect and are
surplusage.
70 See infra notes 83-84. In Seymour v. Heubaum, 211 N.E.2d 897 (Il1. App. Ct.
1965), it was contended that language apart from the remainder to the life tenant's
heirs indicated the conveyor considered two stepdaughters the equivalent of children
so that the class of heirs was expanded to include the stepdaughters. The theory was
not that "heirs" when used in the remainder clause meant other than heirs in the
technical sense, but instead that subsequent language added persons to the class of
heirs. Therefore, the court did not have occasion on the facts to opine, as it did, that
it must "clearly and affirmatively" appear that the conveyor did not use the word
"heirs" in its technical sense. Id. at 901.
71 Jones v. Johnson, 307 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); accord Pass v. Ste-
phens, 198 P. 712, 714 (Ariz. 1921); Ramsey v. Nordloh, 354 P.2d 513, 514 (Colo.
1960); Miller v. Ridgley, 117 N.E.2d 759, 760-61 (Ill. 1954); Weaver v. Ellis, 469
N.E.2d 251, 253 (Ib1. App. Ct. 1984); Coin v. Eater, 438 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Fenstermaker v. Holman, 62 N.E. 699, 700 (Ind. 1902); Hemenway Mem'l
Presbyterian Church v. Aigner, 443 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Estate of Nagl,
408 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Bank of New England, NA. v. McKennan,
477 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Rogers v. Morgan, 164 So. 2d 480, 484
(Miss. 1964) ("[E]ach word and clause therein should be reconciled and given a
meaning if it can be reasonably done."); Holland v. Holland, 509 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Mo.
1974) (give effect to all language "unless so repugnant or meaningless that it cannot
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to every case in which Shelley's Rule is invoked where the conveyor
has deliberately qualified the term "heirs" with an adjective or modify-
ing phrase. As will be shown below, in such cases like, the courts have
almost always ignored the maxim while concluding that a word that
seems to qualify "heir," such as "lawful" or "nearest," has no meaning
and is mere surplusage.72 This allows Shelley's Rule to eliminate the
apparent remainder. Such an approach refuses to apply the "ordinary
rules of construction" and also can be viewed as construing the instru-
ment with the objective of making the Rule in Shelley's Case
applicable.
One of the few cases where the maxim requiring giving effect to
each word was applied in the Shelley's Rule context involved a deed of
land "to Nancy West, and her present heirs."73 It was argued that the
Rule applied and Nancy took a fee simple absolute because the clause
should be read as "to Nancy West for life and then to her heirs." This
contention stressed the absence of words of inheritance before the
comma after Nancy West's name and urged that the word "present"
did not qualify the word "heirs." The latter contention was rejected by
the Indiana Supreme Court, which declared that " [w] ords deliberately
put into a deed, and put there for a purpose, are not to be lightly
considered, or arbitrarily put aside."74 To give meaning to the word
"present," the court construed the phrase "present heirs" to mean
children of Nancy alive when the deed was delivered.75 Shelley's Rule
then could not apply.
be done"); Fleischman v. Furgueson, 119 N.E. 400, 401 (N.Y. 1918); Haas v. Speen-
burgh, 203 N.Y.S. 202, 204 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd mem, 207 N.Y.S. 847 (App. Div.
1925); Griffin v. Springer, 92 S.E.2d 682, 684 (N.C. 1956); Highland v. Pennsylvania,
161 A.2d 390, 402 (Pa. 1960); Yuscavage v. Hamlin, 137 A.2d 242, 244 (Pa. 1958)
("[No part shall be rejected if it can be given a meaning."); Third Nat'l Bank v.
Stevens, 755 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870,
872 (Tex. 1984) (requiring courts to recognize that parties to instrument intended
every clause to have an effect), overruled on other grounds by Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d
459, 464 (Tex. 1991); Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks, 283 S.W.2d 39, 44-45 (Tex.
1955); Estate of Little, 721 P.2d 950, 960 (Wash. 1986); Fowler v. Tarbet, 274 P.2d
341, 342 (Wash. 1954) (requiring courts to "give some meaning to every word, if rea-
sonably possible"); Hodgins v. State, 513 P.2d 304, 307 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) ("In the
construction of a deed, a court must give meaning to every word if reasonably
possible.").
72 See infra text accompanying notes 135-66 and 181-97.
73 Fountain County Coal & Min. Co. v. Beckleheimer, 1 N.E. 202 (Ind. 1885).
74 Id. at 203.
75 There were six such children, and hence a seven-party tenancy in common was
created by the limitation.
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D. The Maxims that a Deed of Realty Is Presumed to Convey the Grantor's
Entire Interest and that a Will Should Be Construed to Avoid Partial
Intestacy Have Also Been Ignored in Some Shelley's Rule Cases
Assume a devise or grant clause in a deed conveying land "to A
for life or until remarriage, and after A's death or remarriage, to A's
heirs." The presumption that "heirs" is used in its technical sense can
be applied here. If so, the conveyor has failed to provide who shall
take the estate on A's remarriage, because A has no heirs until he
dies.76 But there is no such "gap" if "heirs" is construed to mean chil-
dren or issue per stirpes then living. Employing the maxim of con-
struction that a technical word such as "heirs" is presumed to be used
in its technical sense results, in the case of a will, in a conflict with "the
canon of construction that there is a presumption against [partial]
intestacy."77 In the case of a deed, it conflicts with the maxim presum-
ing that the grantor "intended a complete disposition of the prop-
erty"78 that is the subject of the grant. If "heirs" has its technical
meaning, the quoted clause makes no provision for persons to take
the property on A's remarriage. There is a partial intestacy79 or an
76 See, e.g., Faulkner's Guardian v. Faulkner, 35 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1931).
77 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 115 cmt. a (1936); accord Hilton v. Kinsey, 185
F.2d 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Beardsley V. Johnson, 134 A. 530, 534 (Conn. 1926);
Bates v. Kingsley, 102 N.E. 306, 307 (Mass. 1913); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Miller, 25 S.E.2d 177, 179 (N.C. 1943); 2A RicHARD R.B. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 24.04[2] (Patrick Rohan ed., rev. ed. 1996). The "gap" in the devise at issue arising
if "heirs" is taken in its technical sense has been called an "interstitial intestacy."
SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 1, § 843, at 336, quoted in 2 TIFFAN, supra note 3, § 334, at
60.
If the will with such a specific devise containing a gap concludes with a residuary
clause, the applicable maxim is not against partial intestacy, but favoring a construc-
tion by which the testator or testatrix disposes of his or her entire interest in the land
in the devise clause dealing with that land. This is illustrated by In re Berardini's WA
213 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1961), affid without opn, 226 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1962),
where the testator bequeathed $75,000 in trust for his daughter Loretta for life.
Should she remarry, her interest would terminate and pass to her children as each
attained age 21. Three sons of the testator were residuary legatees. The "gap" here
was the failure to name the remainderpersons to take on Loretta's death when, as
happened, she did not remarry. To prevent this remainder from falling into the re-
siduary estate, the court inferred that the testator would rather have had Loretta's
children take at her death. See also Casey v. Gallagher, 227 N.E.2d 801, 811-12 (Ohio
1967) (filling gap in scheme for disposition of trust income).
78 2A POWELL, supra note 77, § 24.04[2] (citing Brock v. Hall, 206 P.2d 360 (Cal.
1949)); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 115 (1936).
79 Unless the will has a residuary clause, in which case the broader maxim favor-
ing a complete disposition in the language of conveyance itself is the maxim being
disregarded. See supra note 77.
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incomplete disposition by deed. No living person has heirs. Thus, on
A's remarriage, the fee simple title is in the grantor (if alive) or her
heirs.80 The two rules in favor of complete disposition would have the
court construe "heirs" to mean "issue of A" if she had any living at the
time she acquired an interest in the land. Under this approach there
are persons8' to take the estate if A's interest ends either by her remar-
riage or death.
Conveyance clauses like the one quoted above-with the life es-
tate determinable on marriage and a remainder to the life tenant's
heirs-seldom appear in reported decisions. As discussed below,8 2
although one case has construed "heirs" in this context to mean "is-
sue," no court has recognized the significance to such an instrument
of the maxim favoring complete disposition and disfavoring the con-
clusion that there was an interest retained by the conveyor or his
estate.
V Si-uLV's RULE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE INSTRUMENT
QUALIFIES "HEIRS" TO EXCLUDE ONE OR MORE POTENTIAL TECHNICAL
HEIRS FROM THE CLASS
The term "heirs" is not used in its technical sense and Shelley's
Rule "does not apply if anyone is omitted from the class of heirs."83
Example: a devise "to Edcut Dillard for life, then to his heirs exclud-
ing his brothers Charlie and Searcey."84 By a parity of reasoning,
80 In jurisdictions where a possibility of reverter is alienable inter vivos or devisa-
ble, the grantor of the deed at issue may have subsequently conveyed the future inter-
est to an inter vivos grantee or to a devisee, who would now have the title. At common
law, the possibility of reverter was not alienable or devisable but did pass by intestate
succession. See SnsAs & SMrTH, supra note 1, § 1853.
81 A gift to "issue" implies a condition that if A's child dies before A's death or
remarriage leaving grandchildren of A, they will take to the exclusion of the child's
devisee or his or her heirs (which today would include a surviving spouse). However,
a child of A who dies without issue before A's death or remarriage is not divested of
his or her remainder (in the event A dies before remarrying) or executory interest (in
the event A remarries). See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 249 cmt. i, illus. 3 (1940).
82 See infra notes 318-38 and accompanying text.
83 SmiEs & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 1546; accord 1 ArMmscAN LAW, supra note 6,
§4.43, at 486.
84 This was the creative interpretation made in Gardner v. Dillar, 258 S.W.2d 93,
94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref d). In fact, the remainder as written was
to Edcut's "lawfufl heirs" without other direct qualification. Elsewhere in the will, how-
ever, specific devises were made to Edcut's half-brothers, Charlie and SearceyJohn-
son, with the explanation in the joint will executed by Edcut's parents that the devised
parcels "are all of the lands and property that they [Charlie and Searcey] shall receive
from our estate." Id The court concluded that the conveyors thus intended to ex-
clude Searcey and Charlie from the class of heirs of Edcut intended to take a remain-
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"heirs" is not used in the technical sense if the class includes relations
who would not inherit intestate, such as grandchildren of the named
ancestor whose parent, the ancestor's child, survives the ancestor. An-
other example: to A for life then to A's heirs including his illegitimate
children, even if not qualified to inherit from him by the applicable
statute.
An instrument excluding an heir (or including a nonheir) by
name as in the Edcut Dillard example is rarely encountered. Much
more commonly, Shelley's Rule is alleged to be inapplicable because
the remainder is conveyed to a "restricted class of heirs of the first
taker,"85 "a particular class of heirs to the exclusion of others."86 The
subclass of heirs-an expanded class seems never to be encountered
in the reported cases-is created, not by excluding potential heirs by
name but by excluding a sub-group of potential heirs.
In a few decisions, American courts have realized that an adjec-
tive or phrase modifying the word "heirs" in a conveyance of a remain-
der interest can qualify "heirs" so that it is not used in its technical
sense. In a relatively recent case, the Illinois Supreme Court dealt
with a devise to the testator's nephew for life with remainder "to his
heirs of blood." It held Shelley's Rule inapplicable:
[H]is heirs [of blood] are only those of his heirs who are related to
him by consanguinity and would not include his widow, although
the statute of this State has always, under certain conditions, made
the widow an heir of her deceased husband .... nor include an
der interest because it would have been in addition to the land devised to the half-
brothers.
Likewise, Shelley's Rule is not applicable if the language in the instrument's con-
veyance of the remainder is used "to designate certain individuals who are only a part,
and not all, of the heirs of the first taker." Jones v. Stone, 279 S.E.2d 13, 18 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981). On the other hand, Shelley's Rule does apply where the conveyor uses
the term "heirs" and specifies by name one or more who are included in the class. See
Taney v. Fahnley, 25 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1890) (construing son's deed to mother for life,
remainder "to her heirs in equal portions, the said Nathaniel, the maker of this deed,
included"); see also Prior v. Quackenbush, 29 Ind. 475 (1868), discussed in infra note
298.
85 Fields v. Rollins, 119 S.E. 207, 208 (N.C. 1923) (emphasis added); accord Wal-
lace v. Wallace, 106 S.E. 501 (N.C. 1921).
86 Miller v. Harding, 83 S.E. 25, 26 (N.C. 1914) (emphasis added). "The heirs of
the life tenant must be described in such terms as to encompass all his possible heirs,
ascendants, descendants, and collaterals" if Shelley's Rule is to create a fee simple.
Annotation, Modern Status of the Rule in Shelley's Case, 99 A.L.R.2d 1161, 1176 (1965);
accord Cahill v. Cahill, 84 N.E.2d 380, 385-86 (Ill. 1949) (stating that remainder must
be conveyed to "all" who would inherit intestate from life tenant). A remainder to the
restricted class of bodily heirs of the life tenant did create a fee tail under the Rule in
Shelley's Case. See supra note 55 and text accompanying note 61.
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adopted child, whom the statute puts on an equality with children
by birth for the purpose of inheriting from the adopting parent....
The devise here is of a life estate and the remainder is not granted
to the heirs generally of the life tenant, but to a restricted class of
his heirs.
87
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that Shelley's Rule would
not apply if the remainder were conveyed to the life tenant's "heirs
now living."8 8 The heirs presumptively alive when the instrument be-
came effective could be children who would predecease the life ten-
ant, with grandchildren ultimately being the actual heirs.
8 9
Another Pennsylvania case 9° involved a conveyance of a life estate
to the conveyor's four sons for life and then to "each of their nearest
male heirs." Since the qualifier "male" excluded females who might
be heirs, the class of male heirs was not the same as heirs in the tech-
nical sense. Shelley's Rule did not apply.9 1
A New York case concerned a devise to the testator's son for life,
but "if he leave no legitimate heirs," then to a brother of the life ten-
ant.92 The court first found an implied remainder to the life tenant's
"legitimate heirs" and then held that these were words of purchase:
"Now the words 'legitimate heirs,' had in mind of the testator no
other meaning than 'children born in lawful wedlock. . . .'9" The
court held that Shelley's Rule did not apply.
87 Cahill v. Cahill, 84 N.E.2d 380, 386-87 (Ill. 1949).
88 McCann v. McCann, 47 A. 743, 745 (Pa. 1901) (dictum). On the other hand,
Shelley's Rule does apply where the remainder is to "surviving heirs" where the per-
son they must survive is the life tenant. See, e.g., Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 369 (1848);
Price v. Griffin, 64 S.E. 372 (N.C. 1909); Mayv. Lewis, 43 S.E. 550 (N.C. 1903); Daven-
po9t v.Eskew, 48 S.E. 223 (S.C. 1904) (construing remainder to life tenant's "remain-
irig heirs" to mean "surviving" heirs). To be an heir, one must survive the ancestor,
hence the word "surviving" is legally "superfluous." Hiester v. Yerger, 31 A. 122, 122
(Pa. 1895).
89 Moreover, no living person has heirs, which are determined only at his or her
death.
90 Jones v. Bower, 20 Pa. C. 95 (1897). See Jones v. Jones, 51 A. 362 (Pa. 1902),
which dealt with the same instrument and construed it in an identical fashion.
91 The court observed that the phrase "heirs male of the body" was the technical
term for creation of a fee tail male under Shelley's Rule, but that in the will at issue
"male heirs" included collaterals. Bower, 20 Pa. C. at 97.
92 Lytle v. Beveridge, 58 N.Y. 592, 594 (1874).
93 Id at 604. Oddly, the court also said that "legitimate heirsy might mean "chil-
dren generally"-that is, not necessarily those born in wedlock. This could suggest
that Sheley was inapplicable because the brother devising the alternative contingent
remainder was one of the technical heirs. See infra text accompanying notes 204-316.
In Lytle, the will became effective in 1823, and the life tenant died in 1829. Ac-
cording to my research, New York first abrogated the filius nuUius doctrine by a stat-
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A. Contemporary Application of Shelley's Rule to a Remainder to "Lawful
Heirs" Is Erroneous
1. The Doctrine of Filius Nullius Was Long Ago Rejected in All
American Jurisdictions
At common law, for purposes of intestate succession, an illegiti-
mate was filius nullius, a child of no one.94 He could not even be the
heir of his own mother, until that judge-made rule was altered by stat-
utes. Until the filius nullius doctrine was abrogated, the maxim that
meaning is to be given to every word inserted in a will or deed could
not be implemented in the case of a devise to A for life then to A's
"lawful" heirs. Although an illegitimate was sometimes referred to as
not being a "lawful" child of his parents, giving the word that meaning
in the devise would not qualify the word "heirs," for the illegitimate
was already by law excluded from the class.
Late in the eighteenth century, American states began by stat-
ute95-and shortly thereafter, in one jurisdiction by case law96-to
recognize an illegitimate as heir of his or her mother. Statutes provid-
ing a means for an illegitimate's father to confer heirship status on the
child were soon enacted in many states and in recent years were com-
pelled by decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning
equal protection rights of illegitimates. 97
The earliest statutes abrogating the filius nullius doctrine pro-
vided only that the illegitimate was the heir of his or her mother, but
such statutes altered the significance of a remainder to "lawful heirs"
not only when the life tenant was a female (whose child might be her
heir), but also when the life tenant was a male. That is so because the
male life tenant's heir might not be his child but could be a niece or
ute enacted in 1855. 1855 N.Y. Laws 547. The Lytle opinion was written in 1874, after
some 19 years during which illegitimates could be intestate heirs in New York. Appar-
ently, in stressing that the testator intended to restrict the class of heirs of the life
tenant to legitimates, the court forgot that the filius nullius doctrine, see infra text
accompanying note 94, was applicable to the instrument involved so that the word
"legitimate" was surplusage.
94 See Central Trust Co. v. Skillen, 138 N.Y.S. 884, 886 (1912); In re Sheffer's Will,
249 N.Y.S. 102, 105 (Sur. Ct. 1931); Decker v. Meriwether, 708 S.W.2d 390, 392
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
95 See, e.g., 1796 Ky. Acts CCLXXVI, §§ 18-19, reprinted in 1 LrrrLL's LAws 559
(1809).
96 Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228 (1824) (involving intestate succession to the es-
tate of a mother dying in 1778). The court rejected the English authorities' holdings
that the word "children" in an intestate succession statute excluded illegitimates.
97 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852
(1986); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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nephew-illegitimate offspring of his sister-a grandchild, bastard of
his predeceased daughter, or even a half-brother or half sister, illegiti-
mate child of his own mother.
2. Many Modem Cases Not Involving Shelley's Rule Recognize
That a Conveyor's Use of the Term "Lawful" Expresses
Intent to Exclude Illegitimates
a. Under Contemporary Policy, Illegitimates Are Included in a
Class of Devisees or Grantees in Case of Doubt, But
Their Exclusion Is Not Prohibited
While the old common law presumptively excluded illegitimates
from a class gift in favor of a person's issue or heirs, 98 contemporary
public policy is accommodating of them and requires their inclusion
in the class in the event of any doubt concerning the conveyor's in-
tent.99 On the other hand, apart from the rights of his or her surviv-
ing spouse, a conveyor is free to exclude anyone he pleases from the
benefits of his deed. 00 I could find no case holding that there is any
ambiguity in a class gift to, for example, "legitimate" children or issue.
This express terminology will exclude illegitimates.10°
98 See infra text accompanying notes 124-29.
99 Persons born illegitimate, whether or not legitimated by their father, were in-
cluded in class gifts in the following illustrative cases: Eaton v. Eaton, 91 A. 191
(Conn. 1914) (discussing gift to father's "children and descendants"); Hicks v. Smith,
22 S.E. 153 (Ga. 1894) (discussing gift to father's "children"); Dunlavy v. Lowrie, 25
N.E.2d 67 (Ill. 1939) (discussing gift to "child or children of his body"); Conway v.
Childress, 896 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing gift to "heirs-at-law"); Powers
v. Stele, 475 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1985) (involving gift to "issue"); Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 172 A.2d 345 (RI. 1961) (involving gift to "living lineal heirs");
Scales v. Scales, 564 S.W.2d 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (discussing gift to "children");
Eberlein v. Tousey, 50 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1951) (involving gift to "my heirs"); accord 10
AM. JuR. 2D Bastards § 135, at 941 (1963).
100 See generally RErSTATEmNT oF PROPERTE § 292 cmt. e (1940).
101 Will of Hoffman, 53 A.D.2d 55, 64 (N.Y. 1976), held that a devise to "issue"
included a child born a bastard. "On the other hand," said the court, "a bequest to
legitimate 'children' would cut off any claim an illegitimate child might assert." Id.
Cf Estate of Hoigaard, 360 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a provi-
sion in a will for "issue" of the testator). A "definitions" section of the will defined
"issue" as all lineal descendants, including adoptees, "except illegitimate descendants
and their descendants." Id. at 362. This excluded an illegitimate son of the testator
whom he had openly acknowledged as his in two court proceedings to fix his support
obligation.
Although no case I found considered "legitimate" ambiguous, total clarity can be
obtained by this type of wording: excluding any person born illegitimate, whether or
not subsequently legitimated by his or her father and whether or not having status as
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b. When Shelley's Rule Is Not at Issue, Almost All Courts
Hold that "Lawful" Is Not Surplusage and Excludes at
Least Some Illegitimates From a Class of
Children, Issue, or Heirs
Despite the contemporary policy against discrimination based on
illegitimacy, in situations where Shelley's Rule is not at issue, almost
all contemporary cases hold that "lawful" means the same as "legiti-
mate" when modifying a class of takers in a deed such as "children,"
"issue," or "heirs." It is not surplusage and excludes at least some ille-
gitimates from the class.
Illustrative is a 1989 case, Presley v. Hanks,'0 2 which involved a will
creating a trust for the benefit of "Lisa Marie Presley, and any other
lawful issue I might have." Upon termination of the trust, there was to
be a distribution to Elvis' "lawful children." The Tennessee Court of
Appeals held that one claiming to be an illegitimate daughter was ex-
cluded from trust benefits: "Unless we disregard and give no meaning
to the word 'lawful,' we are compelled to believe that the word was
used to denote those born in lawful wedlock."' 03
Another recent Tennessee decision' 0 4 construed a devise to the
testator's son William for life, then to his issue. A "definitions" section
of the will defined issue as "lawful issue." William died survived by a
bastard daughter he had never legitimated, but it was held she did not
qualify as a remainderperson. The court cited the maxim that techni-
cal words are presumed to be used in their technical sense, conclud-
ing that it was "clearly the testator's intent that only the legitimate
children of William P. Meriwether would take under this provi-
sion."105 In a factually similar case from New York involving a will
taking effect in 1872,106 the court held:
"Lawful" is the antithesis of "unlawful" or "illegitimate." In
popular usage, the words "lawful issue" have an accepted meaning.
All children are "issue" of their parents, for the operation of natural
heir of his or her mother or father, as well as any person claiming through such
illegitimate.
102 782 S.W.2d 482, 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
103 Id. at 489.
104 Decker v. Meriwether, 708 S.W.2d 390, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
105 Id. The same interpretation applies when the illegitimate is a remote issue of
the named ancestor. See Last Will & Testament of Kane, 496 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sur. Ct.
1985) (discussing situation in which the life tenant's only child, a legitimate daughter,
had given birth to an illegitimate child who was excluded because of this status from
the class of the life tenant's "lawful issue" named to take the remainder).
106 At least by 1855, New York had abrogated the filius nullius doctrine to recog-
nize an illegitimate as heir of his or her mother. See supra note 93.
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laws favorable to the procreation and birth of offspring is not af-
fected by the existence or nonexistence of a marital contract. But
when this word relating to children is qualified by the adjective "law-
ful," it is ordinarily understood to mean those begotten and born in
lawful wedlock.
10 7
A 1921 Illinois case' 0 8 construed a provision of the will of Mar-
shall Field providing that if his grandson Henry "shall die leaving law-
ful issue surviving," each such "child" should acquire an income
interest in the trust. Henry was survived by a bastard son. "Obvi-
ously," said the Illinois Supreme Court, "'leaving lawful issue' cannot
include illegitimates ... 109
I could find only one case involving an instrument taking effect
after abrogation of the filius nullius doctrine, that did not involve Shel-
ley's Rule, in which the court held that the word "lawful" in "lawful
heirs" or "lawful issue" is surplusage and ineffective to exclude any
illegitimates from the class. A North Carolina case, Harrell v. Ha-
107 Central Trust Co. v. Skillin, 188 N.Y.S. 884, 886 (1912); accord United States
Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 57 N.Y.S. 53, 56 (Sur. Ct. 1899) (stating that the words "lawful
issue" have "clear, distinct and well-settled meaning"-issue "born in wedlock"). In
both Skillin and Maxwell, the wills as construed excluded children born illegitimate
but whose parents later married, and the legislature subsequently passed a statute
making such marriage an act of legitimation. More recently, the Appellate Division
has held that children born illegitimate but later legitimated, even after the testator
died, are within the class of "lawful" issue or heirs. In re Vought's Trust, 285 N.Y.S.2d
780, 787 (1967); see also In re Sheffer's Will, 249 N.Y.S. 102 (Sur. Ct. 1931) (involving a
testamentary disposition to testator's widow for life and then to his four children or
their "lawful issue"). The court said that but for the later marriage of their parents,
two bastard children of one of the testator's sons who predeceased the life tenant
could not have qualified as remainderpersons.
In Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N.E. 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 1905), the question concerned
the meaning of the term "legitimate heirs." In explaining why it thought precedents
concerning the meaning of "lawful heirs" were pertinent, the court said: "[T] he words
'legitimate heirs' have been defined to mean children born in lawful wed-
lock .... 'Legitimate' is also defined by Webster to mean lawful; lawfully begotten;
born in wedlock." Id. at 1013.
108 Marsh v. Field, 130 N.E. 753 (Ill. 1921).
109 Id. at 754. Actually, Henry's illegitimate child did not even contest this conclu-
sion. The battle was over a corpus interest bequeathed to "all the surviving children"
of Henry, and the question was whether the requirement of being a "lawful" child,
imposed in the clause bequeathing an income interest-a few lines above the corpus
provision in the same paragraph of the will-implicitly attached to the gift of a corpus
interest. The court held that it did. Cf. Reinders v. Koppelman, 7 S.W. 288 (Mo.
1888) (construing will effective in 1869 and finding that a gift to the testator's "lawful
heirs" excluded his adopted daughter). Most states now reject this interpretation as a
matter of public policy. See e.g., 1 AMmucAN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 3.04(6) (c) (iii)
(Arthur R. Guadio ed., 1991).
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gan,"1 0 concerned a devise to the testator's daughter in fee, but if she
"die without leaving a lawful heir," over to the testator's sons. The
daughter died intestate survived by two illegitimate children and no
legitimate issue. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that there
was no defeasance because the word "lawful" was surplusage. "[T] he
term does not at all mean 'legitimate' but simply the person desig-
nated by law to take by descent.""1 Under the 1799 statute partially
abolishing the filius nullius doctrine in North Carolina," 2 the two ille-
gitimates were the life tenant's heirs because she left no legitimate
offspring. The sole support for the "mere surplusage" holding was a
citation to a 1904 decision involving application of Shelley's Rule to a
remainder to "lawful heirs."
1 3
At least one court has recognized that the abrogation of the filius
nullius doctrine means that use of "lawful" as a qualifier is no longer
surplusage and ordinarily would exclude illegitimates, yet it declined
to make this construction due to special circumstances.1 4 This oc-
curred in what appears to be Kentucky's first case to deal with the
issue after enactment in 1796 of a statute' 15 making an illegitimate the
heir of his or her mother. In Black v. Cartmell the original will devised
land to the testator's daughter, Catherine, subject to a life estate in
her husband William, with Catherine to be defeased in favor of the
testator's heirs "if the said Catherine dies, without issue, before the
said William.""16 A codicil was soon executed in which the testator
eliminated the disposition in William's favor; but the rewritten defeas-
ing clause operated if Catherine "die without lawful issue."' 17 The tes-
tator died in 1833, and Catherine subsequently died survived by a
bastard son born after execution of the codicil.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals acknowledged that because of
the 1796 statute changing the common law, old cases holding that
"lawful heirs" simply meant heirs determined by statute were not con-
trolling in the Black case. In the codicil to be construed, "issue"
means descendants or offspring-and . . . the phrase "lawful de-
scendants or offspring" would clearly exclude illegitimate, or unlaw-
ful descendants, or offspring, although they might
110 60 S.E. 909, 910 (N.C. 1908).
111 Id. at 911.
112 1799 N.C. Sess. Laws 522, quoted in infra note 160.
113 Wool v. Fleetwood, 48 S.E. 785 (N.C. 1904), discussed in infra text accompany-
ing note 157.
114 Black v. Cartmell, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.)188 (1849).
115 1796 Ky. Acts CCLXXVI, §§ 18-19, reprinted in I LrIra.L's LAws 559 (1809).
116 Black, 49 Ky. at 188.
117 Id. at 189.
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inherit .... [T] he fact that an illegitimate child may inherit from its
mother, seems hardly to be a sufficient ground for saying that he is
embraced in the words "lawful issue," as he certainly would not be
in the words "lawful descendant."118
As discussed below," 9 the court proceeded to hold that the word "law-
ful" had been inadvertently inserted in the codicil and was to be disre-
garded for this reason.
c. Instruments Referring to Illegitimates Voluntarily
Legitimated by Their Father as "Lawful" Children,
Issue, and Heirs, Do Not Embrace All
Illegitimates Who Could Be Heirs.
Some courts have held or stated in dictum that a class of "lawful"
issue or children of a father in an instrument would include children
bom illegitimate but later legitimated by a voluntary act of the father,
as by marrying the children's mother.120 I could find no case ex-
tending this approach to find that a lawful child or lawful issue of a
father included a person born illegitimate who established paternity
in a suit brought against the father in his lifetime and resisted by the
father, or brought after the father's death.' 2 ' Such a scope for the
118 Id at 193-94.
119 See infra text accompanying notes 169-73.
120 See Traders Bank v. Goulding, 711 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. 1986) ("lawful issue" held
to exclude an illegitimate where there is no evidence of subsequent legitimation);
Riddle v. Deters Trust Co., 24 N.W.2d 434 (Neb. 1946) ("lawful issue" included child
legitimated by natural father's compliance with California's adoption statute); In re
Vought's Trust, 285 N.Y.S.2d 780, 787 (1967) ("lawful issue" held to include illegiti-
mate whose father went through putative marriage ceremony); Will of Hoffman, 385
N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1976) (dictum). ("lawful issue" includes illegitimates whose
parents marry or attempt to marry after the child's birth); In re Scheffer's Will, 249
N.Y.S. 102 (Sur. Ct. 1931) ("lawful issue" held to include two children born out of
wedlock to father who later married their mother).
121 A survey in Robert Silverman, Comment, Inheritance Rights. of Non-Marital Chil-
dren Under Michigan's 1993 Probate Code Changes, 1995 DET. C.L. REv. 1123, 1132 n. 65,
finds that all but six American jurisdictions permit an illegitimate to sue after the
death of the intestate to establish the paternity necessary to make the claimant an
heir. Id. The article includes Oregon as one of the six, but my own research indicates
that there is no such time limit there. See OR. REv. STAT. § 112.105 (1990).
The situs state, deciding rights in land under Shelley's Rule or otherwise, will
determine the status of a potential heir of an intestate or named ancestor in an instru-
ment of title under the law of the domicile of the child and his father at the time of
the alleged legitimation. See, e.g., Bickford v. Carden, 221 S.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Ark.
1949); Zuckswert v. Goss, 304 So. 2d 704, 706-07 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Wickware v.
Session, 538 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); see also Estate of
Dauennauer, 535 P.2d 1005, 1006-07 (Mont. 1975); Estate of Radke, 505 P.2d 779,
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word "lawful" would make that word mere surplusage in the type of
class gift on which we are focusing, namely a gift to a named person's
"lawful heirs." Certainly if all illegitimates who had qualified as heirs,
whether or not based on a voluntary act of their father, were included,
so would persons entitled to heirship due to adoption.122 Thus, all
heirs would be included in, and all non-heirs excluded from, the class.
It would also seem that an extension of the existing case law con-
cerning fights of illegitimates voluntarily legitimated by the father to
illegitimates who gain heirship status without such voluntary action
would require a holding that illegitimates of a mother, who does not
have to take any action to establish their status as her heirs, would be
included in the phrase "lawful children." This holding would be con-
trary to the only case on point I could find.123 Once again, such inclu-
sion of illegitimates would make the word surplusage and contrary to
the maxim of construction requiring that effect be given to every word
unless doing so is unreasonable.
Thus, courts are not likely to extend the holdings that include as
"lawful heirs" bastards legitimated by a voluntary act of the father to
other situations. Instead, the precedents restricting the meaning of
"lawful" may be reconsidered because they can benefit only illegiti-
mate children of a father. The mother, knowing her illegitimates
have heirship status automatically, has no reason to do any act to vol-
untarily legitimate them unless she knows of the deed or will in favor
781 (Utah 1973); 15A CJ.S. Conflict of Laws § 14(8), at 479 (1967); Annotation, Con-
flict of Laws as to Legitimacy or Legitimation or as to Rights of Rlegitimates, as Affecting De-
scent and Distribution of Decedent's Estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1274 (1967). But see Estate of
Blanco, 323 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (applying situs rather than domi-
cile law concerning bases for legitimation but conceding that this is minority ap-
proach). Under the majority rule, and according to the Restatemen if the allegedly
legitimating father and the bastard have different domiciles, the law of the father's
domicile controls. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLcIT or LAWs §§ 137-141 (1934); accord RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287 cmt. f (1971) (discussing cases
where state of father's domicile holds child to have been legitimated).
122 See McIlvaine v. AmSouth Bank, 581 So. 2d 454, 459-61 (Ala. 1991); Estate of
Heard, 319 P.2d 637, 641-42 (Cal. 1957); Marsh v. Field, 130 N.E. 753, 755 (111. 1921);
Trenton Trust Co. v. Gane, 8 A.2d 708 (NJ. 1939) ("surviving lawful heirs"). Older
case law presumed adoptees were not included in class gifts to "lawful" children, issue,
or heirs. See, e.g., Reinders v. Koppelman, 7 S.W. 288 (Mo. 1888) (construing remain-
der to "lawful heirs");Jenkins v. Jenkins, 14 A. 557 (N.H. 1888) (construing "issue" as
"lawful issue").
123 In re Underhill's Estate, 28 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sur. Ct. 1941) (involving a trust for
the benefit of an adopted child and at her death to her children and issue of any
deceased child). At this time, New York courts treated the word "issue" as meaning
"lawful issue." The court held that a deceased daughter's illegitimate child could not
take under the trust as "lawful issue." Id.
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of her "lawful heirs." Even if she does, there may be no procedure she
can pursue, because the illegitimates already have heir status.
1 24
124 The case law rule under analysis is not always discriminatory against the class of
lawful heirs of a female. If the claimant under the class gift is her illegitimate
grandchild, whose father, her son, predeceased her (or an illegitimate collateral, such
as a niece, child of the named ancestor's brother), presumably the courts giving "law-
ful" the broadest meaning would hold that voluntary legitimation before his death by
the father predeceasing the named ancestor would bring the illegitimate into the
class of her "lawful heirs." Likewise, this expansive view of "lawful" is of no benefit to
a grandchild claiming under a deed or will to be the "lawful heir" of his grandfather
(male ancestor), when the grandchild is an illegitimate child of the predeceased
daughter of the named ancestor. She will not have done any act to voluntarily legiti-
mate the child. The situation is the same if the claimant is an illegitimate child of a
collateral female relative (predeceased) of a male named ancestor.
The fact that in these unusual situations the case law treating illegitimates volun-
tarily legitimated by their father as "lawful" applies when the named ancestor is a
female and does not always apply when the named ancestor is a male is no reason for
failing to abrogate the expansive meaning given to "lawful" as generally discriminat-
ing against illegitimate children of a female. In the great majority of cases, it will be.
In those cases where, after the death of his or her grandparent or collateral rela-
tive, an illegitimate, who predeceased the intestate, sues to establish paternity in order
to inherit through his father, a curious statute of limitations problem arises. Literally,
the applicable time bar will be in the statute concerning the action against the father,
who may have been long dead with distribution of his estate made years before (with-
out including the illegitimate). Because the action to establish paternity is not
brought for purposes of asserting a claim against the father, but rather through him to
a grandparent or collateral relative, the purpose of the statute of limitation to protect
the father's estate from stale claims of heirship is not promoted by barring the suit.
Suppose there is a statute of limitations providing a long time to file-or imposing no
time limit at all-concerning the suit to establish paternity vis-a-vis the father. See, e.g.,
WASH. R v. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(1) (a) (West 1997) (stating that "any interested
party," which would include child seeking to claim through and not from the father,
may sue "at any time" to establish paternity). Furthermore, suppose the grandson of a
South Carolina intestate brings suit in Washington to establish his paternity by the
intestate's son, who died years ago while domiciled in Washington. The grandson is
planning to invoke a judgment of paternity obtained in Washington in intestacy pro-
ceedings concerning his South Carolina paternal grandfather. This action is brought
one year after the grandfather's death as a domiciliary of South Carolina, where by
statute a direct suit against the intestate claiming he was an illegitimate's father, would
be barred by the state's special limitation requiring the paternity action to be filed
within the later of eight months after the death of the intestate or six months after the
probating of his will. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109(2) (ii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Should South Carolina find a policy basis for rejecting a Washington paternity deter-
mination as untimely? Its statute with the short limitations period recognizes that the
illegitimate may be seeking a determination of paternity in order to claim inheritance
rights "through" his deceased father. Id. at § 62-2-109.
In the reverse situation, where grandfather was of Washington and the prede-
ceased father of South Carolina, should courts of the latter state permit the paternity
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To summarize, where Shelley's Rule is not at issue, almost all
cases construe "lawful heirs" to refer only to persons born legitimate,
with one exception in some states: the class may include children le-
gitimated by a voluntary act of their father. Illegitimate children of a
mother and a father's illegitimates who gain heirship status by action
initiated by them will be excluded. Thus "lawful heirs" does not mean
the same thing as intestate heirs in the technical sense.
3. Older Shelley's Rule Cases Ignoring the Possibility that "Lawful"
Could Qualify "Heirs" Are Explainable by the Filius Nullius
Doctrine
It is quite understandable that decisions involving instruments
from the eighteenth and the earliest part of the nineteenth centuries
do not discuss whether "lawful heirs" meant something different than
"heirs" in its technical sense. It did not. Because of the filius nullius
doctrine, the word was surplusage. Indeed, in Wolfe v. Shelley itself, the
remainder was "to the use of the heirs male of the body of the said
Edward [Shelley] lawfully begotten .. .. "125 Thus, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court applied Shelley's Rule to the will of a testator,
dying in 1815, who devised a life estate to two sons, with the remain-
der to "any lawful heirs at the time of their decease.' 26 New Hamp-
suit to be filed more than a year after the father's death so that the illegitimate can
make a claim through his father in Washington proceedings?
How courts will resolve these kinds of problems remains to be seen. Legislative
fine tuning is obviously needed, except in Mississippi. Its statute provides that an out-
of-state determination of paternity by a pre-deceased, non-Mississippian domiciliary,
through whom an illegitimate claims heirship rights against a Mississippi decedent,
shall not be recognized unless such determination is filed within ninety days after the
death of the intestate. Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15 (3) (c) (ii) (1994).
125 Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 207 (K.B. 1581); see Note, supra note 2, at
968.
126 Crockett v. Robinson, 46 N.H. 454 (1866); see also Simper's Lessee v. Simpers,
15 Md. 160 (1860) (holding that Shelley's Rule created fee tail where the testator,
who died in 1805, devised a remainder to the life tenant's "lawfully begotten" heirs
male, and the filius nullius doctrine had been abrogated in Maryland in 1825, 1825
Md. Laws 156); The Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 209
(1880) (involving an 1842 deed with remainder to life tenant's "lawfully begotten"
heirs of the body); Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa. 501 (1872) (dictum) (stating that Shelley's
Rule would create fee tail where will of testator dying in 1841 contained remainder to
"lawful issue"); Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa. 117, 118 (1859) (stating that there was "no
doubt" Shelley's Rule created fee tail where devise of remainder was to the life ten-
ant's "legitimate issue"). In this last case, the date of death was some time before
1848, when the transferee named as life tenant disentailed the fee tail Shelley's Rule
had created. Pennsylvania first recognized an illegitimate as heir in 1855. 1855 Pa.
Laws 387, 368; see Opdyke's Appeal, 49 Pa. 373 (1865).
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shire first recognized that an illegitimate could be an intestate heir by
statute in 1845.127
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Campbell v. Lewisburg & North-
ern Railroad,'28 dealt with a will that took effect in 1866 and contained
a devise to the testator's grandson for life, "then to the heirs of his
body by a legal marriage." The court explained that Shelley's Rule
would have applied, but for a statute abolishing it. It declared that
heirs "of a legal marriage" meant the same as heirs "of a lawful mar-
riage." The latter phrase, in turn, meant the same as "lawful heirs" of
the body.129 Although the testator must have intended to exclude as
remainderpersons bastard children and grandchildren of his grand-
son, the expression was, perhaps, considered to be legally redundant
because it was not until legislation of 1867 that Tennessee recognized
an illegitimate as heir of his mother. 30
Perhaps the most curious of these cases dealing with old instru-
ments is Polk v. Faris,'31 also decided by the Tennessee Supreme
Court. In a 1786 deed, the grantor, "then a single woman," 3 2 con-
veyed property for life to a child described in the instrument as the
grantor's "natural daughter." The remainder was granted to the heirs
127 See Reynolds v. Hitchcock, 56 A. 745 (N.H. 1903) (applying the statute making
an illegitimate heir of his or her mother, 1845 N.H. Laws 238).
128 26 S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. 1930).
129 Id. at 144.
130 See Laughlin v. Johnson, 52 S.W. 816 (Tenn. 1899) (applying section 10, chap-
ter 36, of the Tennessee Acts of 1866-67).
In the three preceding paragraphs in text, the phrase "lawful" or "legal" heirs or
issue appeared in instruments with effective dates of 1815 and 1866. In both cases,
the jurisdiction had yet, as of the effective date of the instrument, to-but might have
been expected to-change the law to recognize an illegitimate as heir of his or her
mother. In both cases, the life tenant died after statutory abrogation of the filius
nullius doctrine. If this had been pointed out to the court as part of an argument that
the qualifier "lawful" caused "heirs" to have a nontechnical meaning by excluding
illegitimate heirs, would the court have dismissed this on the ground that the con-
veyor intended the definition of "heirs" at the time of execution of or the effective
date of the will (testator's death in the case of the wills in the New Hampshire and
Tennessee cases)?
It is suggested below, in the context of a choice of law clause for situs law, that a
"freezing" in the instrument of the law by selecting currently applicable principles
precludes application of Shelley's Rule when a change in the law of heirship is plausi-
ble. See infra text accompanying note 262. Thus in the two cases, there may have
been a basis for rejecting Shelley's Rule, but it was not pointed out to the courts. It is
for that reason that I cite them as illustrations of why the existence of the filius nullius
doctrine can explain the failure to consider whether "lawful" or "legal" qualified
"heirs."
131 17 Tenn. (9 Yer.) 209 (1836).
132 Id. at 210.
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of the body of the life tenant "lawfully issuing," and in default of "such
issue, lawfully begotten," the property would revert to the grantor. 33
The court found no basis for avoiding Shelley's Rule, under which the
grantee took a fee tail upgraded in Tennessee to a fee simple. Coun-
sel, arguing against the application of Shelley's Rule, stressed that the
life tenant was "nullius filiae."'3 4 She could have no heirs except her
own issue, and, somehow, this meant that the grantor had used "heirs
of the body" to mean children only, and not issue. Because Tennessee
did not abrogate the filius nullius doctrine until 1867, counsel was un-
able to make what today should be the winning point: that the gran-
tor, specifically noting the illegitimate status of her daughter-grantee,
took care to exclude from the class of heirs the grantee's own illegiti-
mate issue, who would by statute be her heirs.
4. Modem Cases Treating "Lawful" as Surplusage in Order to
Apply Shelley's Rule Are Erroneous.
The Restatement of Property's discussion of Shelley's Rule in 1940
noted that by that date an illegitimate was always the heir of his or her
mother and that the states had statutes whereby the father could legit-
imate the illegitimate so he or she would be the father's heir as
well.135 However, it further noted that "additional language" inserted
to qualify "heirs" could exclude illegitimates who would otherwise be
in the class of heirs. Clearly, the qualifier "legitimate"136 would have
this effect, but is not "lawful" effectively the same?
Despite the modem treatment casting heirship on many illegiti-
mates, twentieth century cases in the context of Shelley's Rule uni-
formly continue to treat "lawful" as mere surplusage. In most of these
cases, the courts just ignore the word "lawful" as possibly restricting
the class of "heirs."1 37 This probably occurred because the party argu-
133 Id. at 211. One can ponder whether the grantor had her draftsperson twice
add the legally meaningless reference to "lawfully" issuing and begotten to remind
her bastard daughter not to suffer the same shame and ignominy her mother had by
bearing a child out of wedlock.
134 Id. at 216.
135 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 305 cmt. 1 (1940).
136 See supra text accompanying note 92.
137 See, e.g., Webbe v. Webbe, 84 N.E. 1054 (Ill. 1908) (dictum) (construing will
admitted to probate in 1888); Myers v. Myers, 190 N.W. 491 (Neb. 1922) (construing
remainder to life tenant's "lawful heirs"); Benton v. Baucom, 135 S.E. 629 (N.C. 1926)
(construing remainder "to [life tenant's] lawful heirs," where life tenant had illegiti-
mate child who predeceased her); Tyson v. Sinclair, 50 S.E. 450 (N.C. 1905) (constru-
ing remainder "to the lawful heirs of his body"); Britt v. Rowland, 48 S.E. 586 (N.C.
1904) (construing remainder to female life tenant's "lawful heirs"); McCann v. Bar-
clay, 53 A. 767 (Pa. 1902) (construing remainder to life tenant's "lawful heirs"; it is
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ing against the application of Shelley's Rule neglected to pursue the
theory that "lawful" qualified "heirs," so that the class referred to in
the instrument was narrower than "heirs" in its technical sense. Other
decisions simply state as a conclusion, without supporting analysis,
that "lawful" does not change the meaning of "heirs." Typical is an
Illinois Supreme Court decision of 1919 dealing with an 1895 deed
containing a remainder to the life tenant's "lawful heirs." 38 Illinois
by statute had recognized since 1829 that an illegitimate could be his
mother's heir. 3 9 Surely it was possible that the conveyor intended to
exclude this subclass of heirs by use of the word "lawful." Neverthe-
less, the court held that, "[t]he qualifying adjective 'lawful' . . . does
not in any way change the meaning of the word 'heirs' to one of
purchase rather than limitation." 40 This was repeated in similar con-
clusory fashion as recently as 1965 by the Illinois Court of Appeals
which held, "Itlhat the word 'heirs' is preceded by the word 'lawful'
does not affect its ordinary or technical meaning."' 4' In Illinois, this is
a special rule reserved only for Shelley's Rule cases. We know this to
conceivable the will here became effective before Pennsylvania first abrogated the
filius nullius doctrine in 1855, see supra note 126); Lacey v. Floyd, 87 S.W. 665 (Tex.
1905); Gardner v. Dillard, 258 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Note, supra note 2, at 1020 (declaring without analysis that the word "lawful"
qualifying heirs does not take the remainder out of the Rule in Shelley's Case).
Some late nineteenth century cases which were decided not long after the state
began to recognize that an illegitimate could be an heir also just ignored "lawfully" or
"lawful" as modifying "heirs." Thus, Shelley's Rule was applied to a remainder to the
life tenant's "lawful heirs" in Perkins v. McConnell, 36 N.E. 121 (Ind. 1894) (date of
testator's death not given, but filius nullius doctrine abrogated in Indiana by 1817;
The Revised Laws of Indiana ch. XXXI, §§ 8-9 (1824) (enacted in 1817), and Moorev.
Brooks, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 135 (1855) (construing an 1810 deed with remainder to life
tenant's "heirs lawfully begotten," where the filius nullius doctrine was abrogated by
1785 Va. Acts ch. LX, §§ XVI-XVII). See also Conger v. Lowe, 24 N.E. 889 (Ind. 1890)
(dictum) (testator's date of death 1874). In Clarke v. Smith, 49 Md. 106 (1878), the
testator died some time before 1873, and his will devised a remainder to the life ten-
ant's "heirs lawfully begotten." Shelley's Rule was applied. Id. Maryland abrogated
the filius nullius doctrine in 1825. 1825 Md. Laws 156; see also Earle v. Dawes, 3 Md.
Ch. 230 (1849). Kleppner v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 70 (1871), applied Shelley's Rule to create
a fee tail under a will effective in 1869, where the remainder was to the female life
tenant's "lawful issue." Pennsylvania had recognized an illegitimate as heir of his or
her mother since 1855. 1855 Pa. Laws 387.
138 Wilson v. Harrold, 123 N.E. 563, 564 (Ill. 1919).
139 1829 Ill. Laws p. 207.
140 Wilson, 123 N.E. at 566.
141 Seymour v. Heubaum, 211 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (dealing with a
will taking effect in 1939).
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be so from the treatment of "lawful issue" in the 1921 Illinois case,
discussed above,' 42 construing the will of Marshall Field.
This major development concerning the scope of Shelley's Rule
emerged in Illinois jurisprudence without any analysis-not of the sig-
nificance of the end of the doctrine of filius nullius and not of the
potential application of the maxim that meaning should be given to
every word in an instrument if reasonably possible. Both the 1919 and
the 1965 Illinois opinions cite a 1903 case, Deemerv. Kessinger,143 where
it was argued that the testator knew the life-tenant devisee had an ille-
gitimate child and must have intended to exclude him in confining
the group of remainderpersons to "lawful" heirs of the life tenant.
The Deemer court rejected this without analysis,'4 citing an 1894 case
concerning a remainder to the life tenant's "legal heirs,"' 1 5 and an
1895 decision concerning a remainder to "lawful heirs" of the life
tenant.146
Neither of these latter two decisions even hinted at the possibility
that "lawful" might change the technical meaning of "heirs." These
were cases where there were words qualifying "heirs" in the remainder
clause, "but no notice was taken of them, so that the question of what
effect they may have had on the sense in which 'heirs' was used was
not involved." 147
In North Carolina, one finds an almost identical development of
the Rule that "lawful" is mere surplusage in modern instruments when
it modifies "heirs," including a key twentieth century case where the
life tenant in fact had an illegitimate child. As in Illinois, the citations
relied on for the mere-surplusage "rule" lead back to an analytical
void. In Paul v. Willoughby,'48 the devise was to the testator's daughter
ElizaJane "during the period of her natural life,"'149 and at her death
142 See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
143 69 N.E. 28, 29 (1903) ("Much stress is laid upon the fact that [life tenant]
William Deemer had an illegitimate child which the testator sought to exclude from
taking under the will by use of the term 'lawful heirs' .... ").
144 The only sentence of the opinion responding to the argument reads: "The
words 'nearest,' 'legal,' 'lawful,' or similar expressions preceding the word 'heirs,'
without other words of limitation, in a devise, do not convert the word 'heirs' from a
word of limitation to that of purchase." Id.
145 Vangieson v. Henderson, 36 N.E. 974 (1ll. 1894) (involving a will probated in
1887).
146 Silva v. Hopkinson, 41 N.E. 1013 (fI1. 1895).
147 Note, supra note 2, at 1070.
148 169 S.E. 226 (N.C. 1933).
149 Id at 227. The Rule in Shelley's Case was never mentioned specifically by the
court in its opinion, although it was much debated by the parties in their briefs before
the court. The court did cite a Shelley's Rule case from Illinois. See Stisser v. Stisser,
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to "the legal heirs of her body" with an ultimate gift over to collateral
heirs. ElizaJane died, survived by an illegitimate daughter as her sole
heir. Because the modifying word in the will was "legal," rather than
"lawful," the opinion is dictum concerning the significance of the lat-
ter term. But the North Carolina Supreme Court treated them as in-
terchangeable: "'Where the expression 'legal heirs' or 'lawful heirs' is
used the meaning is the same as when the word 'heirs' is used alone
... ". 150 Immediately after stating this rule-that "lawful" had no
meaning-the court quotes the heirship statute in effect at Eliza
Jane's death' 51 that made her illegitimate child her heir, obviously un-
aware that statutory abrogation of the filius nullius doctrine was incon-
sistent with the notion that the word "lawful" modifying "heir" was
surplusage.
Case law support in Paul for the notion that "lawful" had no legal
significance consisted solely of one 1908 case from Illinois' analytical
vacuum, 152 and a 1908 North Carolina decision that did not involve
Shelley's Rule, but rather discussed a clause defeasing a devisee
should she "die without leaving a lawful heir."153 In that case, the only
issue of the devisee surviving her were illegitimate. But, held the
court, there was no defeasance. The term "lawful" (as well as "legal"),
when qualifying "heir," "does not at all mean 'legitimate,' but simply
the person designated by law to take by descent."1 54 The only authori-
ties relied on in this 1908 opinion were two Shelley's Rule cases from
85 N.E. 240 (Il1. 19080. The court also indicated that the life tenant's child took the
property after her death as her heir, which could have occurred only if Shelley's Rule
had given the life tenant a fee estate. Strangely, the type of fee ElizaJane was held to
have received was a fee simple defeasible upon definite failure of issue. Pau4 169 S.E.
at 227 (finding that Eliza Jane took a "defeasible fee"). The remainder to "heirs of
the body" should have created a fee tail, converted by statute into a fee simple abso-
lute. 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 204, § 5. North Carolina cases recognizing that Shelley's
Rule creates a fee tail when the remainder is conveyed to the "heirs of the body" of
the life tenant include Edgerton v. Harrison, 52 S.E.2d 357, 359 (N.C. 1949), and
Leathers v. Gray, 7 S.E. 657, 658-59 (N.C. 1888).
150 Pau4 169 S.E. at 228 (1933) (quoting 2JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF WILLS, Exzcu-
TORS AND ADMINISTRAToRs § 990 (6th ed. 1923)).
151 She died in February 1932. The statute quoted in the opinion, N.C. Sess. Laws
71, dates from 1913 and made a mother's illegitimate child her heir whether or not
she had legitimate children. Pau, 169 S.E. at 228. Compare infra note 160.
152 Stisser v. Stisser, 85 N.E. 240 (Ill. 1908), which contained no analysis concern-
ing the effect of the use of the word "lawful" in the instrument to modify "heirs,"
dismissing it as irrelevant with a cite only to Deemer v. Kessinger, 69 N.E. 28, 29 (1ll.
1903), discussed in supra note 143.
153 Harrell v. Hagan, 60 S.E. 909 (N.C. 1908), discussed in supra text accompany-
ing notes 110-12.
154 Id. at 911.
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North Carolina. One from 1895155 involved a devise to the conveyor's
son for life and then "to his lawful heir or heirs." The word "lawful,"
declared the court, could be stricken as "meaningless" because there
can be no such thing as an unlawful heir. No authority was cited for
this conclusion.
156
The second case cited by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
1908 also leads back to authority citing no pertinent authority. Wool v.
Fleetwood 57 concerned a devise to a son, and apparently to a daughter
of the testator, for life with remainder "to their lawful heirs." Shelley's
Rule was applied, with the court holding: "There can be no such thing
as an unlawful heir. The term 'lawful heirs' means the heirs desig-
nated by law to take from the ancestor .... "15 This rule was an-
nounced in the context of an argument that "lawful heirs" meant
children rather than an argument that it meant all heirs except illegit-
imates. The only case relied on was Patrick v. Morehead,'59 concerning
a will taking effect in 1835 and a grandson's power to appoint the fee
among his "lawful heirs." No illegitimates were involved there, and
the meaning of "lawful" was not discussed.
Just as in Illinois, the case law in North Carolina, holding that
"lawful" has no meaning, traces not to a case involving a life tenant
who died while the filius nullius doctrine was in effect (which one
might have anticipated), but to a precedential void. A North Carolina
statute enacted in 1799, which made an illegitimate heir to his mother
provided she had no legitimate children, had sufficiently abrogated
the filius nullius doctrine to make old common law precedents about
the significance of "lawful" as a modifier of "heirs" distinguishable.
160
155 Francks v. Whitaker, 21 S.E. 175, 176 (N.C. 1895).
156 Id- The discussion in this case about "lawful" was dictum, as the court held
"heirs" was not used in its technical sense for a reason not involving adjectives or
phrases directly modifying that word.
157 48 S.E. 785 (N.C. 1904).
158 Id. at 788.
159 85 N.C. 62 (1881). It in turn cited a case of a remainder to "lawful issue" of the
life tenant, where the court said in dictum that Shelley's Rule would ordinarily apply,
a fee tail being created to be converted by statute into a fee simple. Ward v.Jones, 40
N.C. 400 (1848). The meaning of "lawful" was not discussed; Shelley's Rule was held
inapplicable for a reason unrelated to use of that word.
160 1799 N.C. Sess. Laws 522. It provided: "That where any woman shall die intes-
tate, leaving children, commonly called illegitimate or natural, born out of wedlock,
and no children born in lawful wedlock, all such estate whereof she shall die seized or
possessed of, whether real or personal, shall descend to and be equally divided among
such illegitimate or natural born children, and their representatives, in the same man-
ner as if they had been born in lawful wedlock .... " See Wilson v. Wilson, 126 S.E.
181, 182 (1925) (dictum) (under 1799 law bastard would inherit from his mother if
she were not survived by legitimate child).
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It is worth noting that the authorities cited in twentieth century
cases in Illinois and North Carolina for the propositibn that "lawful
heirs" means no more than heirs determined by law-for example,
the intestate succession statutes-do not include those Shelley's Rule
precedents where the remainder was to the life tenant's heirs "lawfully
begotten."16' Surely in that posture-as in cases involving bodily heirs
"lawfully issuing"162 and heirs "by a legal marriage"' 63 -the words
"lawfully" and "lawful" cannot refer simply to those persons made
heirs by a statute but can only mean legitimate heirs, excluding bas-
tards. There is no basis for a court's holding that the word "lawful" in
the term "lawful heirs" has a different meaning than "lawfully" in the
term "heirs lawfully begotten." 64
Modem Shelley's Rule cases treating "lawful" as meaningless or as
mere surplusage are wrong. First, most clearly in Illinois, the courts
do not initially construe the instrument as if Shelley's Rule did not
161 See, e.g., Nichols v. Cartwright, 6 N.C. 137 (1812) (involving a 1798 deed to the
life tenant and "her heirs lawfully begotten of her body"). Shelley's Rule was applied
to create a fee tail in the grantee. Whether "lawfully begotten" qualified "heirs" was
not discussed, perhaps because the filius nullius doctrine was in full force in North
Carolina until a year after the effective date of the deed. See supra note 160 and ac-
companying text; see also Clarke v. Smith, 49 Md. 106, 120 (1878) (involving a remain-
der to "heirs lawfully begotten"); The Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co.'s
Appeal, 93 Pa. 209, 212 (1880) (involving remainder to "heirs of the body of the said
Henrietta lawfully begotten").
162 See Polk v Farms, 17 Tenn. (9 Yer.) 209, 211 (1836);Jesson v Wright, 4 Eng. Rep.
230 (H.L. 1820), discussed in supra note 65.
163 See Campbell v. Lewisburg & N.R.R., 26 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tenn. 1930), dis-
cussed in supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
164 My research produced no case involving dispositions to heirs "legally issuing"
or issue "legally begotten," where Shelley's Rule or some other construction problem
was involved. Of course, there are many cases besides those from North Carolina
discussed in the text above where Shelley's Rule was applied to a remainder to the life
tenant's "legal" heirs, apparently on the theories that "legal" was either mere surplus-
age or directed a reference to the statutes for determining heirship. See Pease v. Da-
vis, 80 N.E. 249 (111. 1907) (construing a remainder to "legal heirs" with no discussion
as to whether "legal" qualified "heirs"); McCllen v. Sehker, 123 N.E. 475, 476 (Ind.
1919) (involving a remainder "to his legal heirs"); Bassett v. Hawk, 11 A. 802, 802 (Pa.
1888) (construing a remainder "to his legal heirs"); Chipps v. Hall, 23 W. Va. 504,513
(1883) (holding that a remainder to "legal heirs" contained no "words whatever of
qualification").
These decisions are less subject to criticism for treating "legal" as surplusage be-
cause the conveyors rarely used the term "legally issuing" (as opposed to the fre-
quently encountered "lawfully issuing") to exclude illegitimates.
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exist,165 but have a special treatment of "lawful" restricted to Shelley's
Rule cases. Second, the courts refuse to apply the maxim of construc-
tion that meaning be given, if possible, to every word in the
instrument.
166
5. Evidence that the Draftsperson Copied "Lawful" Out of a Form
Book Should Not Render it a "Meaningless" Term
Probably in the overwhelming number of cases involving a re-
mainder to the "lawful heirs" of a grantee or devisee named as life
tenant, use of that term ultimately can be traced to some formbook
(or sample instrument) employed by an attorney or lay draftsperson.
The conveyor probably did not ask the draftsperson to include the
word "lawful." Should such extrinsic evidence be received, and if it is
believed, is there a basis for ignoring the word?
Where the instrument transfers the remainder to heirs "lawfully
begotten" or "issue of a lawful marriage," or the like, it refers directly
or by necessary implication to a birth in wedlock. There is no ambigu-
ity, and, as a result, in most states extrinsic evidence should not be
received to prove that the phrase actually meant "as determined by
statute."16
7
The phrase "lawful heirs" is ambiguous. In the unlikely event
there is extrinsic evidence showing that the transferor did not mean
to refer to legitimacy at birth, but rather to the statutes defining heirs,
it must be received. I suspect that in more than ninety-nine percent
165 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. Recall that in Illinois "lawful" is a
meaningless term only when Shelley's Rule is at issue. Compare supra text accompany-
ing notes 108-109, with supra text accompanying notes 138-41.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
167 Under the California version of the Parol Evidence Rule, ambiguity need not
appear on the face of the instrument. Ambiguity can itself be established by extrinsic
evidence, with the same evidence being used to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the
interpretation not apparent on the face of the document. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 646 (Cal. 1968), which is followed
in a few states. See In re Estate of Flowers, 848 P.2d 1146 (Okla. 1993). It is hard to
imagine a trier of fact giving credence to testimony that the conveyor stated at about
the time of execution of the instrument at issue, that notwithstanding the reference
in the instrument to "begotten" or "marriage," he or she meant "lawfully" or "lawful"
to refer only to the statutes that determine heirship. Apparently, because the word
"lawful" is included in "lawfully begotten," if such testimony is believed, ambiguity is
created, and the meaning not suggested by the words on their face is given effect
under the California version of the Parole Evidence Rule. Of course it is possible the
conveyor may comment that he was making a provision for a bastard relative who
could only take under the instrument if within the class of "heirs lawfully begotten."
For criticism of the California version of the Parol Evidence Rule see Wilson Ar-
lington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1990).
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of the cases the conveyor will have done or said nothing that casts
light on what he or she intended by the word "lawful." On the other
hand, if evidence shows that the conveyor asked counsel if "lawful" was
inserted to exclude illegitimates and was told that it just refers to the
statutory laws defining heirs, then that meaning can be given to "law-
ful heirs." Shelley's Rule would then be applicable and would defeat
the conveyor's intent to create a remainder interest in heirs (includ-
ing illegitimates who qualify as heirs). Otherwise the ambiguity is re-
solved by applying the maxim of construction requiring every word or
phrase to be given meaning if reasonably possible rather than being
treated as surplusage.
In the only case I could find where extrinsic evidence was taken
on the significance of "lawful," it was employed not to show that the
word meant something other than "legitimate" but to show that "law-
ful" got into the instrument by mistake and therefore did not express
the conveyor's intent. There is authority that the maxim of construc-
tion requiring a court to give meaning to every word or clause in a will
does not apply to a word "inadvertently used."'6 8 The Kentucky case
of Black v. Cartmell, discussed above, 169 did not concern Shelley's Rule;
it concerned a defeasance clause: a devise in a codicil to testator's
daughter, Catherine, in fee, but if "she die without lawful issue," then
to testator's heirs by way of executory interest. 70 Catherine survived
the testator, but later died and was survived only by an illegitimate
child.
The original will had left the testator's son-in-law, William, a life
estate in the land in addition to Catherine's defeasible fee, and the
original defeasing language was triggered by occurrence of the follow-
ing condition subsequent: "if the said Catherine dies, without issue,
before the said William .... ,117 The Kentucky Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the addition of "lawful" to the defeasing clause in the cod-
icil, written, the court believed, solely to eliminate William's life estate,
was inadvertent, and stated that, "The introduction of the word "law-
ful" into the codicil, was, as we infer, the mere act of the draftsman
who intended to make the codicil more formal than the original provi-
sion, for which it was to be a substitute, and therefore implies no spe-
cial view to legitimacy of birth."1
7 2
168 Estate of Rush, 626 A.2d 602, 604 (Pa. 1993).
169 See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
170 Black v. Cartmell, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 188, 191 (1849).
171 Md
172 Id. (emphasis added). Elsewhere the court said it inferred that the codicil had
been written "hastily." Id. at 192.
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I agree that in the case of an attorney-drafted will, the term "law-
ful" is usually added by counsel for the purpose of making the will
sound "formal," just as so many wills say "give, devise and bequeath"
rather than the adequate "give" by itself, and contain all sorts of need-
less gobbledygook.1 7 3 I do not understand how a court can infer that
the testator himself, however, did not read the word "lawful" and con-
clude from it that a court would give the word its ordinary meaning.
A rule that "formal" language in an instrument of conveyance is to be
disregarded or even just presumptively disregarded is fraught with
danger. Is it not likely that a person's will is one of the most impor-
tant documents in his or her life, and that the testator makes a very
careful reading of it?
Hopefully Black will not be followed outside Kentucky, and will be
confined to cases having the extraordinary extrinsic evidence present
there-a prior operative version (not just a draft) of the instrument
without the later "formal" addition of the word "lawful."
There is one "formal" addition foolishly made to far too many
wills that perhaps has to be treated as meaningless by the courts: the
grant of an estate to a person for his or her natural life. The formaliz-
ing "natural" appears to qualify the grant of the life estate in a substan-
tial majority of the Shelley's Rule cases I read in preparing this
Article.174 1 could find no case in any context, civil or criminal,175
holding that "for his natural life" in a deed or will meant anything
other than just "for life." The most apparent meaning-that "natural
life" excludes periods during which the transferee remains alive only
because of artificial life support efforts, such as those of a heart-lung
173 See Thomas S. Word, Jr., A Brieffor Plain English in Wills and Trusts, 14 U. RIcH.
L. REv. 471 (1980).
174 The grant or devise for a person's "natural" life appears often in even the most
recently litigated cases. A Westlaw search of 1994, 1995, and the first half of 1996 for
opinions using the word "estate"-to eliminate criminal life-sentence cases-and
either "natural life" or "natural lives" produced 30 cases involving wills or deeds with
effective dates ranging from 1912 to 1993. There were five from Illinois, three each
from Alabama, Ohio, and Missouri, two each from Oregon, South Carolina, and
Texas, and one each from Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
175 SeeExparteStewart, 149 P.2d 689, 690 (Cal. 1944) (finding that the word "natu-
ral" was surplusage in governor's order commuting death sentence to imprisonment
for "natural" life); People v. Wright, 50 N.W. 792, 799 (Mich. 1891) (finding the
words "mere surplusage" in criminal sentence ). I had expected to find-but did
not-some court opining that the phrase was intended to exdude the transferee's
supernatural life in heaven or hell after his or her death as a mortal on earth. But cf.
Stryker v. Sands, 72 A.2d 175, 178 (NJ. 1950) (holding that a bequest to provide for
testator's widow for her "natural life" did not include the period just following her
death; and thus funds could not be used for her burial expenses).
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machine-is almost absurd.176 The maxim requiring meaning to be
given to every word 177 does not demand such an unreasonable con-
struction to give meaning to "natural."
Black's Law Dictionay says the term "natural life" is used to distin-
guish a physical death from civil death occurring at common law-
and by statute in several American states-when a man entered a
monastery as a monk or was convicted of a crime punishable by life
imprisonment.178 That usage is not unreasonable, but I suspect al-
most all conveyors have never heard of the civil death concept, and
the same is true for a majority of their attorneys who draft deeds or
wills using the term "natural life."' 7 9 In any event, "lawful" as meaning
legitimate when modifying terms such as "issue" and "heirs," is simply
not that obscure a usage, so cases holding "natural" in the phrase "nat-
176 Surely the conveyor does not intend to cut off funds the life tenant may need
to pay for the most effective medical efforts to stave off death. There are, neverthe-
less, modem authorities that would support this meaning of "natural life." Califor-
nia's "Natural Death Act" begins with a legislative finding "that modem medical
technology has made possible the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natu-
ral limits," and goes on to provide for the making of a living will. CAL. H.ALTH &
SAr-Tv CODE § 7185.5(b) (West Supp. 1997); see also In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517,
531-32 (App. Div. 1980), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981);
David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neo-Cortical Death, 71 CORNLL L. REv. 850 (1986).
A contrary notion of what constitutes the "natural" termination of life is ex-
pressed in Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997),
stating that a death is not natural when the patient has either had disconnected or
refused at all times to use a life-support system that will enable him or her to breathe,
when that would be impossible without such assistance: "By ordering the discontinu-
ance of these artificial life-sustaining processes or refusing to accept them in the first
place, a patient hastens his death by means that are not natural in any sense." Id. at
729.
177 See supra note 71.
178 BLAcK's LAw DicrioN~AR 1026 (6th ed. 1990). I could find no case holding
that a will or deed conveying property "for his natural life" to a man sentenced to life
imprisonment for a crime, and thereby suffering civil death, would allow him to con-
tinue receiving income from the property despite a statute calling for the administer-
ing of his estate as if he were physically dead. See, e.g., Holmes v. King, 113 So. 274,
275 (Ala. 1927). It is true, however, that many cases explaining what civil death is
contrast it to "natural" death. See, e.g., Vann v. Rogers, 142 So. 539, 540 (Ala. 1932);
Lee v. Hall Music Co., 35 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. 1931). The term "natural life" does
appear in the standard definition: "Civil death is the state of a person who, though
possessing natural life, has lost all his civil rights .... " In re Estate of Donnelly, 58 P.
61, 61 (Cal. 1899); accord Breed v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., 4 So. 2d 315, 316 (Ala.
1941); Holmes, 113 So. at 275 (applying such a statute); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 18
S.W. 481, 482 (Tex. 1892).
179 With respect to a monk who is a tenant for his "natural life," surely the monas-
tic vows waive the income benefits even if the transferor, by using the term, intended
them to continue.
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ural life" to be meaningless are not on point when a court is grappling
with the meaning of "lawful heirs."
B. Decisions Applying Shelley's Rule Where the Remainder is to
the Life Tenant's "Nearest" Heirs Are Erroneous
Shelley's Rule case law concerning remainders to the life tenant's
"nearest heirs," although much smaller, is similar in many respects to
the "lawful heirs" jurisprudence. "Nearest" is treated as meaningless,
just as "lawful" was. The "nearest heirs" case law presents one small
difference: while I could find no Shelley's Rule decision giving mean-
ing to the word "lawful" in "lawful heirs," there is one "nearest heirs"
case where the court held Shelley's Rule inapplicable by giving mean-
ing to the word "nearest."180 By way of an example to illustrate why
"nearest" should make Shelley's Rule inapplicable, consider a case
where the remainder is to the life tenant's "nearest heirs," and the life
tenant dies survived by one child and two grandchildren, issue of a
predeceased son or daughter of the life tenant. The two grandchil-
dren, although heirs of the second degree to the decedent, would
share the estate-under a per stirpes distribution rule contained in
the pertinent heirship statute-with the decedent's child, a first-de-
gree heir. But the restriction in the instrument of conveyance favor-
ing "nearest heirs" would exclude the grandchildren.
Interestingly, as with the "lawful heirs" case law, some of the most
significant opinions are from courts in Illinois and North Carolina. In
the 1887 Illinois Supreme Court case of Ryan v. Allen,181 a testatrix
devised land to her stepson for life, then "to his nearest heirs." Re-
jecting the contention that this class did not include all potential heirs
so that Shelley's Rule was inapplicable, the court held that there was
no such thing in law as "nearest heirs."
[T] he law furnishes no means of determining which one or more of
the common class is or are "nearest" in the quality or right of inheri-
tance.... The. nearest heirs are all those persons upon whom the
law would cast the inheritance.... [N]earest heirs can be no other
than heirs generally, and must include all those who stand in the
180 Jones v.Jones, 51 A. 362 (Pa. 1902) (construing a remainder to the life tenant's
"nearest male heirs"). The court's discussion of the limiting effect of "nearest" is an
alternative holding, as it initially held that the qualifier "male" eliminated the applica-
bility of Shelley's Rule. The instrument in Jones is discussed in supra text accompany-
ing notes 90-91.
181 12 N.E. 65 (Ill. 1887).
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same relation to the ancestor in respect of the right of
inheritance.
1 8 2
Thus Shelley's Rule did apply. The canon of construction requir-
ing that meaning be given if possible to the superadded word "near-
est" was not alluded to, and the only authority cited for the quoted
holding was a section of Jarman on Wills noting that under English
cases, a fee tail was created whether the words of inheritance in the
conveyance were to the "heirs of the body" of the grantee or devisee
or to his or her "next heir of the body."' 83 Of course, the fee tail was
intended to pass at the time of primogeniture to the next heir, and
then the next, on down the line. The word "next" in this context,
when added to the instrument, is indeed surplusage.
The concept of "nearest heirs" is not at all analogous. It calls for
the use of a gradual, that is degree-counting, system of intestate suc-
cession. For example, brother or sister stands in the second degree,
uncle and nephew/niece in the third, grand-nephew and first cousin
in the fourth. When the contending heirs are all rather remote collat-
erals of the decedent, the intestate succession statutes of many states
employ the concept of gradualism to determine heirship, under
which the "nearest" heir or heirs prevail. Indeed, at the time of the
Ryan decision in Illinois, the statutory scheme for descent, when no
takers appeared in the first parentela of collaterals (that headed by
intestate's parents), was pure gradualism.18 4 This meant that an uncle
in the third degree would .take to the exclusion of first cousins, daugh-
ters of the intestate's predeceased aunt. The uncle was the "nearest
182 Id. at 66. This case is followed in dictum in Deener v. Kessinger, 69 N.E. 28, 29
(Il. 1903).
Carey, supra note 44, at 387, says Ryan is wrong because the language of the
instrument was addressed to a situation where the life tenant's technical heirs might
be unequal in degree and the conveyor intended to remove heirs more remote in
degree from the class of remainderpeople.
183 The citation in the Ryan case is to "Jarm. on Wills, 326 and citations." Ryan, 12
N.E. at 66. This seems to refer to 2 THOMASJARMAN, THE LAw OF WHIs 326 (Melville
M. Bigelow ed., 5th Am. ed. 1880).
184 The pertinent statute, 1877 lI. Laws 1, at 93, provided:
Fifth. If there is no child of the intestate or descendant of such child, and no
parent, brother or sister or descendant of such parent, brother or sister, and
no widow or surviving husband, then such estate shall descend in equal parts
to the next of kin to the intestate in equal degree, (computing by the rules
of the civil law), and there shall be no representation among collaterals,
except with the descendants of brothers and sisters of the intestate ....
Compare present law, 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/2.1(g) (West 1992), under which
heirship is per stirpes through the parentela headed by intestate's great grandparents
and thereafter purely gradual.
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heir" in the Illinois statutory scheme. The Illinois court in Ryan surely
was aware of the approach to inheritance, preferring the "nearest" rel-
ative claiming to be an heir. The correct holding there was that Shel-
ley's Rule did not apply, with the remainder passing by purchase to
the life tenant's "nearest heirs."' 85 If the life tenant died survived by a
brother and a niece, child of a predeceased sister, both would be
"heirs" under the Illinois statute that provided for representation
within the parental parentela, but only the brother would own the fee
in remainder, as he is a second degree relative, and the intestate's
niece is a third-degree relation.
North Carolina held that the word "nearest" was surplusage in a
similar case, also without citing any relevant authority. In Crisp v.
Briggs,186 land was devised to the testator's son for life, and "then it
shall descend to his nearest heirs." The court applied the Rule in
Shelley's Case, stating simply that "The words 'nearest heirs' mean
simply 'heirs' and do not take this case out of the rule.' u8 7 No author-
ity was cited. Twelve years later, in a case where Shelley's Rule was not
involved because the remainder was "to my nearest heirs" (that is, the
testator's, not the life tenant's), the North Carolina Supreme Court
said that giving effect to the word "nearest" would destroy the efficacy
of the word 'heirs'188-apparently on the theory that representation
within the parentela headed by the decedent's parents was an inher-
ent aspect of heirship. However, on this theory, a gift to a named
person's "male heirs" would have to go to female heirs as well, because
lack of discrimination based on gender is an inherent part of modem
heirship law. The notion that a conveyor cannot qualify the class of
185 Carey, supra note 44, at 387 (asserting that conveyor in Ryan intended to re-
move from class of "heirs" relatives more remote in degree than those closest in de-
gree to the ancestor).
186 96 S.E. 662 (N.C. 1918).
187 Id. at 663.
188 Cox v. Heath, 152 S.E. 388, 389 (N.C. 1930). In Ratey v. Oliver, 47 S.E.2d 703
(N.C. 1948), Shelley's Rule was again the issue. After a devise to a life tenant, the gift
over was "to his nearest heirs." It was urged that this verbal formulation did not in-
clude all the heirs so that Shelley's Rule did not apply, but the court held that the
argument was foreclosed by Crisp and Cox. Addition of the word "nearest" failed to
show that "the devisor intended to change the rule of descent." Id. at 704. Chappell v.
Chappell 133 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1963), involved a disposition to the "nearest heirs" of
the testator's son. The court followed Cox and treated the word "nearest" as if it were
not in the will. Id. at 668.
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"heirs" to whom he is transferring property is wrong18 9 and inconsis-
tent with scores of Shelley's Rule authorities. 190
Indeed, when presented with a hypertechnical factual distinction,
the North Carolina courts were quick to escape from Crisp v. Briggs
and its creation of a senseless rule fashioned, rather clearly, to enable
the court to apply the intent-defeating Shelley's Rule. In Fields v. Rol-
lins,'9 ' decided seven years after Crisp, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a remainder to the life tenant's "nearest relatives" was
not controlled by Crisp. Here the court concluded that the word
"nearest" did exclude kin more remote in degree than those closest to
the decedent under a gradual system.
9 2
Thus North Carolina is in the position of having cases on both
sides 93 of a nationwide split of authority on the question whether
"nearest-in the context of devises and bequests to "nearest heirs,"
"nearest relatives," and "nearest kin" rather than Shelley's Rule situa-
tions-is mere surplusage or directs the court to determine who the
takers are under a gradual system although the pertinent heirship stat-
189 See Webster, supra note 6, at 11 n. 22 (stating that the "nearest heirs" cases in
North Carolina are wrongly decided).
190 See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
191 119 S.E. 207 (N.C. 1923); see also Wallace v. Wallace, 106 S.E. 501, 504 (N.C.
1921). In Pritchett v. Thompson, 221 S.E.2d 757, 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976), a remainder
was devised to the "nearest next of kin" on the paternal side of testator's family. It was
held that the entire devise went to one cousin who was closest in degree to the dece-
dent, excluding others of more remote degree who were his heirs by representation
under the intestate succession statute.
192 Fieds held that the 1918 Crisp decision had left untouched as precedent Miller
v. Harding, 83 S.E. 25 (N.C. 1914), where there was a remainder to the "nearest blood
relatives" of the life tenant. There the court held that this would not include all the
heirs, positing a case where the life tenant was survived by a sibling and nephews and
nieces, issue of a predeceased sibling. Although the latter would be heirs under the
representation provisions of the intestate succession statute, the surviving sibling
would be the exclusive devisee of the remainder because of the language of the will.
Id.
193 North Carolina's inconsistency was highlighted by the facts of the most recent
case there involving this problem. In Rawls v. Rideout 328 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985), the testatrix made a devise of land and personalty to her husband for life, then
"to my nearest (relatives) heirs." If the first mentioned noun, albeit in parentheses,
controlled, degree-counting would be employed to determine the takers; but if-as
held--"heirs" controlled over "(relatives)," the word "nearest" would be ignored and
the takers determined under the intestate succession statute, including its provisions
for representation.
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ute would employ representation. 194 Counting cases, it seems that a
slim majority does give effect to the word "nearest"' 95
Interestingly, Illinois, which ignored "nearest" in Ryan in order to
apply Shelley's Rule, shifts to the majority position when Shelley is not a
factor. In 1920 the Illinois Supreme Court had to construe a disposi-
tion to a named party's "nearest akin."196 It held the devisees were to
be determined by degree counting, notwithstanding that the heirship
statute would employ representation.
Although the majority of cases give meaning to the word "near-
est" when Shelley's Rule was not an issue, I could find only a single
decision taking this approach in the context of the Rule in Shelley's
Case.197 Each court treats "nearest" as having no meaning in order to
apply Shelley's Rule. These "nearest heirs" cases strongly support the
194 The cases are collected inJ. Kraut, Annotation, Effect of word "nearest" or "imme-
diate" in testamentary gift to "nearest heir" or "immediate heir" or the like, 100 A.L.R.2d 1069
(1965), and R.F. Martin, Annotation, Term "next of kin" used in will as referring to those
who would take in cases of intestacy under distribution statutes, or to nearest blood relatives of
designated person or persons, 32 A.L.R.2d 296 (1953).
195 See, e.g., Buchan v. Buchan, 118 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa 1962) (To the "nearest heirs
of my [testator's] body." A son took to the exclusion of a grandson, the child of the
decedent's predeceased sibling.); Swazey v. Jaques, 10 N.E. 758 (Mass. 1887) (Substi-
tutional gift; if named legatee did not survive, to his "next of kin." This was equivalent
to "nearest of kin," so takers were ascertained by degree counting, not by applying the
intestate succession statutes.); Galloway v. Babb, 90 A. 968 (N.H. 1914) ("unto my
next of kin then living in equal shares." Two brothers took to the exclusion of dece-
dent's nephews and nieces, children of predeceased siblings.); Zeigenfus v. Snel-
baker, 118 A.2d 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1955) (To party's "next nearest heirs at
law" means those closest in degree); Haas v. Speenburgh, 203 N.Y.S. 202, 204 (Sup.
Ct. 1924) ("[T]o be divided equally between my nearest kin." Nephews took to the
exclusion of grandnephews who were heirs by representation because "the qualifying
word 'nearest' must be given effect by force of the common canons of construction
and not rendered meaningless and inoperative"-"every provision in a will must be
given some effect."), affd mem., 207 N.Y.S. 847 (App. Div. 1925).
See also Kritser v. First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo, 463 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.). The case involved a grant of remainder to the life
tenant's "children (or child) and their heirs per stirpes." The court held that "per
stirpes" modified "heirs" to make it a word of purchase. Id.
196 Hammond v. Myers, 126 N.E. 537 (Ill. 1920). This addressed a remainder fol-
lowing a devise for life to the named ancestor, but the court did not consider Shelley's
Rule an issue, apparently because "kin" is not the equivalent of "heirs."
197 SeeJones v.Jones, 51 A. 362 (Pa. 1902). I exclude here cases involving remain-
ders to the life tenant's "nearest relatives" and "nearest kin," even though the courts
may have made reference to Shelley's Rule, because these courts never would have
applied Shelley's Rule to an unqualified remainder if the disposition were "to A for
life then to A's relatives," or "to B for life then to B's kin." See McCann v. McCann, 47
A. 743 (Pa. 1901) (devise to son for life then "to his next nearest blood relations"); see
also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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thesis of this Article that courts are deliberately stretching legal princi-
ples to extend Shelley's Rule beyond its scope, thereby needlessly de-
feating the intention of many conveyors.
C. The Majority Rule that Words of Distribution Added to the Remainder
to Heirs Do Not Make Shelley's Rule Inapplicable May Be Technically
Correct in Some Contexts But Is Dubious Where "Equal" Shares
Are Mandated
Consider an instrument in which, after conveying a life estate to
A, the transferor devises or grants a remainder to "A's heirs and their
heirs"1 98 or to "A's heirs in fee simple absolute."1 99 All but one2
00 of
the non-ancient cases I read held this kind of additional language-
often called words of distribution-did not make Shelley's Rule inap-
plicable. The theory is that the added language is no different than a
statement in the instrument that the conveyor intends to use "heirs" as
a word of purchase, or a statement that the conveyor's intent is that
the Rule in Shelley's Case shall not apply to the instrument.20' Since
Shelley is a rule of law and not of construction, such intent is irrelevant.
It will be recalled that Shelley's case in effect converts "to A for
life then to his heirs" to A and his heirs," with "his heirs" carrying the
historical meaning of "in fee." Where the limitation is to "A for life
then to his heirs and their heirs," language of inheritance is already
present (the final "their heirs"). The argument against the majority
rule in these cases of added words of distribution is that to convert the
first "heirs"-intended by the conveyor to refer to purchasers-into
words of inheritance cannot be done as the result would be two sets of
198 Shelley's Rule was applied in each of the following cases although the remain-
der was to the life tenant's "heirs and their heirs": Ham v. Ham, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. &
Bat. Eq.) 598 (1837);Jarvis v. Wyatt, 11 N.C. (1 Hawks) 227 (1825); Grimes v. Shirk,
32 A. 113 (Pa. 1895); Physick's Appeal, 50 Pa. 128 (1865).
199 Shelley's Rule was applied in the following cases: Kaup v. Weathers, 135 N.E.
38 (Ill. 1922) (remainder to life tenant's heirs "in fee simple"); Fowler v. Black, 26
N.E. 596 (Ill. 1891) (remainder to life tenant's heirs "in fee simple"); Kirby v. Broad-
dus, 145 P. 875 (Kan. 1915) ("the fee to... vest absolutely in the heirs"); Morrisett v.
Stevens, 48 S.E. 661 (N.C. 1904) ("in fee simple forever"); Clark v. Neves, 57 S.E. 614
(S.C. 1907) ("in fee simple . . . forever"); Sybert v. Sybert, 254 S.W.2d 999 (Tex.
1953) ("in fee simple"); accord Note, supra note 2, at 1070.
200 Jones v. Stone, 279 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), discussed in infra text ac-
companying note 205.
201 See, e.g., Sims v. Clayton, 7 S.E.2d 724 (S.C. 1940) (commenting on a remainder
to bodily heirs "in fee") (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 196 S.E. 541 (S.C. 1938)); Simms v.
Buist, 30 S.E. 400 (S.C. 1898).
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words inheritance in the instrument.20 2 The leading English case of
Jesson v. Wright203 demonstrated that to accept this argument-or any
argument by which addition of words of distribution could negate the
applicability of Shelley's Rule-would convert the Rule from one of
law to one of construction. That is, the intent that the first "heirs"
refer to purchasers would control.
Jesson has been widely followed in this country, not only when the
words of distribution say the heirs are to take a fee but when these
words speak of "dividing" the remainder between the heirs or even
dividing it equally among them.204 Such language does not preclude
applying Shelley's Rule. A contrary, recent North Carolina case 20 5
held Shelley's Rule inapplicable where the remainder was "to be di-
vided among his [life tenant's] heirs at law." The theory was that the
words "to be divided" showed the testator did not intend the word
"heirs" to refer to "the indefinite succession of persons from genera-
tion to generation through intestacy."20 6 This just cannot be squared
with the settled doctrine in North Carolina that Shelley states a rule of
law and not of construction, and this North Carolina decision should
be considered erroneous under contemporary Shelley's Rule theory,
although certainly consistent with the understanding of the principles
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in England.
The same result-Shelley's Rule is applied-seems to be reached
in all states but Georgia,20 7 North Carolina208 and Texas20 9 in the ar-
guably distinguishable situation where the remainder is not just to be
202 See Kleppner v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 70, 74 (1871); George B. Young, The Rule in
Shelley's Case in Illinois: A New Analysis and Suggestions for Repeal, 45 U. ILL. L.
Rv.(NoRTHWEmSRN) 173 (1950); see also cases cited supra note 200.
203 4 Eng. Rep. 230 (H.L. 1820) (remainder to life tenant's heirs "share and share
alike"). For a fuller discussion of the facts of Jesson and arguments made there against
application of Shelley's Rule see supra note 65.
204 See Holt v. Pickett, 20 So. 432 (Ala. 1896) (remainder be "equally divided" be-
tween the life tenant's "heirs of her body"); Watts v.James, 2 Fla. 369 (1848) (remain-
der be "equally divided" among the life tenant's "heirs of her body"); Clarke v. Smith,
49 Md. 106 (1878) (to life tenant's "heirs lawfully begotten" and to be "equally di-
vided" between them); Moore v. Brooks, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 135 (1855) (remainder to
be "equally divided" among life tenant's "heirs lawfully begotten"); see also Sisson v.
Seabury, 22 F. Cas. 238 (C.C.RI. 1832) (No. 12,913); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 29 N.J.L.
185 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1861); King v Beck, 12 Ohio 390 (1843); Simms v. Buist, 30 S.E. 400
(S.C. 1898).
205 Jones v. Stone, 279 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
206 Id. at 17.
207 Tucker v. Adams, 14 Ga. 548 (1854) ("to be equally divided among and be-
tween the lawful heirs of the body" of the life tenant).
208 Cheshire v. Drewry, 197 S.E. 1 (N.C. 1938) ("equally," "share and share alike");
Bedford v. Jenkins, 2 S.E. 522 (N.C. 1887) ("to be equally divided"); Mills v. Thorne,
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"divided" among the life tenant's heirs but is conveyed to those "heirs
in equal shares" or "equally"210 or "share and share alike."211
The argument that the majority errs in treating "equally" as mere
surplusage is as follows under the heirship statutes of every state there
are situations where heirs take per stirpes and not per capita. Typi-
cally, where the intestate is survived by one child and two grandchil-
dren, offspring of a child of the intestate who predeceased him or her,
the division of the estate is fifty percent to intestate's child and twenty-
five percent each to the two grandchildren. Stated more broadly,
heirs taking per stirps do not receive equal shares except where the
heirs all stand in the same degree to the intestate and the number of
heirs in each stirpes is the same. Language of the instrument calling
for equal division in the face of a statutory per stirpes distribution
95 N.C. 362 (1886) ("share and share equally"); Ward v.Jones, 40 N.C. (5 Ired.) 400
(1848) ("equally").
209 Robinson v. Glenn, 238 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1951) ("unto her bodily heirs, share
and share alike"); Wallace v. First Nat'l Bank, 35 S.W.2d 1036 (Tex. 1931) (alternative
holding) ("to his bodily heirs equally"); Gardner v. Dillard, 258 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("equally").
210 Shelley was applied in the following cases under the majority rule concerning
the addition of words of distribution in the clause conveying a remainder to the life
tenant's heirs: McQueen v. Logan, 80 Ala. 304 (1885); Estate of Donovan, No.
CIV.A.756, 1983 WL 103280 (Del. Ch. April 14, 1983); Cook v. Sober, 135 N.E. 60 (11l.
1922) (dividing "equally"); Taney v. Fahnley, 25 N.E. 882 (Ind. 1890) ("in equal por-
tions"); Hochstedler v. Hochstedler, 9 N.E. 467 (Ind. 1886) ("equally"); Rhodes v.
Brinsfield, 135 A. 245 (Md. 1926) ("equally"); Stigers v. Dinsmore, 44 A. 550 (Pa.
1899) ("divided equal"); Cockins' Appeal, 2 A. 363 (Pa. 1886) ("in equal amounts");
Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R.I. 261 (1859) ("equally"); Davenport v. Eskew, 48 S.E. 223 (S.C.
1904) ("equally").
Note, supra note 2, at 1077-79, 1081-82, says that the weight of authority holds
that words of distribution affixed to "heirs" do not render Shelley's Rule inapplicable
but questions the correctness of some of the holdings. Id at 1078. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 310 cmt. e, (1940), says that "equally" and the like added to "heirs" should
negate the applicability of Shelley's Rule but that such a qualification can be ignored
if the court finds the conveyor actually intended to adopt the governing heirship stat-
ute even if it provided for stirpital distribution in certain situations. However, com-
ment c says that Shelley's Rule cannot apply if the amount accorded in the instrument
to a member of the class of "heirs" is different than under the applicable intestate
succession statute. The overall tenor of the Restatement is a rejection of the majority
rule concerning the effect of a direction to distribute equally or per stirpes.
211 Shelley's Rule was applied in these cases: Sims v. Georgetown College, 1 App.
D.C. 72 (1893) ("share and share alike"); Eiten v. Eiten, 357 N.E.2d 810 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) ("share and share alike"); Knox v. Barker, 78 N.W. 352 (N.D. 1898) ("share and
share alike"); Society Nat'l Bank v.Jacobson, 560 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1990) ("share and
share alike"); Carson v. Fuhs, 18 A. 1017 (Pa. 1890) ("in fee simple, share and share
alike"); Bullock v. Waterman St. Baptist Soc'y, 5 R.I. 273 (1858) ("share and share
alike").
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unequally does show the intent of the conveyor that the heirs not take
in the capacity of intestate heirs. Instead the heirship statute is implic-
itly incorporated by reference to constitute a class of transferees to
whom shares will be distributed not according to the statutory formula
but by a scheme set forth in the instrument. A perhaps more stark
example of this kind of use of the heirship statute would be a deed of
a fee estate "to the heirs of A [who is already dead], with those heirs
under age 35 receiving shares twice the size of older heirs of A."
The same legal issue is raised by a remainder to the life tenant's
"heirs per stirpes."212 It could happen that the life tenant's heirs were
remote collaterals who would share the estate equally under a gradual
system of heirship that excluded representation by issue of relatives of
the same degree of kinship to the decedent as his or her heirs but who
predeceased the intestate. The instrument would in such a case refer
to the intestate succession statute solely to identify the devisees, while
the deed or will, not the statute, would fix their share.
The theory underlying the majority rule is technical. To avoid
Shelley's Rule, the conveyor must draft the instrument to change the
"who," because changing the "how much" does not do so.2 13 The
group to which the remainder is conveyed still consists of the life ten-
ant's heirs when language is added calling for equal division. To the
majority of courts it is as if the conveyor had said, "I want to make it so
clear that I intend the heirs to take as purchasers that I am going to
alter the shares they would take under the heirship statute." The ma-
jority responds to the conveyor by saying, "That's still just an expres-
sion of your intent, which is irrelevant once you've chosen to use the
word heirs."
The minority position is that "heirs" is not used in the technical
sense if the conveyor's language makes it possible the person qualify-
ing as an heir might not receive an heir's statutory share.2 14 Certainly
if one of the heirs were to actually receive by way of deed or will a
future interest in remainder of a fraction less than he or she would
212 See Kritsen v. First Nat'l Bank, 463 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).
213 This rationale was expressed in the following cases in which Shelley's Rule was
applied in the face of words of distribution in the instrument describing the share
each heir would receive: Clarke v. Smith, 49 Md. 106 (1878) (remainder to "heirs
lawfully begotten, forever, to be equally divided between them"); Bullock v. Waterman
St. Baptist Soc'y, 5 R.I. 273 (1858) (remainder to heirs "share and share alike"). See
also Fountain County Coal & Min. Co. v. Beckleheimer, 1 N.E. 202, 206 (Ind. 1885)
(to avoid Shelley's Rule, super-added language must work alteration not merely to
mode of succession, but to objects of succession).
214 E.g., Jones v. Stone, 279 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
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have taken under the intestate succession statute, this relative of the
life tenant is taking by purchase.21
5
Examination of authorities dating from feudal England indicates
that the policy basis underlying what is now called the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case might not have been considered by judges of that time in-
volved in the situation of a feoffment by Lord A's underlord, B, of B's
eldest son, C, and one or more other persons, causing C to acquire a
lesser interest than he would have by succession under the rule of
primogeniture. Suppose B enfeoffed eldest son C and two younger
sons D and E so that each owned a one-third interest in the manor
lands B had previously held of A. An Act of Parliament in 1267216
made the enfeoffment of , the eldest son who would have taken the
estate by succession, a fraud on overlord A because, if given effect, it
would have deprived A (or his successor by succession) of money-pro-
ducing feudal incidents of Cs tenure as underlord that he owed A if
he, , took his estate by succession.
According to a note in the Yearbooks following the report of a case
from 1292,217 "if the father enfeoff his eldest or youngest son, the lord
shall not have the Relief or Heriot from him after the death of the
father; by reason of the enfeoffment."21 8 Although this passage says
the eldest could avoid the relief if he took by enfeoffment, it ceased to
be applicable to eldest sons after 1571, according to Lord Coke.219 In
that year Parliament passed a statute that declared void all enfeoff-
ments that prevented the payment of a relief to the overlord upon the
death of the feoffor (who had been the underlord).220 Coke's discus-
215 If he or she takes more, the argument can be made that the heir's share comes
to him in his capacity as heir and the excess as a purchaser under the instrument.
But, of course, if any one of a group of heirs gets by the instrument a share larger
than he would take by intestate succession, one of the others in the class has to take
less, and for this reason the class constituted by the will or deed will always be arguably
different than the class of heirs in the technical sense.
216 The Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 6, reprinted in 1 Statutes of
the Realm 19, 20-21 (1963); see also supra note 7. The statute applied to enfeoffments
of eldest sons that would have denied the feoffer's overlord the benefits of the feudal
incident of wardship-in effect, beneficial ownership, including all rents and profits,
of the lands held by the son (C in the scenario in text) during his minority. The
incident attached only if the son took by succession rather than feoffment. Depend-
ing on how many years the son as new underlord was in wardship, this feudal incident
could be more costly to the family than even the relief payable at the moment of
succession. See supra note 6.
217 Asserugge v. Godfrey, Y.B. 20 Edw. I 210 (Salop Iter 1292).
218 Id. at 212. The relief was often the most costly feudal incident. See supra note 6.
219 1 CoKE UPON LrrLETON § 325 (Thomas Coventry ed., 1827).
220 Fraudulent Deeds, Gifts and Alienations, 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (Eng.), reprinted
in 4 Statutes of the Realm pt. 1, at 537-38 (1963).
1997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
sion of this statute does not suggest that he considered the 1571 stat-
ute to affect the Rule in the Yearbooks from 1292 that enfeoffinent of
the youngest son was valid. The younger son never would have owed a
relief, as he would not have taken by succession if his eldest brother
survived their father. Although it is true that if the youngest son takes
all of the lands held by his father of the overlord, the latter is deprived
of a relief for one generation.
However, in the hypothetical enfeoffment above, C, the eldest
son, does take a one-third interest and will owe a relief to A due to the
1571 statute. Apparently the amount owed would be reduced com-
pared to the size of the relief payable on A's death by C if he then
owned the entire estate rather than sharing it with two brothers. Ac-
cording to Littleton, if the tenure was in knight's service, the amount
of the relief was cut in half if the estate inherited by the eldest son was
a moiety of a knight's fee.2 21 If the tenure was held in socage, the
relief owed was the value of the quit rent and rent service which the
tenant (owner) paid yearly.2 22 These rents were apparently tied to the
size of the estate. So it seems the enfeoffment of sons C, D, and E
reduced the relief Lord A would collect. But A was now the overlord
of three rather than just one tenurial chain, and the chances of bene-
fiting from the other feudal incidents, such as marriage, would
increase. 223
Further research can be done on this point, but my tentative con-
clusion is that the feudal policies that spawned Shelley's Rule toler-
ated "estate planning" that reduced, but did not eliminate the feudal
incidents attaching to an eldest son who would have taken the entire
221 LrITLETON'S TENURFS § 113, at 227 (Henry Cary ed., 1829).
222 Id. at § 126.
223 Nothing I have read suggests that the overlord, after the enfeoffment of three
sons of his underlord, trebling the number of persons owing feudal incidents in the
next generation if heirs then took one third interests by succession under primogeni-
ture, suffered any reduction in the benefits of wardship and marriage incidents be-
cause the chances of enjoying the benefits of these incidents had been trebled.
Of course, a court is capable of reducing by two-thirds the money payments owed
by the three underlords in the generation following the enfeoffment. Such appor-
tionment would seem to be impossible, however, for the incident (which may or may
not have actually existed or have been enforced) called in law French droit du seigneur,
see Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv.
661, 667 (1995), and in Anglo-Saxon primer nocht, see BRAVEHEART (Icon Productions/
Ladd Co. Productions-Oscar winner for Best Picture 1995, in which a Scottish rebel-
lion was ignited after the King in London ordered British lords in Scotland to take
advantage of this incident). Droit du seigneur was the right of the lord to have sex with
a subject's bride on the first night of the marriage. Whether this incident was enjoyed
by an underlord taking succession of an estate held in free tenure or only by vassals
apparently has not been documented.
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estate by succession. From this historical basis, then, Shelley's Rule
need not apply to a modem limitation whereby heirs of the life tenant
take different shares than they would under the laws of intestate
succession.
D. Any Choice of Law Clause Qualifying "Heirs" Should Render Shelley's
Rule Inapplicable.
1. "Time" and "Place" Rules for Determining Heirship
If a court has determined that a conveyor has used the word
"heirs," in what appears to be a disposition of a remainder interest, in
the technical sense, heirship is determined under a statute in effect at
the death of the named ancestor,224 absent a directive to the contrary
in the instrument. A conclusion that language in the instrument di-
rects the court to determine heirship under the laws in effect at some
other time means the word "heirs" is not being used in its technical
sense. 225
The traditional rule as to which state's laws in force at the death
of the named ancestor should be consulted selects the law of the si-
tus 22 6 of the real property.227 As discussed below, it is quite possible
224 See Faulkner's Guardian v. Faulkner, 35 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Ky. 1931); In re Hood's
Estate, 239 N.W. 448, 451 (Wis. 1931); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 308, 305 cmt. e,
illus. 1 (1940).
225 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. g (1940) (discussing the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case).
226 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNFIar OF LAWS § 239 (1971) (situs law deter-
mines intestate succession and validity and effect of devises in will); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 305 cmt. e (1940).
227 The intestate takers of personalty were historically referred to as "next of kin"
and were determined under the law of the decedent's domicile at death. E.g., RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) CoNLIcr OF LAWS § 263 (1971). As has been noted, a few states
have applied Shelley's Rule in cases involving personalty where the apparent remain-
der was conveyed to the life tenant's "heirs." See supra text accompanying notes
43-45. These courts view "heirs" as the equivalent to "next of kin." In these states, it
is unclear whether the takers of personalty in a "mixed" gift in a will-for example 0
gives Blackacre and all personalty located therein at 0's death to A for life then to A's
heirs-are determinable under the law of A's domicile if it is in a state other than that
where Blackacre is situated. For obvious reasons in a jurisdiction where Shelley no
longer applies, the "heirs" taking the land should be the same parties taking the per-
sonalty located there.
The situs choice of law rule has been departed from by several real property cases
not involving Shelley's Rule,see infra text accompanying notes 245-53. However, in
the area of succession to personalty, the reason for this departure-to assure unity of
succession-militates against use of any law other than that of decedent's domicile to
determine his next of kin. Accordingly, I believe that where personalty is involved, a
choice of law clause to the law of the state of domicile of the life tenant at his death-
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that in the future some states will abandon a once iron-clad choice of
situs law in real property cases for a rule employing a flexible ap-
proach that looks at the interests of nonsitus states as well. Neverthe-
less, reference to the law in force at the domicile at death of the life
tenant-indeed, any choice of law clause to a state other than the
situs-must be treated as qualifying the technical meaning of "heirs"
in a remainder clause in a conveyance of real property.228 Addition-
ally, a choice of law clause even to the situs that incorporates the law
in force when the instrument becomes effective-rather than the law
of heirship at the time of the life tenant's death-qualifies "heirs" so
that it does not have its technical meaning. In both instances, Shel-
ley's Rule has no application and the artificially229 determined heirs
take a remainder interest.
2. Some, But Not All, Courts Have Realized that a Directive in an
Instrument to Determine Heirs Under a Law in Effect at a
Time Other than the Life Tenant's Death Renders
Shelley's Rule Inapplicable
I was able to find four reported cases where the instrument spe-
cifically, or by implication, directed that heirship be determined by a
law in effect at a time prior to the death of the life tenant.23 0 In two of
the four the court held Shelley's Rule inapplicable for this reason.
which cannot be a named state, as the conveyor cannot know where the life tenant
will be domiciled at his or her death-directing that this law be applied in determin-
ing heirs does not qualify the term "heirs" in its technical sense. It is redundant.
228 Where the instrument conveys real property, Shelley's Rule does not apply if
the instrument directs that heirship be determined by a statute that "is the one appli-
cable to personal property [for example, the law of the life tenant's domicile] or,
even though it is one applicable to real property, it is not the same as the one that
would be employed on the death of the ancestor intestate." RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 312 cmt. g (1940).
229 Shelley's Rule is inapplicable even if it turns out the determination is not "arti-
ficial." For example, a will executed today states that the life tenant's heirs are to be
determined by the law of his domicile at his death. Ten years later, the situs state
enacts a statute providing that domiciliary law rather than situs law governs rights of
intestate succession to land in the jurisdiction. After that the life tenant dies. The
resulting application of the same law that the situs state would employ to determine
heirs-domiciliary law-is not an "artificial" determination of heirship. Nevertheless,
the will's choice of law clause permanently froze the domiciliary reference, so that if
the situs jurisdiction had, before testator died, reverted back to a situs rule by repeal
of the law making a domiciliary reference, the determination would have been artifi-
cial. As explained below, any clause in the instrument taking choice of law away from
the courts should lead to a holding that "heirs" is not used in the technical sense. See
supra text accompanying notes 236-53.
230 In each, the reference was to situs law.
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A 1959 decision involving a testamentary trust of personalty and
real property in the District of Columbia2P3 construed a will that pro-
vided that upon the death of each of various life tenants, grandchil-
dren of testator, the decedent's share of the estate would go
"absolutely to the persons who shall then be her or his heirs at law
according to the laws of descent now in force in the said District of
Columbia."232 This was not the same, held the court, as a disposition
to the life tenant's "heirs."233 Shelley's Rule
"does not apply if... the heirs are to be ascertained as of some time
other than the death of the ancestor .... Cases of that sort would
be where the remainder is to the heirs of A according to the statutes
in force at the time of the making of the will .... ,23 4
In an 1870 New Jersey case, 235 Jacob Quick devised realty to his
son, Ezekiel, for life, then "to his heirs, to be divided among them as
the law directs in case of dying intestate."236 When the will was written
in 1808, NewJersey intestacy law gave male heirs a share twice the size
of that inherited by a female heir. Gender equality was enacted in
February 1816, and the testator died in November 1816. The Rule in
Shelley's Case was held inapplicable on the following basis:
[T]he testator first indicates that his paramount intention was to
give [the land] to such persons as should be the heirs of Ezekiel at
his death, but he as clearly indicates that he intended to control the
division of it among these heirs, and that not by the law as it might
stand at the death of Ezekiel, but as it then stood; "as the law di-
rects," means this, in contradistinction to the law as it shall then
stand, indicated by the words "as the law may direct."
2 37
231 American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367 (D.D.C. 1959).
232 Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
233 The court did not indicate that there had been any change in the district's
heirship laws between 1901, when the will took effect, and its decision 58 years later.
It is enough that there might have been a change to conclude that the will did not use
the term "heirs" in its technical sense. See American Sec., 175 F. Supp. 367.
234 American Sec. and Trust Co., 175 F.Supp. at 374 n.17 (quoting SimEs & SMIrH,
supra note 1, § 1547).
235 Quick's Ex'r v. Quick, 21 NJ. Eq. 13 (1870).
236 Id at 14.
237 Id. at 18. See also In re Wilson'Estate, 225 P. 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924), involving
a remainder to the testator's heirs as "provided by the laws of the state of California,
the same as if I had died intestate." The court held that the will did not use "the word
'heirs' in a technical sense." Id. at 289. Had it said "as the laws of California may
provide," it would have referred to the laws in effect at the testator's death. But "the"
laws of California meant those in effect when the will was executed. But see Echart v.
E.G. Senter & Co., 474 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), involving a devise of Texas realty to a daughter and then "to the heirs of her
body, according to the Statutes of descent and distribution," inferentially meaning the
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An interesting Maryland decision recognized one intricate aspect
of a choice of law clause, overlooking the more obvious reason why it
precluded application of the Rule in Shelley's Case.238 An 1836 deed
granted Maryland land in trust for the benefit of the grantor's daugh-
ter for life with remainder to "such person or persons as would, by the
now existing laws of the state of Maryland, be entitled to take an estate
in fee simple in lands by descent from her."239 This was the ultimate
remainder in the deed, applicable only if the daughter died without
surviving issue, which did occur. The court observed 24° that the
clause did not describe heirs in the technical sense because it did not
refer to the very land conveyed under the deed but to "any estate in
fee simple."2 41 Under Maryland's intestacy law in effect at the date of
death of the life tenant in this case, if she died owning a fee estate that
was ancestral property, acquired for example by succession from her
mother, the heirs would have been restricted to those of the blood of
her mother.242 On the other hand, if the land held in fee was not
such ancestral property (for example the decedent had bought it her-
self), maternal and paternal kin would have shared heirship. Which
group of heirs the deed referred to was "a question of no easy solu-
tion,"243 and thus the court could not hold that "persons" in the
choice of law clause equated to the life tenant's heirs in the technical
sense.
It seems evident from the court's reliance on this highly technical
theory for holding Shelley's Rule inapplicable that it failed to see the
significance of the words "now existing"244 in the choice of law clause,
which mandated an artificial determination of heirship-that is, not
laws of the Texas situs. Id. (emphasis added). Shelley was applied, the court ex-
plained, because, "[T] he addition of these words in no way changed the bequest [sic]
of the remainder or qualified it in any way... because a person's heirs are those who
are named in the statute of descent and distribution." Id. at 17.
238 Handy v. McKim, 4 A. 125 (Md. 1886).
239 Id. at 126. (emphasis added).
240 This was an alternative holding. The court first held that Shelley's Rule could
not vest a fee in the daughter because in 1836 Maryland had yet to abrogate the
common law rule that the words "and heirs" had to be used in a deed in order to
create an estate in fee. Shelley's Rule could not supplant that requirement until a
statute was passed eliminating the need for "and heirs" in a deed to create in the
grantee a fee estate. Common law never required "and heirs" in a will to devise an
estate in fee simple. See SIMMs & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 1548, at 442.
241 Handy, 4 A. at 130.
242 1 MD. CODE art. XLVII, §§ 11-18 (2d ed. 1860). A version of this law was
passed as early as 1820. See 1820 Md. Laws 191.
243 Handy, 4 A. at 130.
244 But the persons who wrote the syllabi for the case in the Maryland Reports and
the Atlantic Reporter did not. They italicized the word "now."
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under the law in effect at the life tenant's death but rather those laws
in effect when the deed was delivered.
Similarly, a Texas court failed to see any significance in a choice
of law clause in a will clearly directing application of the intestacy laws
in force when the will was executed.245 The devise was to the testator's
son for life, then to "the legal heirs then living of my said son, accord-
ing to the statutes of descent and distribution now in force in
Texas.''246 Shelley's Rule was held inapplicable on the theory that the
words "then living" showed "heirs" was not used in its technical sense.
The theory was not that an heir had to be alive at the testator's death,
so that "heirs" meant a class, such as descendants, that would include
persons who could predecease the life tenant. Rather the court some-
how believed that "then living heirs"-referring to the death of the
life-tenant-was a different class than "heirs,"247 which is incorrect.
The court must not have appreciated that this untenable theory to
avoid Shelley's Rule need not have been invoked in light of the word
"now" in the choice of law clause.
3. In the One Case Where the Instrument Directed Application of
Nonsitus Law, the Court Failed to See the Significance of
the Choice of Law Clause.
I found only one case where the instrument directed a court that
would construe it to determine heirship under the law of a state which
turned out not to be the situs of the land. In a relatively recent
case, 248 the Wyoming Supreme Court dealt with a will in which the
testatrix devised one half of all of her estate to a son for life, remain-
der to "the heirs of his body who may be living at that time."249 The
will further provided that if the son died without issue, as he in fact
did, at his death his half of the estate, which included Wyoming land,
"shall be divided among his heirs according to the rules of descent
and distribution of the State of Illinois."
250
The court held, in effect, that the phrase "who may be living at
that time" in the first remainder clause by implication modified not
245 Finley v. Finley, 318 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1958, writ refrd
n.r.e.).
246 Id. at 481. This was clearly an attorney-drafted will, and one readily infers that
counsel inserted this clause for the very purpose of negating the Rule in Shelley's
Case.
247 Id at 482.
248 Crawford v. Barber, 385 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1963).
249 Id. at 656.
250 Id. The instrument was clearly attorney-drafted, and one can infer it was pre-
pared by an Illinois attorney, probably when the testatrix was domiciled in Illinois.
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only "heirs of his body" in the initial remainder clause, but also "heirs"
generally in the final clause. Somehow this meant that "heirs" was not
used in the technical sense. Therefore Shelley's Rule did not apply.
This was untenable. There was no qualifying phrase in the ultimate
remainder provision other than the choice of laws clause. Moreover,
by definition a person's heirs must be alive "at that time"-his death.
The correct holding is that Shelley's Rule did not apply because
the heirs in the technical sense would be determined under Wyoming
law, that of the situs of the land at issue;251 yet the testatrix directed
that they be determined under a different law, that of Illinois, demon-
strating that she was not using "heirs" in its technical sense. 252
4. Even Choice of Law Clauses Viewed as Referring to Sims Law at
the Time of the Life Tenant's Death Are Not Surplusage
and Qualify the Term "Heirs."
In many cases where the courts considered the applicability of
Shelley's Rule and the disposition to "heirs" was linguistically qualified
by a choice of law clause, the latter was ignored. Apparently, the court
thought the clause was surplusage by construing it as referring to the
heirship law of the situs state in force at the death of the life tenant,
the same law the court would apply without the clause. Typical is a
1924 Illinois case253 involving a deed of Illinois land to the grantor's
daughter for life, and then
to such person or persons as may be entitled to inherit real estate by
descent from her, as her heirs at law, by virtue of the[
25 41 statute of
the state of Illinois and in the same proportions to each as they
would severally have been entitled to had the said property been by
251 See In re Estate of Ray, 287 P.2d 629, 635 (Wyo. 1955) (effect of devise in will on
Wyoming realty was determined by situs law).
252 The Wyoming court ignored the choice of law clause except for a passing com-
ment that it was ironic that Wyoming should be deciding if Shelley's Rule applied to
the will, since Illinois had abolished that Rule by statute in 1953. Crawford, 385 P.2d at
656; 765 ILL. COMP. ANN. STAT. 345/1 (West 1993) (enacted by 1953 Ill. Laws § 1, at
1479). The opinion does not state the date of the will, but it seems likely it was after
enactment of the Illinois statute, since if it predated Illinois' abolition of Shelley's
Rule there would be little irony. The Wyoming court's implicit holding that the stat-
ute of Illinois abolishing Shelley's Rule is not part of Illinois' "rules of descent and
distribution" would seem to be correct. The statute related to construction of instru-
ments of conveyance.
253 People v. Emery, 145 N.E. 349 (ill. 1924).
254 Recall that in NewJersey and California, this word would have caused the court
to hold the reference was to the laws in effect when the deed was delivered rather
than at the death of the life tenant. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
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them inherited from the said Emily Adelaide Emery as her heirs at
law.2
55
This was "redundant language," declared the court2 5 6 It simply de-
scribed heirs in the technical sense, so Shelley's Rule was applicable.
A similar 1877 case brought to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court25 7 involved a devise of Pennsylvania land with the ultimate re-
mainder at the life tenant's death to
such person or persons in such shares, and for such estates and in-
terests therein, to whom and as the same would go had she [the life
tenant] died seised thereof in fee and possessed of the said trust
estates and property and investments thereof agreeably to the
then 258 existing intestate laws of the state of Pennsylvania.25 9
The court said this language was the equivalent to a remainder to
"heirs," so Shelley's Rule gave the life tenant a fee simple.
What the Illinois and Pennsylvania courts failed to realize was that
the instruments in the cases before them directed application of situs
law to determine heirship even though the court construing the deed
or will might have applied a different law, such as that of the dece-
dent's domicile.2 60 Maybe in 1877 and 1924 such a departure from
the situs rule was inconceivable. It certainly is not today. Moreover
255 Emey, 145 N.E. at 350.
256 Id.
257 William's Appeals, 83 Pa. 377 (1877).
258 This refers to the date of death of the life tenant.
259 Id. at 385.
260 The same oversight appears in cases involving dispositions to "heirs" with a
directive in the instrument to apply situs law where Shelley's Rule was not an issue.
Thus, in First & American National Bank v. Higgins, 293 N.W. 585, 588 (Minn. 1940),
the devise of Minnesota land was to two named persons "and to their heirs at law by
right of representation, in accordance with the then laws of descent of the State of
Minnesota." The instrument took effect after abolition of Shelley's Rule, so the ques-
tion was whether the quoted dause was the equivalent to "and their heirs" so that a
fee simple passed-as the court held-or whether a remainder was created. The deci-
sion seems wrong, in that the will by its terms permitted only an heirship statute pro-
viding for representation per stirpes to be applied. Apparently Minnesota had such a
statute when the will was written; but it could have been amended-before the life
tenant's death or even after the will was executed but before testator died-to provide
for determination, for at least some heirs (such as remote collaterals), of heirship
based on gradualism (degree counting) without representation. Because of this, the
court would not have had to discuss the second reason that the choice of law clause
meant that the "heirs" described were not those in the technical sense: that is due to
"freezing" application of situs law. See supra text accompanying notes 245-53; see also
Petition of Fuller, 40 Cal. Rptr. 393, 394 (Ct. App. 1964) (devising California land to
life tenants and then to their "heirs... according to the laws of the State of Califor-
nia--Shelley's Rule had been abolished).
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the courts should hold that they need to be convinced solely by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the choice of law clause qualifies the
word "heirs."261 A court should not demand that the party resisting
application of Shelley's Rule "clearly" show that the choice of law
clause has that effect.
The possibility that a modem court might apply a law other than
that of the situs to determine heirs who would inherit land-but for
situs law's adoption in a choice of law clause in an instrument-is not
remote. The formerly iron-clad choice of law rule in favor of sims law
to determine all interests in land has been departed from many times,
although usually not in cases involving a determination of heirship.
262
In Robinson v. Glenn, 238 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. 1951), the conveyance of Texas
realty was to the grantor's granddaughter for life, remainder "to the issue of her body,
or their descendants, in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution of the
State of Texas." Since the sole issue was whether Shelley's Rule applied, and it does
not in Texas where the remainder is to issue rather than heirs, the court did not need
to discuss whether the word "the" called for determining heirship under the laws in
effect when the will was written rather than at the death of the life tenant or whether
the direction to apply situs law qualified the meaning of "bodily heirs" (had "issue"
been treated as its equivalent).
261 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. The facts of Starrett v. Botsford, 9 A.2d
871, 872 (RI. 1939), illustrate this point. See also Allison v. Allison's Ex'rs, 44 S.E. 904
(Va. 1903). Starrett involved a disposition by the residuary clause of a will in favor of
the testator's sister, with the assets-primarily personalty but with some realty in-
cluded-upon her death or marriage to "be divided amongst my legal heirs in accord-
ance with the inheritance laws of Rhode Island." Starrett, 9 A.2d at 872. It was urged
that because Sister was one of testator's heirs, the ultimate takers should be deter-
mined artificially by looking at surviving relations of testator at the moment of Sister's
death or remarriage. The court declared that "in the absence of a clearly indicated
contrary intent in the will," such an artificial determination of heirs would not be
made. Id. at 873. Since those seeking that artificial interpretation were not relying on
the choice of law clause that modified the word "heirs," the court's use of the "dearly"
standard may have been correct. Suppose, however, the instrument were a deed mak-
ing an assignment to a trustee, and the issue was application of the Doctrine of Wor-
thier Title, which the jurisdiction applied to personalty as well as realty. The clause
modifying "heirs" is to be given some meaning if possible to render it not redundant,
and that meaning need not "clearly" appear. Of course, on these facts, the "dearly"
standard is satisfied. The grantor might die domiciled in a state other than Rhode
Island. Thus as to the personalty assigned, the instrument "freezes" as applicable a
law that might well otherwise not be employed to determine the grantor's intestate
takers. At least as to the personalty, "heirs" is not used in the technical sense, and
thus the Doctrine of Worthier Title should not apply to the personalty.
262 For a discussion of rejection in civil law countries of the situs rule of choice of
law in dealing with a wide range of real property issues, see Peter Hay, The Situs Rule in
European and American Conflicts Law: Comparative Notes, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL
EDUCATION: EssAYS IN HONOR OFJOHN CRMBET 109 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich
eds., 1988).
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For example, at divorce, the law of the marital domicile, not the situs,
is almost always used to decide if an interest owned by one spouse
should be transferred to the other in the process of sorting out the
parties' property rights at the termination of marriage.263 With re-
spect to capacity to convey26 or encumber 265 land, occasional deci-
sions reject the law-of-the-situs rule, as does one modem case
involving recognition of a constructive trust in land arising out of a
breach of confidential relationship.
266
In the area of succession, a few decisions-without compulsion of
a borrowing statute-have rejected situs law to determine the validity
of a will devising land. The law of the conveyor's domicile was consid-
ered more appropriately applied because of the interest of that juris-
diction.267  Even when the issue is determining heirship on
263 See e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 125 (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.02(lm)
(West Supp. 1995) (directing application of forum law to out-of-state realty); Ford v.
Ford, 80 Cal. Rptr. 435 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding that before enactment of statutory
directive, California law of domicile applied to Illinois land); Marriage of Day, 904
P.2d 171 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (applying Oregon law to California land); Dority v.
Dority, 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). Indeed, in a detailed study of the issue of applicable
law for division of real and personal property at divorce, I was able to find only two
cases that did not apply the forum law, which was invariably the domicile of at least
one of the divorcing spouses, usually the domicile of both. Anderson v. Anderson,
449 A.2d 334 (D.C. 1982); Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4 (D.C. 1978). In both of
these decisions situs law was in fact applied to realty located outside the forum, but
situs was not the primary reason for the choice of law. In these two District of Colum-
bia cases one spouse had moved to the forum jurisdiction, and the court concluded
the last common marital domicile (which happened to be the situs state) had the
greater interest with respect to division of property. William Reppy, Jr., Conflicts of
Law Problems in the Division of Marital Property § 10.02 [4] in I VALUATION AND DiSTRmu-
TION OF MARrAL PROPERTv (Matthew Bender ed., 1987).
264 See Ducharme v. Ducharme 872 S.W.2d 392 (Ark. 1994), where the issue was
whether duress vitiated a gift deed. The court used the "most significant relation"
choice of law theory (sometimes called center of gravity), although ultimately situs law
was applied.
265 Proctor v. Frost, 197 A. 813 (N.H. 1938), concerned the capacity of a wife to
mortgage her land to secure a debt of her husband. Using interest analysis, the fo-
rum and situs state concluded that its incapacity rule was addressed only to its domi-
ciliary wives and applied the validating law of the marital domicile, which was also
where the mortgagor signed the instrument. See generally Robby Alden, Note, Modern-
izing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65 TEX. L. REv. 585 (1987) (explaining that
situs law should govern real property issues only when application will implement an
interest of the situs state).
266 Rudow v. Fogel, 426 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (recognizing such an
equitable interest under the law of the common domicile of affected family members
while acknowledging situs law would not support such a holding).
267 In re Estate ofjanney, 446 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1982), applied interest analysis as the
choice of law method to uphold a devise of New Jersey land under the law of the
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intestacy-involved in Shelley's Rule cases-an occasional statute268
or case rejects situs law in favor of that of the decedent's domicile.
269
Almost all the scholarly literature praises such use of domiciliary law
testatrix's domicile. The devisee was an attesting witness, and the court concluded
that the sims state had no interest in invalidating the devise for this reason under its
law, when the domiciliary state would not.
In Folsom v. Board of Trustees, 71 N.E. 384 (Ill. 1904), a charitable devise was inva-
lid under the mortmain statute of testator's domicile but valid under the law of the
situs state. Based on the domiciliary state's interest in protecting children from
disherison due to pressures on a dying parent from charities, the court applied the
invalidating domicile law.
Additionally, many situs states have enacted borrowing statutes that require ap-
plying the validating law of some other jurisdiction in order to avoid invalidating a
devise by application of sis law. Thus, section 2-506 of the Uniform Probate Code,
enacted in 15 states, provides for an alternative reference in order to validate a will
with respect to formalities of execution to (a) testator's domicile at death, (b) testa-
tor's domicile at time of execution, (c) testator's habitual abode at the time of death,
(d) testator's habitual abode at the time of execution, (e) the country of which testa-
tor was a national at the time of execution, (f) the country of which testator was a
national at death, and (g) the place of execution. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-506
(1993); see also L. Frank Chopin, Multijurisdictional and Separate Situs Wills § 6.04, in
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING (Charles G. Stephenson et al. eds., 1994) (noting
that the Hague Convention on Conflict of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary
Dispositions directs the same seven alternative references to validate on issues of for-
malities of execution).
For a discussion of cases where courts have applied domicile law to determine
whether a will validly had disposed of real property located in another state because
of a "blending clause"-one testamentary disposition covering both personal and real
property-see J.H.C. Morris, Intestate Succession to Land in the Conflict of Laws, 85 LAW
Q. REV. 339, 344 (1969).
With respect to current significance of a choice of law rule to the situs to decide
real property issues, Chopin concluded that, "because a too rigid application of situs
rules might defeat the testator's intent without carrying out any overriding policy
objectives, most states in the United States and numerous foreign jurisdictions have
relaxed the rules governing the disposition of real property." Chopin, supra, § 6.05, at
6-17.
268 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 120 (West 1991) (share of intestate's spouse's California
land is determined by law of decedent's domicile, not situs law).
269 In Clapp v. Tower, 93 N.W. 862 (N.D. 1903), the intestate, a Pennsylvania domi-
ciliary, owned land in North Dakota. At his death, North Dakota employed sis law
to invalidate his will but employed domicile law to reject a claim of heirship under the
North Dakota intestacy statutes. The theory was that because the land at the moment
of death was subject to an executory contract of sale, equitable conversion had oc-
curred. So courts should treat it is as personalty, even though the contract had been
terminated before this decision was made. Other cases where the theory of equitable
conversion was used to avoid the situs rule are discussed in Moffatt Hancock, In the
Parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap, 16 STAN. L. REV. 561 (1964). See also
RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 431-32 (3d ed. 1986).
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of heirship in order to achieve "unity of succession" and avoid the
often foolish results of scission.
270
In sum, a directive in a deed or will that the heirs of a life tenant
designated to take as remainderpersons are to be determined under
the law of the situs in effect at the life tenant's death is not mere
surplusage. Applying the maxim of construction that effect is to be
given if reasonably possible to every phrase the conveyor has decided
to add to the instrument, such a choice of law clause tells courts that
in the event the forum state has a statute or case law-for example
one designed to achieve unity of succession-choosing the law of an
intestate's domicile to determine heirship rights in land located else-
where, the court must nevertheless employ situs law. It can be seen,
then, that any choice of law clause pertaining to determining heirship
upon the life tenant's death causes the term "heirs" not to be used in
its technical sense. The Rule in Shelley's Case is thereby rendered
inapplicable.
VI. EXTENSION IN SOME STATES OF SHEuEY's RULE TO REMAINDERS
TO "ISSUE" AND "PERSONS WHO WOULD INHERIT" IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE TECHNICAL WORD "HEIRS" WAS ERROR
As has been noted above, when the doctrine now known as The
Rule in Shelley's Case first emerged in England, its likely purpose was
to compel the son of an overlord upon his father's death to acquire
ownership of his father's lands by succession so that a relief was paya-
270 See INTERNATIoNAL ESTATE PLANNING ch. 6 (Charles G. Stephenson et. al. eds.,
1992); WEINTRAUB, supra note 269, at 428-29; Morris, supra note 267, at 344; Symeon
C. Symeonides, Exploring the "Dismal Swamp": The Revision of Louisiana's Conflicts Law on
Successions, 47 LA. L. REv. 1029 (1987).
An example of the mischief of scission is this: Husband dies domiciled in state A,
a ommunity property state with no applicable nonbarrable share statute. Wife elects
against his will, asserting rights in $300,000 of personalty acquired by decedent's earn-
ings during marriage and inherited land, also worth $300,000 and located in state B, a
common law state. If applied to all the assets at issue, Bs law would view decedent as
owner of $600,000 worth of property and assure the widow a nonbarrable share of
one third of all of it-worth $200,000. State A considers the widow sufficiently pro-
tected due to owning half the assets traceable to decedent's earnings-a share worth
$150,000. With scission, the widow gets $250,000-half the personalty and one third
of the realty-substantially more than she would have if the succession law of only one
state were applied.
A lone voice criticizing unity of succession achieved by abandoning the situs rule
for determining heirship to land is Jeffrey Schoenblum, Choice of Law and Succession to
Wealth: A Critical Analysis of the Ramifications of the Hague Convention on Succession to
Decedents'Estates, 32 VA.J. INT'L L. 83 (1991). See alsoJeffrey A. Schoenblum, Multqju-
risdictional Estates and Article II of the Uniforn Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1291 (1992).
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ble to the lord above the son on the tenurial chain and so that the son
would be liable for other feudal incidents that attached only if he took
his estate by succession (as opposed by deed, as under a remainder
clause in favor of the father's "heir").271 Thus when confronted with
an enfeoffment by a grandfather of his son for life, then to the son's
heirs, the courts converted the reference to "heirs" into words of
limitation.
Moreover, if the language allegedly creating a remainder interest
to which Shelley's Rule denies effect was construed to mean "then to
the eldest son of the feofee" (the person who would be -the feofee's
heir), a fee estate in remainder in the grandson probably could not
have been recognized at old common law due to lack of language of
inheritances attached to the ultimate gift construed as being words of
purchase. Unless the remainder were "then to his heir and his heirs,"
the life tenant's son might take only a life estate due to the absence of
language of inheritance.
272
Unquestionably, when Shelley's Rule was formulated, a grant
from 0 to A for life and then to A's "issue" or then "to the persons
who would inherit the land at A's death intestate if he owned it in fee
simple absolute" could not create a fee estate in A for lack of the word
"heirs."273 The essence of Shelley's Rule is to combine language creat-
271 See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
272 See Sres & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 493. However, the actual word used, in cases
where it is urged Shelley's Rule applies, is "heirs," not "heir." Perhaps "heirs" in a
grant of an apparent remainder interest "to the heirs of son A, the life tenant," could
carry two meanings: firstly, in singular form to refer to the feoffor's grandson; and
secondly, in plural form, to be words of inheritance. A grant after the abolition of
primogeniture "to the heirs of A" is said to give them a fee, without adding "and their
heirs," apparently on the theory that the word "heirs" stated only once can do double
service. See Campbell v. Rawdon, 18 N.Y. 412 (1858). But cf. Siu.s & SMITH, supra
note 1, § 495; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 30 (1936) (stating that when the grantor
intends "heirs" to refer to specific persons, rather than those who may be the heirs if
events transpire so that the heirs apparent at the time a deed is executed are not in
fact the heirs, the additional "and their heirs" is needed for a fee estate to be created
in the heirs of A). Thus, "heirs" does do double duty-naming the grantee purchas-
ers while also serving as words of inheritance-if the deed creates an executory inter-
est in future heirs of a living person. It also could do so if the grantor did not know
the named ancestor was dead and thus could not have intended "heirs" to refer to
specific persons.
273 See supra note 240. Nobles v. Nobles, 98 S.E. 715 (N.C. 1919), recognized a fee
estate by application of Shelley's Rule to a devise in remainder to the life tenant's
"legal representatives" on the theory this was the equivalent of a remainder to his
heirs. The court implied that in 1581, when Wolfe v. Shelley was decided, the lack of
the word "heirs" precluded upgrading the life estate to one in fee. I. at 716.
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ing only a life estate with a subsequent clause containing the word
"heirs" so that an estate in fee results.
Several American jurisdictions adhere to this historic aspect of
Shelley's Rule. "[T] he word heirs," held the Iowa Supreme Court, "is
essential to justify the application of the rule, just as it was at common
law to create an estate in fee simple" in a deed.274 In an Indiana case,
the remainder in certain land was devised "to the persons who would
have inherited the same in fee simple from the said William Earnhart
[life tenant] had he owned the same in fee simple at the time of his
death."275 The court held Shelley's Rule inapplicable because "per-
sons" was not a technical term, even though the term "inherited"-
which smacks of heirship-was used in describing who these "per-
sons" were. Virginia reached the same result where the very word
"heirs" was used to describe the "persons" devised the remainder.276
Texas277 and North Carolina2 78 refuse to treat a remainder to "is-
sue" or "issue of the body" of the life tenant as identical to a remain-
274 Brown v. Brown, 101 N.W. 81, 82 (Iowa 1904), held Shelley's Rule inapplicable
where a mother's deed to her daughter for life included a remainder "to her chil-
dren, or to their lineal descendants." I& at 81. In dictum the court said a remainder
to the life tenant's "children" would not be treated as if it were to "heirs of the body"
of the life tenant. Id-
275 Earnhart v. Earnhart, 26 N.E. 895, 895 (Ind. 1891). See Jackson v. Jackson, 26
N.E. 897 (Ind. 1891), holding one day before the court's decision in Earnhardt that
Shelley's Rule was inapplicable unless remainder is to life tenant's "heirs" or "heirs of
his body." Handy v. McKim 4 A. 125, 126 (Md. 1886), involved an 1836 deed with
remainder to "such person or persons" as would take "by descent from" the life tenant
on her death intestate if she owned the fee simple. Shelley's Rule was held inapplica-
ble. Id at 132. The court said the Rule would have applied had the instrument been a
will, as words of inheritance were not required to create a fee in a will, as they then
were in a deed. Id, at 129. Because Maryland law now presumes a fee in a deed of a
grant "to John Smith" with no mention of his heirs, Handy may no longer be good
law, although it has not been specifically overruled. MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 4-
105 (1996) (enacted by 1856 Md. Laws 154).
276 Taylor v. Cleaiy, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 448, 449 (1877), involved a deed of land to
the grantor's grandson for life, then "to such person or persons as shall at the time
[of his death] answer the description of heir or heirs at law of the said Thomas." The
deed also stated that such "persons" were to take as purchasers, which is a basis for
distinguishing Taylorfrom Turnerv. Monteiro, 103 S.E. 572 (Va. 1920), where the court
applied Shelley's Rule to a remainder to the life tenant's "descendants." In Peer v.
Hennion, 76 A. 1084 (NJ. 1909), the remainder was "to such person or persons as shall
be her [the life tenant's] heir or heirs of land held by her in fee simple." Id. at 1085.
Shelley's Rule was held inapplicable for lack of the requisite technical terminology,
even though the word "heirs" appeared in the remainder clause, although not as one
of the direct objects of the verb conveying the land.
277 See Robinson v. Glenn, 238 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1951) ("issue" does not satisfy
requirement of Shelley's Rule that there be language of inheritance).
1997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
der to "heirs of the body" and thus decline to recognize an instrument
conveying a remainder to "issue" as a fee tail in the person named as
life tenant by virtue of Shelley's Rule.
This historically-correct application of Shelley's Rule is the minor-
ity position in the United States today.279 A greater number of juris-
dictions have dispensed with the prerequisite that the remainder be
conveyed to the life tenant's "heirs" or "bodily heirs." Illinois has ex-
panded Shelley's Rule so it applies without the word "heirs" in the
remainder clause. In People v. Emery, a father conveyed land to his
daughter for life, then "to such person or persons as may be entitled
to inherit real estate by descent from her, as her heirs at law" under
the Illinois intestacy statute.280 Shelley's Rule was held applicable
even though "person or persons" were, grammatically, the
remainderpersons. 281 The court's theory was that the clause was sim-
ply a description of the life tenant's "heirs[,] though the language
used to express the idea is excessive." 282 The Illinois court did note
the words "descent" and "heirs" in the language following "person or
persons." The court stated that "[t] here was no definition of persons
except as heirs, to take as heirs, and not as descendants, children,
relatives, or in any other capacity."283 Conceivably, if the remainder
278 See Ford v. McBrayer, 88 S.E. 736 (N.C. 1916); Puckett v. Morgan, 74 S.E. 15
(N.C. 1912); Bird v. Gilliam, 28 S.E. 489 (N.C. 1897); Francks v. Whitaker, 21 S.E. 175
(N.C. 1895); White v. Lackey, 253 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). In each of the cases
the remainder was to the "bodily heirs" or "heirs of the body" of the life tenant, but
the courts decided, based on the context, that the conveyor really intended to use the
term "issue" instead, because the conveyor envisioned the title passing just once, at
the life tenant's death, not generation after generation. Having made that construc-
tion, the North Carolina courts proceeded to hold Shelley's Rule inapplicable for lack
of the word "heirs." But the word "heirs" was there, and thus these cases seem incon-
sistent with the basic proposition that Shelley's Rule is one of law, not of construction.
Under the approach in these cases, if the remainder were to the life tenant's "heirs,
who shall take as purchasers," the court would change the language describing the
remaindermen to "persons who would take intestate," and thus having eliminated the
technical language, would decline to apply Shelley's Rule.
In early dictum, the North Carolina Supreme Court had said Shelley's Rule
would create a fee tail, converted by statute into a fee simple, where the remainder
was to the life tenant's "lawful issue." Ward v. Jones, 40 N.C. 279 (1848).
279 Note, supra note 2, at 1014 says thit it is "not necessary" to always use the word
"heirs" in the remainder for Shelley's Rule to apply. Interestingly, it then cites one
case from the majority camp and three cases contra. I& at 967 n.7.
280 145 N.E. 349, 350 (Ill. 1924).
281 Id
282 i&
283 Id. Accord Cook v. Councilman, 72 A. 404 (Md. 1909), where testator devised
land to his nephew for life and the ultimate remainder "to such person or persons as
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were to "persons who are her closest relatives at her death as defined
by Illinois law," Shelley's Rule would not apply in Illinois.
The Illinois court cited no authority at all for the notion that
Shelley's Rule could apply when "persons" and not "heirs" were the
specified direct object of the devise or grant of the remainder. It did
stress that Shelley's Rule is intent-defeating so that it "cannot be
evaded however distinctly the intention to evade it appears."284 One
has the idea the judges were thinking of Shelley's Rule as a sort of
game. The conveyor was attempting an "end around" but was not do-
ing it the way the court considered most proper (for example, remain-
der to children per stirpes, and if none to ascendants, then collaterals,
without the words "descent" or "heirs" ever appearing). Therefore
the court would extend the scope of Shelley's Rule to frustrate at-
tempts to avoid it.
In a Pennsylvania case, the testatrix was more careful in drafting
the clause she apparently thought would take the remainder out of
Shelley's Rule.285 The devise was to the life tenant with a further de-
vise at her death to "such person or persons and in such shares, and
for such estates and interests therein, to whom and as the same would
go had she died seized thereof in fee and possessed of the said trust
estates... agreeably to the then existing intestate laws of the state of
Pennsylvania."
28 6
Shelley's Rule was nevertheless applied, the court stating that "it
is immaterial in the will whether he [a testator] describes the line of
descent by a word of art [heirs] or a periphrasis, meaning the same
thing."28 7 Of course it was highly material when Shelley's Rule was
created that the term "heirs" appear. The Pennsylvania court gave no
reason why an intent-defeating rule should be expanded by eliminat-
ing one of its key requirements. 288
would, under the laws of the state of Maryland, inherit the same as the heirs of my said
nephew if he had died intestate seized in fee thereof." Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
284 Emery, 145 N.E. at 350.
285 William's Appeals, 83 Pa. 377 (1877).
286 Id. at 385. Note the word "heirs" is never used, the verb is "go" and not "de-
scend," and the statute is not referred to as a succession or heirship statute but as an
"intestate" law.
287 Id at 391. A case cited for this point, Yarnalls Appea4 70 Pa. 335 (1872), did
support the conclusion. See discussion in infra note 288.
288 Pennsylvania had abandoned the common law requirement that the word
"heirs" appear in a deed in order to create a fee estate many years before the decision
in Wi//iam's. Thus the Rule stated there in the case of a will-that Sheley could create
a fee simple estate without the word "heirs" appearing in the instrument-was not
one the court was incapable of applying to deeds.
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"Persons" is by no means the only word that can substitute for
"heirs" under the majority rule expanding the scope of Shelley's Rule.
Several courts have treated a remainder to "issue"28 9 or even "de-
The early cases in Pennsylvania developing the notion that "heirs" is not essential
for application of Shelley's Rule are collected in Yarnall's Appea 70 Pa. 335 (1872),
where the remainder was to the "person or persons" who would inherit from the life
tenant, daughter of testatrix, if she had survived her husband. Shelley's Rule was
applied even though by the terms of the instrument the life tenant's husband was
eliminated as a potential heir so that the class of "persons" to whom the remainder
was conveyed was not coextensive with the life tenant's "heirs." Id. At the time of the
effective date of the instrument in Yarnall, a Pennsylvania husband was his wife's heir
if she was not survived by any issue, parent, sibling, niece or nephew or their descend-
ants, or brothers and sisters of the half blood or their issue. 1833 Pa. Laws 143. The
decision is wrong. See supra text preceding note 87.
289 E.g., Kleppner v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 70 (1871) (fee tail became fee simple abso-
lute); Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa. 117 (1859); Stokes v. Van Wyck, 3 S.E. 387 (Va. 1887)
(life tenant took fee tail, converted by statute abolishing fee tail into fee simple deter-
minable upon definite failure of issue).
The history in Pennsylvania of treatment of a remainder to the life tenant's "is-
sue" is instructive. In the first such case, Jame's Claim, 1 Dall. 47 (Pa. 1780), the court,
citing no authority at all, declared it was of the "opinion" that issue was a word of
limitation. Id at 48.
In the next case, Paxson v. Lefferts, 3 Rawle 59 (Pa. 1831), the court conceded that
"issue" was not always a word of limitation, yet it held that "issue" was a word of limita-
tion in the instrument under consideration, even though the remainder was to the
life tenant's "issue" and "their heirs." Id. at 75. The court declared that superadded
words of inheritance did not necessarily make "issue" a word of purchase. The court
cited the English treatise, CHARLES FEARNa, AN ESSAY ON THE LEARNING OF C6rINN-
GENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES 181 (6th ed. 1809), for this vague notion.
Fearne, in turn, cited Dodson v. Grew, 95 Eng. Rep. 835 (C.P. 1767), where the remain-
der following a devise to testator's nephew was to "the issue male of his body lawfully
to be begotten, and the heirs male of the body of such issue male." Paxon, 3 Rawle at
76. Although this is the equivalent of "to his issue and their heirs," the ChiefJustice
found the conveyor intended to create a fee tail male and applied Shelley's Rule for
this reason. That is, because the remainder was to "issue" and not "heirs," Shelley's
Rule operated as a rule of construction, not of law. See infra notes 293-94 and accom-
panying text. Two of the four justices that decided Dodson concurred on the theory
that "issue" was a word of limitation. If they meant to say it always is such, their views
were inconsistent with that of the Pennsylvania court in Paxson. Under the lead opin-
ion in Dodson, the conveyor's adding words of inheritance to the remainder to "issue"
of the life tenant showed they were to take as purchasers, unless a fee tail was actually
intended (rather than the result of applying Shelley's Rule).
Today, except in Delaware, see infra note 359, common law fees tail are not recog-
nized. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 5, Introductory Note (1936) (three other
states by statute recognize fee tail for one generation only); SIMEs & SMITH, supra note
1, § 62. Accordingly, outside Delaware, a remainder to the life tenant's "issue and
their heirs" should preclude application of Shelley's Rule.
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scendants"290 as equivalent to "heirs of the body" of the life tenant,
thereby giving that person a fee tail under Shelley's Rule, often up-
graded by state statute into a fee simple. In this type of case, however,
as with remainder to "persons" who would inherit,291 Shelley operates
as a limited 292 rule of construction and not of law, so that, if the con-
290 See Turner v. Monteiro, 103 S.E. 572 (Va. 1920) (holding that words of inheri-
tance are no longer required to apply Shelley's Rule).
Smith v. Wright, 779 S.W.2d 177 (Ark. 1989), said a remainder to the life tenant's
"descendants" was equivalent to one to "heirs of the body." In an alternative holding,
the court declined to apply Shelley's Rule on the theory that the bodily heirs were to
be determined at a time subsequent to the life tenant's death, that is at the termina-
tion of the trust at issue, which was to continue for several years after such death.
Thus "descendants" was not the equivalent to "heirs of the body" in the technical
sense.
The court was wrong concerning the time when heirship was to be determined.
The remainderpersons under the will were initially determined at the life tenant's
death. Under the clear terms of the instrument, upon the death of life-tenant Buren,
the trust involved was to continue, and Buren's income interest to be paid to his
widow and "descendants." When the trust later terminated, the real estate in the trust
corpus would be owned "by the survivors, or survivor, of the widow and the legitimate
descendants, or descendants, of said Buren living at the time fixed for expiration" of
the trust. Id- at 179. If the remainder was viewed as to bodily heirs and also as equita-
ble, like Buren's life estate, Shelley's Rule would apply if the flow of income interest
after Buren's death and the ultimate fee interest were considered a single interest.
That is, on Buren's death, a surviving child of his took a vested interest in corpus,
subject to a postponed right of possession and control, but not postponed enjoyment
of the income, limited by a condition subsequent that would divest such child of all
interest if he or she died before termination of the trust. As explained in infra text
accompanying notes 342-43, Shel&y applies not only when the remainder clause pur-
ports to vest a fee simple absolute in the remainderperson, but also when language in
the remainder clause can provide for defeasance of the interest granted; in which
case Shelley's Rule creates a fee simple defeasible rather than a fee simple absolute in
the life tenant.
On the other hand, if the child's right to receive income until the trust termi-
nated was viewed as an interest distinct from the interest in corpus (which was itself an
equitable interest so there was a potential application of Shelley's Rule, see supra text
accompanying note 39), Shelley's Rule would not apply. But not for the reason stated
by the court-that heirship was determined subsequent to life tenant Buren's death.
Rather, non-applicability would be due to the fact that the class taking an interest in
corpus at termination of the trust did not include all of Buren's bodily heirs. For
example, a child who survived Buren but died before termination of the trust would
be outside the class of ultimate remainderpersons. Heirs who survive to a date after
the ancestor's death do not constitute the same class as technical heirs.
291 See Earnhart v. Earnhart, 26 N.E. 895 (Ind. 1891), discussed in supra text ac-
companying note 275.
292 The pertinent cases seem to look to all parts of the instrument except for the
words "for his life" following the naming of the life tenant to ascertain if the "issue" or
"persons" are intended to take a remainder as purchasers. As a-"pure" rule of con-
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veyor adds language to the effect that the "persons" or "issue" shall
take as purchasers the desired remainder interest will be recog-
nized.2 93 Such intent appears if the remainder is to persons or issue
"and their heirs" or "in fee simple." The most direct way to express
the intent is illustrated by a 1914 Pennsylvania case which refused to
apply Shelley's Rule where the gift over after a devise of a life estate
was "to his [the life tenant's] descendants who shall be then living,
who shall take the same in remainder... as they would have taken ... had
he then died actually seised and possessed" of the land.294
struction Shelley's Rule could not exist, as the "for life" in the clause before the re-
mainder clause should be conclusive that the person to hold for life only is not to
have a fee estate, an intent to be implemented by treating the gift over as creating a
remainder.
293 See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 1, § 1548 at 443.
Note, supra note 2, at 1015 n.9, says that Zane v. Weintz, 55 A. 641 (NJ. Ch. 1903),
treated Shelley as a rule of construction. The remainder there was conveyed to "per-
sons" who would succeed to the estate if the life tenant owned it in fee. Dictum in
Zane supports this understanding of it. Six years later, a New Jersey court in Peer v.
Hennion, 76 A. 1084 (N.J. 1909), discussed in supra note 275, can be read to say that in
New Jersey when the remainder is to "persons"-or other non-technical terms are
used to describe this class-there is a presumption that they are words of purchase
rather than limitation. This would effectively eliminate application of Shelley's Rule,
as a conveyor almost never intends it to apply. More recently, Mazzola v. Malley, 68
A.2d 655 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1949), seems to adopt a flat rule that Shelley can
never apply unless the remainder is to "heirs" or "heirs of the body" of the life tenant.
The remainder there was conveyed "to such persons or persons as would by law in-
herit the same [land] if he [the life tenant] had an estate in fee simple" in the prop-
erty. Id. at 656.
294 Lea v. Swanson, 91 A. 611, 612 (Pa. 1914) (emphasis added). The court said a
non-technical term such as "descendants" "'yields readily to a context indicating its
use as a word of purchase."' Id. (quoting Stout v. Good, 91 A. 613 (Pa. 1914)). Erro-
neously, the court said that the italicized words above, as mere words of distribution,
were insufficient to show the intent that "descendants" was a word of purchase, not of
limitation. The court failed to realize that the rule that words of distribution follow-
ing remainder to "heirs" (the technical term) do not negate applicability of Shelley's
Rule and had no application when use of "descendants" rather than "heirs" converted
Shelley into a rule of construction rather than of law. The court did say that the words
"then living" showed the testator's intent that the descendants were to take as pur-
chasers on the theory that "then living" excluded subsequent generations of yet to be
born descendants who would be inheriting if a fee tail were intended. But "persons
who would inherit if the life tenant died owning the property in fee" also has a then-
living requirement built into it, and Pennsylvania has applied Shelley's Rule to such a
case. See William's Appeal, 83 Pa. 377 (1877), discussed in supra notes 285-86. Lea
simply erred in holding that the words "then living" were, in a situation where Sheley
was converted into a rule of construction, necessary to explain the clause "who shall
take the same in remainder."
[VOL- 73:1
RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
Secondary sources embrace-without analysis-the line of cases
that extends Shelley's Rule to remainders to "persons," "issue," and
"descendants," dispensing with the historical requirement of words of
inheritance.295 This majority rule is, however, unsound for at least
two reasons. First, it is contrary to the policies that should direct de-
velopment of common law rules to extend an intent-defeating rule
beyond its original scope, especially when the reason for the Rule-
forcing the payment of feudal "dues" owed by persons who take by
succession-has long since disappeared. Second, if a court adhered
to the maxim of construction that an instrument is initially to be con-
strued as if the Rule in Shelley's Case did not exist29 6 it would have
absolutely no reason to convert "persons who would inherit" into
"heirs" or "issue" into "heirs of the body." If there were no Shelley's
Rule, surely the court would accept the language deliberately chosen
by the conveyor. The refusal to do so seems to be a reaction to what
the courts must view as an attempt to avoid Shelley's Rule by the con-
veyor, although, of course, the conveyor has a right to avoid it.297 The
minority is correct; Shelley's Rule should never apply unless "heirs"
(general or bodily) is the direct object of the grant or devise of the
remainder.
295 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 30.1 cmts. f, g (1988), (with the
qualification, applicable only to South Carolina deeds today, that "heirs" must appear
if, wholly apart from Shelley's Rule, the jurisdiction requires that word to create a fee
estate); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312, cmts. f, g (1940) (same qualification); see
also Note, supra note 2, at 1014; Rhea, supra note 11, at 112.
296 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
297 SmdEs & SMrrH, supra note 1, state that the appropriate mode of avoidance is a
conveyance to the would-be life tenant "for 100 years, should he live that long." Id.
§ 1572, at 490. This makes the particular estate a leasehold, not a freehold, and for
this technical reason, Shelley's Rule (hopefully) does not apply and the future inter-
est conveyed to the heirs of the "lessee" will be recognized. But see Seeger v. Leakin,
25 A. 863, 863 (Md. 1893) (grant of leasehold to daughter during her natural life and
to her bodily heirs if she shall have any; court held that where personal estate "indud-
ing of course terms of years or whatever duration" is bequeathed in terms which
would vest an estate tail in real estate, Shelley's Rule vests an estate tail in the subject
of the personal estate as well); Hughes v. Nicklas, 17 A. 398, 398-99 (Md. 1889) (de-
vise of leasehold to Jane "with remainder over to her heirs of her body if she should
have any," court held Shelley's Rule applies to the leasehold as it would to a
freehold).
1997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
VII. SHELLEY'S RULE HAS ALSo BEEN MISAPPLIED IN CASES
INVOLVING TERMINABLE LIFE ESTATES
A. The Rule Has No Application Where the Instrument Conveys a
Remainder to "Heirs" but Provides a Nontechnical Definition for "Heirs"
The previous sections of this Article have dealt with the question
whether an adjective or choice of law clause directly modifying "heirs"
of the life tenant, the intended remainderpersons, qualified "heirs" so
as to require a conclusion that it was not used in its technical sense.
But phrases other than such modifying adjectives and choice of law
provisions may also qualify "heirs" in such manner. Occasionally, the
conveyor specifically defines "heirs" in a restrictive sense. An example
from New Mexico is a deed to a grantor's daughter for life, then to
"her heir or heirs, meaning her children if she have any at her
death."298 Similarly, a North Carolina deed provided that on the life
tenant's death, the granted land would belong "to her heirs, the chil-
dren of the said Isaiah," her husband.2 99
In most cases the argument that the conveyor intended to use the
term "heirs" in a restricted and nontechnical sense is not so easily es-
tablished. The party seeking to avoid Shelley's Rule on this basis must
rebut the presumption that "heirs"-a technical term of art-is used
in its technical sense. As has been shown, the caselaw generally de-
mands "clear" or "plain" evidence in the instrument of the conveyor's
intention that the word have a nontechnical meaning.300 Apparently
the presumption stands if the court is of the view that more likely than
not the conveyor intended a nontechnical meaning for "heirs," yet
this is not clearly established.
298 Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 279 (N.M. 1979); see also RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 305 cmt. s (1940). In Prior v. Quackenbush, 29 Ind. 475
(1868), the body of the deed referred to grantee Catherine and made a typical refer-
ence to "her heirs." Inserted just above the grantor's signature was a "nota bene" to
the effect that the intent was to give Catherine only a life estate and that "Elizabeth
Stewart and Louisa Stewart ... are the only heirs contemplated in the foregoing
deed." Id. at 476. Shelley's Rule was held inapplicable to defeat the stated intent that
Catherine was to take only a life estate, because of this restricted definition of "heirs."
See also Gardner v. Dillard, 258 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), discussed in supra note 84.
In Hall v. Gradwohl 77 A. 480, 483 (Md. 1910), the remainder clause called for
equal division among the life tenant's "children or legal heirs." The court concluded
that the life tenant's children acquired a remainder as purchasers.
299 Hodges v. Fleetwood, 9 S.E. 640, 640 (N.C. 1889); see also Pryor v. Duncan, 47
Va. (6 Gratt.) 27 (1849) (defining in the context of the instrument "heirs" as
"children").
300 See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
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In an Indiana case30' the testatrix devised land to a daughter for
life, then "to her lawful heirs." Another passage of the will left some
household effects to "my said two heirs," referring to the daughter
and her brother, the testatrix's son. To avoid application of Shelley's
Rule, it was urged that this bequest showed that the conveyor used the
word "heir" to mean "child." The court rejected this argument for
lack of a "clear intention"30 2 of the testatrix that her nontechnical use
of "heirs" in the bequest of household items carried over to the devise
of land in a different portion of the will.303
B. A Nontechnical Definition Is Inferred from a Gift Over to One Who
Could Be an Heir of the Life Tenant
On the other hand, the presumption that "heirs" is used in its
technical sense has been held rebutted in almost every case30 4 where
the instrument provided that if the life tenant died without heirs the
estate should pass to a person or persons who could have been the life
tenant's heir(s). Perhaps the strongest of these cases involved a deed
granting a life estate to the grantor's daughter Sarah, with remainder
"to such heir or heirs as she hereafter may have. But in the event of
the death of the said Sarah Eliza Butler, and in the event of her leav-
ing no lawful issue," to the heirs of Sarah's father.3 05 That latter
301 Perkins v. McConnell, 36 N.E. 121 (Ind. 1894).
302 Id at 122.
303 A contrary result was reached in an Ohio case I find indistinguishable, Bunnell
v. Evans, 26 Ohio St. 409, 410 (1875), where the will gave a remainder to the life
tenant's "heirs." In another part of the will specific devises and bequests were made
to named children of the testator, coupled with a directive that the "above-mentioned
heirs shall bring in an account." The Ohio court was willing to extend the nontechni-
cal meaning of "heir" as "child" in the clause concerning an action to account to the
remainder provision in another part of the will.
Rowe v. Moore, 72 S.E. 468 (S.C. 1911.), involved a devise to a daughter for life,
then to "the heirs of her body." Shelley's Rule was not applied to create a fee tail in
the daughter on the ground that "heirs of the body" actually meant "children." This
was based on a clause of the will devising property to testator's son for life, "then to
the heirs of his body forever, the child or children of one of his children dead, to take
the share of his or their parent." Id. at 469. The court explained that "heirs of the
body" in the technical sense of this phrase would by itself result-if Shelley's Rule did
not create a fee tail-in a per stirpes distribution to grandchildren, yet the conveyor
felt the need to spell that out.
304 One contra decision is King v. Johnson, 83 S.E. 1070 (Va. 1915). There a gift
over to the life tenant's brother in the event the heirs of the life tenant did not take
the remainder was held not to "plainly show" that the word "heirs" was not used in its
technical sense in the remainder clause. Id at 1072. The only other contra decision I
found, from Illinois, seems to have been overruled sub silentio. See infra note 311.
305 Duckett v. Butler, 45 S.E. 137, 137 (S.C. 1903).
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group consisted of relatives who would have been the life tenant's col-
lateral heirs, indicating that the "heirs" of Sarah who were granted the
remainder consisted of a group not as broad as her heirs general. But
there were two additional bases for rebutting the technical-use pre-
sumption. The first involved the use of the words "may hereinafter
have." At the time of delivery Sarah did have ascendants and collater-
als living who could be her heirs, but no children. Second, the word
"issue" in the deed can be viewed as defining "heirs."
306
In most states, however, the two additional factors would not have
been necessary to overcome the presumption of technical use of
"heirs." The gift over to a potential heir itself suffices. Several such
decisions are found in North Carolina caselaw. Shelley's Rule was
held inapplicable in a 1939 case of a devise "to my nephew W. C. Ed-
wards for his lifetime, and to his heirs if he dies without heirs, my
property goes to my Bro. R_ C. Edwards" and then to two named chil-
dren of a nephew of the testatrix. 30 7 The three devisees of the gift
over were potential collateral heirs of the life tenant, and this was suf-
ficient to establish that the "heirs" of W. C. Edwards were not his heirs
in the technical sense, but a restricted group.308 For the same reason
Shelley's Rule was held inapplicable in a 1949 North Carolina case
where the devise was to testator's son for life then to his lawful heirs,
but if he die without lawful heirs to his sister.
30 9
306 The Court declined to construe "heirs" as "heirs of the body"-a possible inter-
pretation-in order to apply Shelley's Rule so that Sarah would take a fee tail.
Rather, the court found "heirs" meant children, primarily basing its conclusion on the
language "as she may hereinafter have." Id. at 138.
307 Edwards v. Faulkner, 2 S.E.2d 703, 704 (N.C. 1939); accord RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 305 cmt. r (1940) (to B for life then to B's heirs, and if he leave no heirs to
his brothers and sisters); Note, supra note 2, at 1097.
308 North Carolina has never implied in this situation that the actual intent was to
use the term "heirs of the body"-which would be consistent with collaterals of the
life tenant taking a gift over-so that Shelley's Rule would apply to create a fee tail in
the named life tenant, upgraded by statute in North Carolina to a fee simple. See
supra note 149.
But see Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N.C. 62, 67 (1881). The devise was to testator's
grandson for life, then to his heirs, or such of his heirs to whom he should appoint;
but if he die without lawful issue, to all of testator's male grandchildren. In dictum
the court said that but for the power of appointment, which restricted the class of
heirs to those the life tenant might select, Shelley's Rule would have created a fee tail
in the life tenant, converted by statute into a fee simple.
309 Tynch v. Briggs, 54 S.E.2d 918, 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 1949); accord White v.
Lackey, 253 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. 1979). The most recent such North Carolina case is
Taylor v. Honeycutt, 81 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. 1954), involving a devise to testator's daugh-
ter, with a substitutional gift to his son if she died without "heirs." It was assumed
there was an implied remainder in such a situation to such "heirs," but Shelley's Rule
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In an Illinois case the life tenant was testator's daughter, and the
gift over in the event of failure of her issue-which cut out her "heirs"
as remainderpersons-was to "my [testator's] other heirs."310 The
court held that the word "heirs" had not been used in the technical
sense. "[Testator] could not have intended to limit a remainder to
the heirs general of the complainant and then take it from them in
default of a particular class of heirs. His intention was to limit the
remainder to the heirs of the body of the complainant .... ,,31
Other states that have recognized that "heirs" cannot mean heirs
in the technical sense in light of a substitutional gift over to one or
more persons who could be in the class of heirs general of the life
did not apply because the gift over showed testator, in referring to his daughter's
"heirs," had not used that word in its technical sense. See also Hampton v. Griggs, 113
S.E. 501 (N.C. 1922) (construing gift over to "the family" to include the life tenant's
collateral heirs); May v. Lewis, 43 S.E. 550 (N.C. 1903) (gift over to life tenant's "next
of kin").
310 Winchell v. Winchell, 102 N.E. 823, 824 (111. 1913).
311 Id. Because the Illinois Court, unlike North Carolina in cases discussed above,
construed "heirs" of the daughter to be "heirs of her body," Shelley's Rule did apply.
It gave her a fee tail, but an Illinois statute cut it down to a life estate with remainder
in fee simple absolute to her heirs. 1871-72 11M. Laws 282, now 765 ILL. Comp. STAT.
ANN. 5/6 (West 1993).
Winchell seems necessarily to overrule sub silentio Silva v. Hopkinsm, 41 N.E. 1013
(Ill. 1895), which could not have been distinguished had it been considered by the
Winchell court. There the testator devised life estates to two daughters with remainder
to their heirs. Should either daughter die without issue, a gift over to the other
daughter would take effect. It was urged that in the remainder clause "heirs" could
not mean heirs general, as the sister of each life tenant was a potential heir, yet was
provided for in a gift over. The court held that the gift over "falls far short of making
it clear that the testator used the word 'heirs' in other than their [sic] legal sense." Id.
at 1014. This passage was quoted favorably in Hege v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 173
N.E. 610, 613 (Ill. 1930), a case where there was ample reason, not present in Silva,
for rejecting the notion that "heirs" meant "children" or something less than heirs
generally.
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tenant are New Hampshire,3 1 2 Ohio,3 13 Pennsylvania,3 14 Texas, 3 15 and
Wyoming.3
16
312 Crockett v. Robinson, 46 N.H. 454 (1866), concerned a devise of life estates to
two sons of the testator, with remainder to the heirs of each, with a gift over if either
died without heirs to named nephews and nieces of the testator. As these could have
been collateral heirs of either life tenant, the court held "heirs" meant "heirs of the
body." Shelley's Rule created a fee tail, but that was upgraded by statute to a fee
simple.
313 King v. Beck, 15 Ohio 559 (1846). Testator devised a life estate to his brother,
remainder to brother's heirs, but if there be no legal heirs, to two named children of
a sister of the testator and life tenant. The court held "heirs" meant children (rather
than heirs of the body, a possible construction), and thus Shelley's Rule did not apply
at all.
314 Bassett v. Hawk, 11 A. 802 (Pa. 1888) (testator's son was life tenant with gift
over to testator's grandchildren; "heirs" construed as heirs of the body, so Shelley's
Rule created a fee tail).
315 In Hunting v. Jones, 215 S.W. 959 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919), modified, 221 S.W.
265 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920), the remainder following a devise to Testator's daugh-
ter for life was "to her bodily heirs equally," and the remainder after a devise to a son
for life was "to his heirs by his present wife." If Shelley's Rule applied to the second
devise the son would have obtained a fee tail special at common law. But the court
held that in each quoted remainder clause the word "heirs" meant children. Id. at
962. This was based on a gift over "to my [Testator's] other heirs," if either life tenant
were to "die without heirs." Testator had a third child that the court noted must be
one of the "other heirs."
316 The holding in Crawford v. Barber, 385 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1963), was probably an
erroneous decision. The devise was to testatrix's son David for life then at his death
unto the heirs of his body who may be living at that time. If any of his heirs
shall have died before his death, then the share of said heir shall go to the
children of said heir. If said heir shall have died without children, then said
share shall be divided among the other heirs of the said David W. Crawford.
If the said David W. Crawford shall die without any children surviving him,
then it is my will that his [share of the devise) shall be divided among his
heirs ....
Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
David died without issue, so the remainder clause of concern was the ultimate
one. The court correctly held that because of the gifts over, the initial references to
"heirs of his body" and "heirs" meant children and not issue. From this the court
leaped to the conclusion that the italicized word was also not used in its technical
sense. Yet it cannot mean "children" in context because the condition that grants the
estate to these heirs is the absence of children. In context it seems clear that the
conveyor's intent is well served by defining the italicized "heirs" in its technical sense.
On the other hand, had testatrix written instead ofjust the italicized "heirs" the term
"heirs other than issue"-which also is what she meant-Shelley's Rule arguably
would not have applied. But see Hardage v. Stroope 24 S.W. 490 (Ark. 1893), applying
Shelley's Rule where the remainder was to the life tenant's bodily heirs, but if she
leave none, to her statutory heirs. Did the conveyor here mean "heirs other than
descendants"?
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C. The Inference of Nontechnical Use Is Strong in Cases of a Determinable
Life Estate With Remainder to the Life Tenant's Heirs
Oddly, in a different type of case where the argument for the
conveyor's having a nontechnical meaning for "heirs" seems as strong
as in most of the decisions discussed above, most courts have been
unwilling to draw the inference, with the result that Shelley's Rule has
again been applied dubiously. This class of cases involves a termina-
ble life estate, to which Shelley's Rule can be applicable.
317
The leading case is Lydick v. Tate from Illinois.318 It involved a
devise to testator's daughter Ellen "during her widowhood... to have
and to hold for and during her natural life, and at her death or remar-
riage the said land shall descend to her heirs."319 It was urged that
"heirs" here meant children (Ellen had three when the will was writ-
ten). The court held:
The word "heirs" is a technical word with a fixed legal meaning,
and, when used in a will, unless controlled by, or inconsistent with
the context, must be interpreted according to its strict technical
meaning .... A careful examination of the entire will fails to dis-
close a single word or expression which even tends to indicate the
testator used the word "heirs" in any other than its technical
sense.3
20
The other state to have clearly321 rendered such a holding is, not
surprisingly, North Carolina. In Ham v. Ham, the remainder to heirs
Note that a remainder "to his issue but if he leave none to his ascendant and
collateral heirs" is not technically the same as "to his heirs," even if the heirship stat-
utes in effect when the will or deed took effect allowed ascendants and collaterals to
take only if the intestate leaves no issue. Disregarding a surviving spouse (who is likely
to be heir along with issue), the heirship statute in force at the life tenant's death
could admit parents, but not collaterals, to shared heirship when the intestate left
grandchildren but no children and no spouse. Likewise if the intestate left no issue,
the statute could prefer parents to the exclusion of any collateral heir, especially those
more remote than relatives in the parents' parentela of collaterals.
317 See 1 AgmRicAN LAw, supra note 6, § 4.42. The Restatement of Property gives two
examples: (1) A to B during her widowhood, then to B's heirs; (2) A to B for the life
of C, then to B'sheirs. RESTATEMENT oF PROPERTY § 312 cmt a, illus. 3 & 4 (1940). A
better example than (1) above for applying Shelley's Rule to a determinable life es-
tate-because it eliminates the argument that "heirs" is not used in its technical
sense-would be a conveyance to A during her widowhood, and if she remarry to her
children, but if she die never having remarried, to her heirs.
318 44 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. 1942).
319 Id. at 587.
320 Id. at 592.
321 In Hiester v. Yerger, 31 A. 122 (Pa. 1895), the grantee was devised land for "his
natural life, upon condition he keep the same in good repair and insured, and also
pay all the taxes thereon during said term; and after his decease ... unto his then
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followed a life estate to testator's daughter "during her lifetime or wid-
owhood."3 22 Shelley's Rule was applied without discussion of the
problem that upon the life tenant's remarriage she would have no
heirs to take the estate but could have children or issue at that time,
which is what the devisor may have meant by "heirs."
3 23
The one contrary holding is from Indiana, Conger v. Lowe,
3 24
where Samuel was devised a life estate in land, followed by this future
interest clause: "At his death, or his refusal to live on or occupy the
same [land], then ... to the said Samuel M. Conger's lawful heirs."
Shelley's Rule was held inapplicable. To the Indiana court it was
surviving heirs .... Id. at 122 (emphasis added). No provision was made for who
would own the estate if the life tenant could forfeit his interest for failure to pay taxes
or make needed repairs. The court applied Shelley's Rule, holding the grantee took
a fee simple, without specifying whether it was absolute or defeasible. However, since
the issue being litigated was whether the party named as grantee had marketable tide,
and the court held he did, the fee must have been absolute. Thus the court necessar-
ily held by implication either (1) that the "condition" about repairs and taxes was
precatory or (2) the conveyor intended to devise a determinable life estate but when
Shelley's Rule was applied, the condition for determination did not attach to the re-
sulting fee to make it defeasible. See infra text accompanying notes 344-64.
If the condition clause was not precatory, Hiester is factually similar to Lydick
Where the issue is whether a named remainderman is entitled to take when a life
estate is terminated prematurely, after a court's ruling that the life tenant must forfeit
it for waste, words like those emphasized above (and "at his death") are construed as
"and when the life estate ends" so that the party named as remainderman can take
when the life tenant's death is not the cause of termination of the life estate. See Kost
v. Foster, 94 N.E.2d 302 (Ill. 1950); Smirs & SMrri, supra note 1, § 144. Thus, if the
condition clause was not precatory, Hester failed to give a nontechnical meaning to
"heirs"-such as "issue"-that would have provided a likely taker upon early deter-
mining of the determinable life estate. Because the instrument is supposed to be
construed as if Shelley's Rule did not exist, see supra text accompanying notes 48-52,
on this view the Hiester court improperly failed to consider the maxim favoring a con-
struction that avoids partial intestacy or incomplete disposition. See supra text accom-
panying notes 77-81.
322 Ham v. Ham, 21 N.C. 464, 464 (1837).
323 In PTyor v. Duncan, 47Va. (6 Gratt.) 27 (1849), the testator understood that the
life tenant's bodily heirs, the named remainderpersons, would be unable to qualify as
heirs to take the estate if the life estate were to determine prematurely on the stated
condition that the life tenant not conceal the property (slaves). The determination
clause provided that if concealment were to occur, "her [the life tenant's] title to
cease, and [I] direct my executors to take them [the slaves] into possession.., and
their increase to be divided among her children if any living, otherwise to be divided
among my [testator's] children." Id. at 27. Counsel argued that the quoted provision
showed that "bodily heirs" in the remainder clause applicable if the life estate ended
upon the life tenant's death must have meant "children." Apparently the court ac-
cepted this less than logical argument, for it declined to apply Shelley's Rule.
324 24 N.E. 889, 889 (Ind. 1890).
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dearly apparent that the testator contemplated that the persons
designated as "lawful heirs" should be persons in being before the
death of Samuel M. Conger, because not only the tile, but the pos-
session, of the estate in remainder over was to vest in them by the
terms of the will, as well upon the failure or refusal of [Samuel] to
occupy the farm as upon his death.
325
Thus it was "absolutely certain that the testator did not use the phrase
for the purpose of designating the whole class" of heirs in the word's
technical sense.3 26 The Conger court held "heirs" here meant children
of Samuel.
While the testator's intention in the Indiana case surely is not so
absolutely certain, the result there seems more reasonable than that in
Lydick or Ham It is bolstered by a factor not mentioned by the Indi-
ana court: that the canon of construction presuming the conveyor
uses a technical term like "heirs" in its technical sense seems to be
neutralized by applicability of the canon favoring a construction that
makes a complete disposition3 27 (often encountered in the form of
the presumption against partial intestacy).328
It has been said that, where two applicable canons of construction
lead to conflicting interpretations of an instrument, a court must give
each presumption "its proper weight."329 Many cases indicate that the
presumption favoring the technical meaning of "heirs" is a weighty
325 Id. at 891.
326 Id.
327 That is, the devise or grant clause embraces every interest in the land at issue,
with no interest retained in the conveyor or, if the instrument is a will, retained by his
estate or passing to residuary devisees.
328 Compare supra text accompanying notes 61-65 with text accompanying notes
78-84. Neither in Illinois' Lydick nor Indiana's Conger case nor North Carolina's Ham
case does the court indicate whether the will contained a residuary clause. If any of
these wills did, the presumption of complete disposition as applied to deeds should
apply by analogy. That is, the paragraph of the will describing the land and disposing
of some interest in it is to be construed separately. Just as in the case of the deed, the
law assumes the conveyor, in disposing of some interest[s] did not hold back an inter-
est to pass, in the case of a deed, later at the conveyor's death (or subsequent pre-
death deed), or in the case of a will, to pass later in the instrument's residuary clause.
See discussion in supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
329 2 ROBERT T. DEVLrN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DEEDS § 840 (1887). Thomp-
son likewise says that in such a situation "the policies underlying the rules [of con-
struction that are in conflict] need to be examined and weighed in the context of the
particular facts of the case." 9 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 82.13(e), at
426 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); see also W.W. Allen, Annotation, Conflict Between
Granting and Habendum Clauses as to Estate Conveyed, 58 A.L.R.2d 1374, 1413 (1958)
(stating that conflicting maxims are to be "given such weight as in law and in reason
they are entitled to"); 95 CJ.S. 2d Wills § 590, at 751 n.89 (1957) (stating that court
"balances against each other" the conflicting maxims of construction).
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maxim of construction in stating that it will prevail unless language of
the instrument "clearly"330 or "plainly"331 establishes that the conveyor
intended a nontechnical meaning. One court has said the case for
the non-technical meaning must be "very clear."332 Another has
stated that the technical meaning of "heirs" controls "unless qualified
by other language which shows beyond a reasonable doubt that a dif-
ferent meaning be given."33
3
On the other hand the presumption that a conveyor intended "to
make a complete disposition of all of her property" is "very strong"
334
and is dispelled only if other language shows "clearly" that the con-
veyor intended to hold back some interest in the property.335 Appar-
ently, then, there is no authority that could be cited-in order to
support the holdings in Lydick and Ham-to the effect that the pre-
sumption of technical usage is stronger than the presumption against
partial disposition. Some other basis for breaking the impasse is
needed, such as subordinating the presumption favoring technical us-
330 E.g., Cook v. Sober, 135 N.E. 60, 61 (Ill. 1922) (other language in instrument
must make it "perfectly clear" term "heirs" not used in technical sense); Perkins v.
McConnell, 36 N.E. 121, 122 (Ind. 1894) (context must manifest "dear intention" to
have employed "heirs" as word of purchase, not of limitation); McCllen v. Lehker,
123 N.E. 475, 478 (Ind. App. 1919) ("heirs" presumed to be used in technical sense
unless contra intent "clearly and unequivocally" shown); Fraser v. Chene, 2 Mich. 81,
84 (1851) (requiring that language must "clearly" show "heirs" used in other than
technical sense); Stephens v. Clark, 189 S.E. 191, 195 (N.C. 1937) ("heirs" accorded
technical meaning unless different intent "dearly expressed"); see also Beardsley v.
Johnson, 134 A. 530 (Conn. 1926) (decided after Shelley's Rule abolished-nothing
"clearly indicate [d]" that "heirs" really meant "children"); Cary, supra note 66, at 379.
331 See Clarke v. Smith, 49 Md. 106, 120 (1878) (none of the circumstances relied
on indicated "plain and unequivocal" intent of testator to use "heirs lawfully begotten" in
sense of children rather than in technical sense); Crockett v. Robinson, 46 N.H. 454,
459 (1866) ("heirs at law" has technical meaning unless "plain" that other meaning
intended); Ham v. Ham, 21 N.C. 464, 464 (1837); Moore v. Brooks, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.)
135, 140 (1855) (must "plainly" appear that the word "heirs" is being used in re-
stricted sense); Note, supra note 2, at 1094 (where Shelley's Rule claimed not to apply,
courts require instrument "plainly" show word "heirs" not used in technical sense).
332 Quick's Ex'r v. Quick, 21 N.J. Eq. 13, 17 (1870).
333 Orme v. Northern Trust Co., 172 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961), modified,
183 N.E.2d 505 (fll. 1962).
334 Gilkey v. Chambers, 207 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. 1947); see also Payene v. Barnes,
638 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (presumption against partial intestacy is
"strong"); Swearingen v. Giles, 565 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Easland 1978,
writ ref d n.r.e.).
335 In rePaulsen's Estate, 158 P.2d 186, 190 (Colo. 1945); Shane v.Johnson, 99 A.
2d 557, 558 (Del. Ch. 1953); Estate of McGahee, 550 So. 2d 83, 86 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tenn. 1977).
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age upon proof that a layman rather than an attorney wrote the
instrument. 33
6
Baron Parke seemed to express the view that where canons of
construction clash in such a manner the more specific or narrow rule
prevails over the more general, or broader.3 37 In the case he was dis-
cussing the competing maxims of construction were that which would
avoid a partial intestacy and that providing, where two passages of an
instrument are repugnant, the second (in order of appearance on the
page) prevails over the first.338 Parke apparently considered the latter
presumption the more specific.
It is true that partial intestacies can arise in many ways, including
wording involving no technical terms at all. Whether a technical term
has its technical meaning probably arises as an issue more often when
partial intestacy is not a possible outcome than when it is. Neverthe-
less, I cannot conclude that one of these maxims is more specific than
the other.
In a situation such as Lydick, then, what can a court do but guess
at the conveyor's intent? The notion of the Indiana court in Conger-
that the conveyor envisions the same relatives taking the property
when the life estate determines prematurely as when it ends upon the
life tenant's death-strikes me as the better guess. If so, the majority
of the American cases involving the possibility of applying Shelley's
Rule to a determinable life estate have been wrongly decided.
Still another possibility is that in the Lydick-Ham situation the re-
mainder to "heirs" is intended to mean not children or issue, but the
life tenant's "heirs determined as if the life tenant had died at the
termination of the life estate by remarriage as well as by her death."
Under this view, if the life tenant's closest relative when she remarried
336 See Gilkey v. Chambers, 207 S.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Tex. 1947) (following Federal
Land Bank v. Little, 107 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex. 1937)).
337 Morrall v. Sutton, 41 Eng. Rep. 735, 736 (Ch. 1845). Baron Parke, as chief
judge of the Exchequer, and ChiefJustice Coleridge of the Court of Common Pleas
were asked to give advisory opinions to the Court of Chancery in this matter involving
a devise to testator's daughter, "her executors, administrators and assigns.. . during
the term of her natural life," IdM, the equivalent of a conveyance "in fee simple abso-
lute for life." No remainderpersons were named. The maxim that the specific rule
prevails over the more general is well established in cases where two statutes apply by
their terms to the same fact situation and call for different results. See Clifford F.
MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944); Board of Supervisors v. Simp-
son, 227 P.2d 14, 15 (Cal. 1951); Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 97 N.E.2d
549, 552 (Ohio 1951); 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 369 (1953).
338 In this country the presumption would have been not in favor of the second
passage but that which conveyed the greater estate, see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 243 cmt. e (1940).
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was a brother, because any issue of hers were yet to be born, the in-
strument provides someone to take possession. The presumption in
favor of complete disposition is better served by this construction than
by that adopted in Conger v. Lowe by the Indiana court (heirs means
children). Does Shelley's Rule apply if this construction is adopted?
It should if the verbal reformulation of the word heirs is "and to her
heirs if the life estate ends by her death, but to her heirs determined
as if she had died when she remarries if remarriage determines the
life estate." The first clause here uses "heirs" in its technical sense.
Perhaps, however, if the verbal reformulation adopted to express the
conveyor's intent is that quoted in the first sentence of this paragraph,
the word "heirs" is not used strictly in its technical sense, and Shelley's
Rule would not apply.
D. Where The Life Estate Is Determinable, Applying Shelley's Rule Should
Create a Fee Simple Defeasible, Not, as Has Been Held, a Fee
Simple Absolute
Applying Shelley's Rule does not always convert a life estate into a
fee simple absolute. We have seen the result can be a fee tail.3 39 The
draftsperson can refine the entailment language following "heirs of
the body" so that application of Shelley's Rule yields a fee tail special.
Example: 0 to A for life then to A's bodily heirs by his present wife. 40
In states where De Donis Conditionalibus has been rejected as part of
the common law, language added to the remainder to the life tenant's
heirs that would create a fee tail results, when Shelley's Rule is ap-
plied, in the would-be life tenant taking a fee simple conditional. 341
Although I could find no case on point and no discussion in any
secondary source of the possibility, the logic of Shelley's Rule requires
recognition of a fee simple defeasible if appropriate defeasance lan-
guage is attached to the remainder to the life tenant's heirs. Example:
to A for life, then to A's heirs so long as no alcoholic beverage is sold
on the premises. By force of Shelley's Rule, the entire remainder
clause merges into the grant of the life estate to create a fee estate.
3 42
Stated differently, in the example above Shelley's Rule changes the
words "for life then" to the word "and." Thus, application of Shelley's
Rule should not destroy the possibility of reverter retained by the con-
339 See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 1; see also Note, supra note 2, at 1008.
340 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.1 cmt. g (1988). If the remainder
were to "heirs male of the body" of the life tenant, a fee tail male would result upon
application of Shelley's Rule. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. g (1940).
341 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. 1 (1940).
342 See 1 RICHARD PRESTON, AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON ESTATES 329-30 (1828).
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veyor in such a situation if a literal interpretation is given to the
instrument.m3
In Ham the court declared that the life tenant obtained a fee sim-
ple absolute, even though the life estate, which merged with the re-
mainder upon application of Shelley's Rule, was determinable. 34 In
Lydick this was strongly implied by the court.34 Lydick expressly de-
343 Likewise, the recognition of a fee simple defeasible upon application of Shel-
ley's Rule would preserve an executory interest. Example: to A for life, then to A's
heirs, but if an alcoholic beverage is sold on the premises within 21 years after the
death of A and her issue living when this instrument takes effect, the title shall vest in
B and his heirs.
344 In Ham the bequest was of two slaves. The person named in the will as life
tenant, Caren Ham, had sold one of them and apparently was preparing to sell the
other. Caren's children, asserting they were remainderpersons and that Caren had
only a life estate, sought an equitable decree enjoining further sale of the property
and requiring Caren to post bond to protect their interests in remainder. Although
one cannot infer this with confidence from the report of the Ham decision, it seems
likely Caren's children were arguing that "heirs" meant "children" or "issue," see supra
note 278 (concerning North Carolina's refusal to apply Shelley's Rule when the re-
mainder is to issue). Perhaps the children argued that Shelley's Rule applied only to
real property. The Ham court held equitable relief would be improper because under
Shelley's Rule, Caren had acquired "the absolute estate."
The 1940 Restatement of Property says that Shelley's Rule applies to a conveyance
from A to B during her widowhood, then to B's heirs, to give B a fee simple absolute.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 312 cmt. a, illus. 3 (1940). Since this was published
before Lydick was decided, the reliance must have been on Ham
345 There the devise was to testator's daughter Ellen "during her widowhood."
She was a widow when the will was written but had remarried before testator died.
When she died she devised all her property to two sons, to the exclusion of issue of
her first marriage, who were the plaintiffs seeking to quiet tite. Their theory was that
the life estate in Ellen failed because she was not a widow when the will took effect.
The remainder was thus accelerated, and in the remainder clause "heirs" meant chil-
dren. The trial court held the plaintiffs were entitled to no interest and dismissed
their complaint. Rejecting the contention that "heirs" meant children, the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed. Since Ellen had already remarried, this event must either
have terminated her interest before the will took effect or have been legally irrelevant.
Since Ellen's devisees took a fee estate, Ellen must have held a fee.
Apparently plaintiffs did not make the argument that under Shelley's Rule the
fee was determinable on Ellen's ceasing to be a widow, and that determination oc-
curred at the moment Shelley's Rule operated on the will, because Ellen was not then
a widow. The unmade argument also contends that a possibility of reverter was left in
the testator's heirs (assuming there was no residuary clause in his will). Ellen was one
of three surviving children of testator and per stirpes took one third of the property at
issue. Since the testator intended Ellen to have only a determinable life estate, she
should not inherit more. Her three children living when the will took effect (who
included the plaintiffs' ancestors) thus took one third of the possibility of reverter.
Precedent would support this argument if the plaintiffs claimed through a clause
in the will devising the possibility of reverter to testator's heirs or if testator's heirs
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clared that the determinable nature of the life estate was simply to be
disregarded in applying Shelley's Rule.346 This seems implicit in Ham.
Neither court considered the point that if the apparent remain-
der clause used "heirs" in the technical sense, the wills provided no
one to take the fee if the life tenant's life estate was determined upon
her remarriage. This meant that either the testators' heirs3 47 had a
possibility of reverter to assert upon the life tenant's remarriage or the
residuary devisees had an executory interest to become possessory in
such event, unless such possibility of reverter or executory interest was
destroyed when Shelley's Rule was applied.
In applying Shelley's Rule to a determinable life estate to create a
fee simple absolute, both the Illinois and North Carolina supreme
courts relied on the exhaustive English treatise, Fearne on Contingent
Remainders3 48 and a 1666 English case, Merrel v. Rumsey.349 Merrel in-
volved a conveyance to a husband, Edmund, and wife Dorothy "for
their joint lives, the remainder to the heirs of the body of Dorothy by
Edmund." There was a further future interest to Edmund's heirs gen-
eral following a life estate in Dorothy should Edmund die before Dor-
othy, as did occur. The court applied Shelley's Rule to the first
remainder, giving Dorothy a fee tail special. Her life estate was
were residuary legatees. See Fisher v. Easton, 132 N.E. 442, 443-44 (fll. 1921). There
is apparently no caselaw to support a holding that Ellen should be excluded from
intestate succession. See Gray v. Shinn, 127 N.E. 755, 758 (Ill. 1920) (life tenant inher-
ited all of undisposed remainder).
346 Lydick v. Tate, 44 N.E.2d 583, 591 (Ill. 1942).
347 As noted in supra note 345, in Lydick the life tenant Ellen was one of three
intestate heirs of the testator. If Shelley's Rule were viewed as creating a fee simple
determinable on her remarriage, she would have taken a one third interest in the
property in fee simple absolute because of the merger of her two interests. Her
brother and sister would have shared a two thirds interest in the fee, which would
never have vested in Ellen due to her not being a widow when the will took effect.
The life tenant Caren in Ham was one of "several" children of the testator, so the
fractional interest in fee simple absolute she would have taken due to merger would
have been smaller than the one third the life tenant would have taken in Lydick had
application of Shelley's Rule created a fee simple determinable rather than a fee sim-
ple absolute.
In each case there is a possibility that there were residuary devisees named in the
will, not including the life tenants, who then would have had no interest to merge
with a fee simple determinable. The residuary devisees would have had executory
interests.
348 Lydick relied on the fourth edition of Fearne. I examined FEARNE, supra note
289. Ham does not specify the edition of Fearne it cites.
349 83 Eng. Rep. 68 (K.B. 1666). Lydick did not itself cite this case nor Fearne, but
rather cited Bails v. Davis, 89 N.E. 706 (Ill. 1909), which did cite these English
sources. Bails did not involve a determinable life estate, so its discussion on Shelley's
application in such a case was dictum.
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merged into the fee upon Edmund's death, and, apparently, the sec-
ond remainder to his heirs never became possessory because it was an
alternative contingent remainder that could take effect only if the first
remainder failed.
350
Merrel does establish that Shelley can operate to create a fee estate
when the named ancestor's life estate ends prematurely because of
the death of a controlling autre vie.351 This is all the Fearne treatise
cites it for.3 52 Because of merger principles, Dorothy had in effect a
life estate pur autre vie (Edmund), should she survive him. The only
interest possibly eliminated in the process was a remainder that was a
second, alternative contingent remainder, which would become void
when the first alternative contingent remainder became possessory.
Merrel simply did not involve applying Shelley's Rule to eliminate a
condition of determination that could still occur after the remainder
became possessory, such as the remarriage condition for determina-
tion in Lydick and Ham. The future interest eliminated in Merrel could
not have been preserved by styling the fee estate created as determina-
ble upon occurrence of a condition that might occur after application
of Shelley's Rule, which was necessarily deferred in Merrel until it was
known whether the wife or husband would be the first to die. The
death of Edmund, the event his heirs would invoke to claim an estate,
then occurred triggering application of Shelley's Rule to vest a fee
estate in Dorothy.
Menel is distinguishable from Lydick and Ham in that applying
Shelley's Rule in those cases to create a fee simple absolute rather
than a fee simple defeasible destroyed future interests subject to a
condition that could still occur after application of Shelley's Rule-
remarriage of the party named as devisee of a determinable life estate.
In both the American cases either there was as a matter of law a rever-
350 Perhaps the remainder to the husband's heirs was void ab initio as repugnant
to the first-granted remainder to the wife's heirs. Because the joint life estate would
end on the husband's death, the court may have thought the effect of the limitation,
on the facts as they actually transpired was this: 0 to Mrs. A for life, and, if she survives
her husband, to Z but if she survives her husband to .
A fee tail special (the estate the wife had after Shelley's Rule operated) is an
estate that could support a contingent remainder. Smms & SMITH, supra note 1, § 107.
Hence the remainder in the husband's heirs was not destroyed for lack of a particular
estate.
351 Because the words "bodily heirs" were of limitation and not of purchase under
Shelley's Rule, it was irrelevant that Dorothy had no bodily heirs when Edmund died;
Shelley's Rule could be applied.
352 FEARNE, supra note 289, at 30-34.
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sionary interest in the devisor's heirs3 53 (including the life tenant) or
an executory interest in the wills' residuary devisees. 354 The holder of
either such future interest should have been entitled to take the fee
upon the life tenant's remarriage. In both Lydick and Ham a holding
that Shelley's Rule created not a fee simple absolute but a fee simple
defeasible upon the widow's remarriage would have properly recog-
nized the existence of the reversionary or executory interests intended
to take possession upon such remarriage.
The Ham court also cited the 1805 English case, Curtis v. Price,
355
which does sustain recognition in both Ham and Lydick of a fee simple
absolute rather than fee simple determinable (upon remarriage of the
intended life tenant). Curtis concerned a trust for the benefit of a
husband for life, then for his wife Eleanor "during the term of her
natural life, if she continued sole and unmarried; and if she should
happen to marry" her life estate would end, she would obtain a small
annuity, and the trustees would apply the remainder of the income to
named children of the spouses. If Eleanor's life estate were to end
not by her remarriage, the estate was to pass to the "heirs of the body
of Eleanor by her said husband .. ,,356 Having purported to disentail
by fine a fee tail special owned by her (and somehow removing her
interest from the trust), Eleanor, joined by her children, purported to
convey a fee simple absolute. It was held that by application of Shel-
ley's Rule she did have a nondefeasible fee tail special rather than a
fee estate defeasible upon remarriage. 57 After noting that Shelley's
Rule applied when there was an estate of freehold in a grantee with a
remainder in her heirs, the court said, "The [life] estate during wid-
owhood is an estate of freehold; and the possibility, that it may termi-
nate in the life of the widow, and before there can be an heir, is no
objection" to applying Shelley.
358
It is true that Merrel had established that the fact that the life es-
tate was determinable was no bar ("objection") to application of Shel-
ley's Rule, but nothing the Curtis court says explains why an
unconditional fee tail rather than a fee tail determinable resulted.
353 In both Lydick and Ham the life tenant was not the sole heir, so the future
interest retained by the devisor's estates would not merge into the defeasible fee Shel-
ley's Rule should have created in the party devised a life estate determinable. See
supra note 347.
354 See supra note 337.
355 33 Eng. Rep. 35 (Ch. 1805).
356 Id.
357 At common law a fee tail could be made defeasible by a special limitation or a
condition subsequent. Srimas & SMITH, supra note 1, § 63.
358 Curtis, 33 Eng. Rep. at 38 (opinion by the Master of the Rolls).
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That possibility was not discussed. Why should it matter when Shel-
ley's Rule merges two interests that the language of determination is
attached to the clause of the instrument purporting to create a life
estate3 59 rather than the clause purporting to create an inheritable fee
interest in remainder? Finding a distinction based on such technical-
ity just adds to the intention-defeating nature of Shelley's Rule 360 with
no reasonable basis. The North Carolina court in Ham should have
rejected Curtis as wrongly decided.3 6
1
The extensive 1911 Note on the Rule in Shelley's Case,362 citing
Fearne, says: "The better conclusion seems to be that the possibility of
the freehold's determining in the life of the ancestor who takes it does
not keep the subsequent limitation to his heirs from attaching to him-
self." As noted above, this is true. But it goes on to say the result of
this is an "unconditional" (that is, nondefeasible) fee simple or fee tail
in the party granted or devised a determinable life estate. This con-
clusion is worthy of examination because the writer relies neither on
Curtis nor its American progeny, Ham.
3 63
The Note gives as its sole example a conveyance to A for the life
of C, remainder to A's heirs. It is true that Cs death before A's deter-
mines the life estate in the sense that it could have continued in A
359 Application of Shelley's Rule where the first-granted estate was a fee tail-with
remainder to the heirs of the first tenant in tail-rather than a life estate is now moot
in this country except in Delaware-the only one of the three states that has not
abrogated Shelley's Rule by statue which also has not abolished the fee tail. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 302 (1989); Springbitt v. Monaghan, 50 A.2d 612, 613 (Del. 1946)
(applying Shelley's Rule to give the life tenant a fee tail where the remainder was to
"heirs of the body"). But it was very much a part of the common law when Curtis was
decided in 1805. See FEARNE, supra note 289, at 28. Consider a will with this limita-
tion: to A and the heirs of her body, so long as no alcoholic beverage is sold on the
premises, remainder to the heirs of A. Shelley's Rule would merge the remainder
with the fee tail to give A a fee simple. Note that here the determination clause is
attached to an estate of inheritance, unlike the situation where A is devised a determi-
nable life estate. Would the Curtis court have held A got a fee simple absolute rather
than determinable by application of ShelLey? If so, the technicality arising from the
facts of Curtis-that the determination language was not affixed to the remainder to
heirs general-cannot explain the result there.
360 That is, although the conveyor does not intend a fee to vest in the life tenant,
at least a fee simple defeasible in the same manner as the life estate was to be is less
destructive of the conveyor's intent than a fee simple absolute.
361 Decided in 1805, Curtis was not part of the common law of England adopted as
the state's common law (unless contrary to the "conditions" of North Carolina) in the
state's 1778 "reception statute." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986), enacted by 1778 N.C.
Stats. ch. 133.
362 Note, supra note 2, at 1005.
363 The only case cited is Merrel v. Rumsey, 83 Eng. Rep. 68 (YKB. 1666). Note, supra
note 2, at 1006 n.88.
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until A's death. However, this example is distinguishable from Curtis,
Ham, and Lydick, in that applying Shelley's Rule to give to A a fee
simple absolute does not destroy an interest in a third party, since the
conveyor did not name a special occupant 364 to take if A predeceased
C. Thus, recognition of a fee simple absolute through application of
Shelley's Rule in pur autre vie cases is not inconsistent with holding
Curtis, Ham, and Lydick to have been wrongly decided and declining to
follow them on the question whether, upon applying Shelley's Rule to




In the dozen or so American jurisdictions where Shelley's Rule
must still be grappled with courts should reconsider numerous prece-
dents that have extended an intent-defeating rule beyond its common
law scope. While many old cases have been cited in this Article to
illustrate several forms of such judicial overkill, the phenomenon is by
no means a relic of the past. Indeed, it is central to the result in the
most recent reported decision in which Shelley's Rule was applied.
Society National Bank v. Jacobson,3 66 from Ohio, involved a 1931367
inter vivos trust creating an income interest in favor of a named bene-
ficiary, remainder to the "heirs of his body, or the descendants of such
heirs." At the beneficiary's death without bodily issue of his blood, his
sole heir was an adopted daughter, who did not qualify as an "heir of
the body" under Ohio caselaw in effect in 1931. The corpus of the
trust was solely personalty, and one issue was whether Shelley's Rule
applied to personalty. The trial court and intermediate appellate
364 See 1 TIFFANY, supra note 3, § 60.
365 Compare McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.E. 139 (Ill. 1909), which involved a trust for
Eliza Jane for life, remainder to her heirs, or as Eliza Jane should appoint by will or
"by an instrument in the nature of a... will." As both interests were equitable, Shel-
ley's Rule applied so that Eliza Jane had a fee interest and her heirs nothing. Eliza
Jane named a taker of the property after her death in a document that qualified
neither as a deed due to lack of delivery nor a will, due to lack of testamentary formal-
ities. It was held, however, that the upgrading via Shelley's Rule of Eliza Jane's inter-
est from a life estate to a fee did not eliminate the power of appointment, and the
document she executed was one "in the nature of a will" and hence effective. Id. at
141-47. If a power of appointment survives application of Shelley's Rule, should not a
condition determining the Shelly-created fee estate in favor of the holder of a possibil-
ity of reverter or executory interest?
366 560 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1990).
367 Shelley's Rule was made inapplicable in Ohio to inter vivos conveyances by a
1941 statute that the Ohio Supreme Court had held did not apply to pre-enactment
conveyances. Ohio Citizens Bank v. Mills, 543 N.E.2d 1206 (Ohio 1989).
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court held Shelley's Rule inapplicable to personalty. The Ohio
Supreme Court conceded that two secondary authorities in the state
had so declared and that this was the majority rule in the United
States by a large margin.
An 1843 case in Ohio, King v. Beck,368 had applied Shelley's Rule
to a mixed devise of realty and personalty on the theory that Shelley's
Rule had to apply to the realty and that the testator intended his devi-
see to have the same interest in the personalty as in the land. King, of
course, did not compel the conclusion that in Ohio Shelley's Rule
applied to a trust consisting solely of personal property. Thus, the
Jacobson court's holding that it did369 was an extension of the Rule
beyond its common law scope-it applied only to realty-as well as an
extension of the "mixed conveyance" rule of King v. Beck.
There was yet another reason why Shelley's Rule should not have
applied in this recent case. The phrase "heirs of the body" must have
meant children, because it is immediately followed by a substitutional
gift to "descendants" of such persons should they not survive the life
tenant. In its technical sense "heirs of the body" includes such de-
scendants, but the draftsperson intended a meaning for "heirs of the
body" that did not include them but required spelling out a substitu-
tional gift to such descendants. Thus Jacobson was the legal equivalent
of a conveyance to A for life then to his heirs but if he leave none to
his grandchildren, to which Shelley's Rule does not apply because
"heirs" is not used in the technical sense.37 0
Jacobson may be a unique case in which the court, knowing that
because of statutory abolition forty-nine years before it spoke further
Shelley's Rule cases were very unlikely to come before it, twisted the
Rule to obtain a "just" result that would not discriminate against the
life tenant's daughter because she was adopted. None of the scores of
other Shelley's Rule cases I read suggested the Rule was being ex-
panded to do "justice," probably because it is always intent-defeating.
As I have suggested in this Article, I am left with the impression
that playing fast and loose with Shelley's Rule by courts is a form of
judicial "sport." The Rule is fun to manipulate. But this is a blood
368 12 Ohio 390 (1843).
369 The Court went on to hold that although Shelley's Rule normally converted a
life estate with remainder to the "heirs of the body" of the life tenant into a fee tail, at
common law there could be no fee tail in personalty, and an attempt to create such a
fee tail resulted in absolute ownership by the life tenant, who apparently had died
intestate. Whether the adopted daughter prevailed because the purported life tenant
died intestate leaving her as his heir or left a will in her favor does not appear in the
Jacobson opinion.
370 See supra text accompanying notes 304-316.
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sport, and the victims are innocent children and grandchildren of a
named life tenant who uses Shelley to defeat the remainder to his or
her "heirs" by an inter vivos or testamentary transfer to others. Like a
"fight" in which the matador painfully kills the bull, such "sport" is
unacceptable under contemporary views about appropriate conduct,
either in the ring or on the bench.
